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This study focuses on the state - bar association 
interface in Turkey. Bar associations are among the 
oldest professional associations in Turkey, dating back 
to the late Ottoman era. While conducting an historical 
analysis concerning the institutionalization of 
attorneyship as a profession, bar associations are 
analyzed as interest groups.
Throughout the study, the judicio-legal sphere has 
been taken as the main arena of interface between bar 
associations and the state. The nature of the Turkish 
State, its extent of dominance within the judicio-legal 
sphere, and the institutionalization level of the bar 
associations have been perceived as the main determinants 
of the nature of the relationship in question. The study 
looks at the developments from the Tanzimat (Reform) 
Period of the late Ottoman period (1839-1876) to the 
present.
It is concluded that the Turkish State has always had 
a superordinate position vis-a-vis the bar associations. 
The dominance of the state in the judicio-legal sphere 
has shaped the identity and goals of the bar
associations, too. In their education and practice, 
attorneys came to be socialized into the norms of the 
state. This made bar associations impatient with their 
subordinate position vis-a-vis the state. Their
dissatisfaction grew as bar associations were further
ABSTRACT
111
institutionalized; the conflict between the latter 
associations and the state became more tense.
IV
ÖZET
Bu araştırmanın konusu Türkiye'de Devlet-Baro 
ilişkisidir. Türkiye'de, barolar, geçmişleri geç Osmanlı 
dönemine kadar uzanan en eski meslek kuruluşları içinde 
yer alırlar. Çalışma çerçevesinde, avukatlığın bir meslek 
olarak kurumlaşmasını konu alan tarihsel analizin 
yanısıra, barolar çıkar grubu olarak İncelenmektedir.
Çalışmada, yargı-hukuk alanı barolar ile devlet 
arasındaki ilişkinin odaklaştığı temel alan olarak ele 
alınmaktadır. Türk Devletinin yapısı, yargı-hukuk 
alanındaki etkinliğinin boyutu ve baroların kurumsallaşma 
düzeyleri, üzerinde durulan ilişkinin niteliğini ortaya 
koyan temel belirleyiciler olarak değerlendirilmektedir. 
Bu çerçevede, Tanzimat Döneminden (1839-1876) günümüze 
kadar uzanan süreç içerisindeki gelişmeler ele 
alınmaktadır.
Sonuç olarak, Türk Devletinin barolar karşısında her 
zaman üstün bir pozisyona sahip olduğu görülmektedir. 
Ayrıca, devletin yargı-hukuk alanındaki hakimiyeti, 
baroların kimliğini ve hedeflerini belirlemektedir. 
Avukatlar gerek aldıkları eğitim, gerekse pratik alanda 
devletin normları uyarınca sosyalleşmişlerdir. Bunun 
sonucu olarak, devlet karşısındaki aşağı konumları bir 
rahatsızlık kaynağı olarak kendini göstermiştir. Söz 
konusu hoşnutsuzluk baroların kurumsallaşmasına paralel 
olarak artmış ve devletle olan ilişkilerinin 
gerginleşmesinde önemli rol oynamıştır.
V
A NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPY
In general Modern Turkish orthography has been used for
words that are now an accepted part of the Turkish
vocabulary, irrespective of their origin in Arabic,
Persian or Ottoman Turkish. Thus for example Shari'a
(Arabic) has been written Şeriat, and Şeyhülislam has 
been used instead of Şhaykh ül-Islam.
VI
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....................................i i
ABSTRACT............................................. İ Ü
ÖZET................................................. V
NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY..................................Vİ
CONTENTS............................................. vii
Chapter One
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ....................... 1
The Aim and Scope of the Study........................1
A Terminological Clarification ........................ 9
Approaches to Interest Group Politics ................. 12
Pluralist Model................................... 13
Neo-Corporatist Model............................. 18
The Statist View: An Alternative to State-
Interest Group Politics ...............................26
A Statist Critique.................................26
"Type of State" as a Determinative
Variable...........................................28
"Type of State", Juridical Sphere, and
Legal Professionals............................... 37
Chapter Two
EVOLUTION OF ATTORNEYSHIP AND BAR ASSOCIATIONS IN
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE .........................................  40
The Early Roots of the Profession ..................... 40
From Tradition to Modernity ...........................  49
The Establishment of First Bar Association:
Institutionalization of Professional Interests .......  58
Search For a New Identity............................. 64
Chapter Three
THE KEMALİST HERITAGE 72
V I 1
The Kemalist Revolution as a Socio-Cultural
and Political Force of Change ........................ 72
The Reform of Law and Judiciary ....................... 79
Legal Professionals and the Kemalist Regime: A
Tentative Relationship ................................85
Legal Professionals: A Conservative
Reaction.......................................... 85
Molding Out the New Profile of the
Profession........................................ 90
The Reflections of The Distrust: The
Case of the Tribunals of Independence....... 90
Steps Towards Creating "Republican
Type" Jurists................................ 93
Kemalist Model of Bar Associations: State
Imperative in Effect ..................................100
Initial Steps Within the Process of
Reorganization.................................... 100
The Process of Nationalization of Bar
Associations................................. 102
The New Restructuration of The Bar 
Associations: An Institutional
Perspective...................................107
Consolidation of the New Model.................... 109
The Quasi-Public Status of the 
Profession: Public Service-Private
Gain..........................................112
Control Mechanism of the State............... 117
Chapter Four
STATE vs. BAR ASSOCIATIONS IN THE POST- 
KEMALIST ERA: FROM A UNILATERAL TO A
MULTILATERAL RELATIONSHIP ............................. 125
The Democratic Party Rule and the Bar
Associations ..........................................  125
The Policies Towards the Judiciary and
Its Personnel......................................125
The Rising Role of the Attorneys as
Social and Political Actors....................... 132
Vlll
The Bar Associations in a State of Internal 
Politization: The Rising Political
Conciousness as a Melting Pot ......................... 136
1960 Military Intervention, New Constitution
and Legal Professionals ................................140
Bar Associations , State and the New Law on
Attorneyship: Continuity or Change? ................... 147
The Establishment of the Turkish Union of
Bar Associations: A New Face for the Old
Problems........................................... 147
The Social Security Rights of the
Attorneys: A Paradoxical Issue.................... 156
A Broadened Field of Interface: Bar
Associations vs. the State in 1970s ................. 162
Bar Associations in Perspective: A
General Assesment..................................162
The Deterioration of the Judicial
Mechanism: Bar Associations in Defence............ 167
The Reappearence of the Signs of 
Distrust Towards the Legal
Professionals: A Return to 1920s............. 167
The Attacks on the Right of Defence
and Professional Freedom..................... 179
Bar Associations as "Outsider Groups" ................. 184
Chapter Five
STATE vs. BAR ASSOCIATIONS IN THE POST-1980 PERIOD:
A POLITICS OF PARADOX ? .......  188
The Bar Associations in the Early 1980s .............. 188
The 1982 Constitution and the Bar Associations ....... 195
General Framework of the Constitution:
The Views of the Bar Associations.................. 195
The 1982 Constitution and the Public
Professional Associations......................... 202
The Bar Associations and the Motherland Party 
Governments, 1983-1989 .................................  206
IX
Some Perceptions on Liberalization and the
Rule of Law................................... 206
The Formation of a State Dominated
Profession.................................... 214
The Bar Associations and the Motherland 
Party Governments in the Late 1980s:
Towards a "Commercialization of Justice"?.. 223
Chapter Six
CONCLUSION............................................. 237
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................... 24 8
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The Aim and Scope of the Study
Between state and society in every contemporary 
nation stands a network of interest group associations. 
Along with political parties, this network of 
associations is one of the principal features of the 
socio-political and cultural spheres whereby the 
interests of different groups in society are defined, 
represented, and transmitted to the political process.^ 
In this respect, the associations in question can be 
regarded as agents of influence, channels of 
representation, and the means of political 
participation.2
Along with others, professional associations have 
been considered as one type of interest group which are 
defined to be formal organizations set up by people 
belonging to the same profession, in order to promote 
their common interests.^ in sociological terminology, a 
profession is a cluster of occupational roles in which
chapter One
 ^ Suzanne Berger, "Introduction," in Organizing Interests in Western 
Europe; Pluralism, Corporatism and the Transformation of Politics, 
Suzanne Berger, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
p.lO.
2 Terry M. Мое, The Organization of Interests (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1971), p.1-2.
Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (New York: Free
Press, 1964), p.372.
incumbents perform certain functions, and typically earn 
a living at a full time job.^ The member of a profession 
is trained usually by a formally organized educational 
process so that only those with the proper training are 
considered to be qualified to practice the profession. In 
this regard, the skills of the professional derive from a 
body of knowledge that is rationally defensible, grounded 
either in scientific research or in theories that are 
logically coherent and empirically confirmed.^ Thus the 
professional man is a technical expert by virtue of the 
mastery of a body of knowledge in a given field and skill 
in its use. In relation to this expertise, the 
professional has a functional monopoly in his respective 
field which gives him a distinct characteristic and 
power. In fact, professional man is usually regarded as 
having "knowledge mandates" and viewed as proceeding with 
expertise functionally useful to society.^ Among other 
things, professional associations, turn out to be the 
representatives of this monopolistic power.
The present study focuses upon Bar Associations in 
Turkey -professional associations set up by attorneys-
Ibid.
 ^ Hence modern professionals are said to engage in "assimilating 
professional knowledge and training to the characteristics of the 
scientific model...so as to defend that body of knowledge against 
competing paradigms and to justify the high status of those who have 
mastered it." See Richard Abel, "The Rise of Professionalism," 
British Journal of Law and Society, 6 (1979), p.87.
 ^ See Terence C. Halliday, Beyond Monopoly: Lawyers, State Crises and 
Professional Enpowerment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987), pp.28-43.
which are among the oldest professional associations in 
the country, dating back to the late Ottoman period. 
While conducting an historical analysis concerning the 
development of attorneyship as a branch of the legal 
profession and attorneys' socio-political role in the 
Turkish modernization process, the bar Associations are 
examined with a view to the critical issue of the 
relationship between the state and civil societal groups. 
A study of the profession and the bar associations in 
this sense is important for the following reasons.
First, although there are studies concerning the 
political ideologies, identifications, affiliations, 
government employment, and other aspects of political 
behavior of incumbents of legal professionals and 
attorneys,"^ in general the study of bar associations as 
interest groups has been relatively neglected. As far as 
the Turkish case is concerned, the bar associations has 
been a totally neglected topic as most of the studies in 
interest group politics have concentrated on economic 
interest groups such as business or labor.
Secondly, though at first sight the case of the Bar 
associations may seem to lack the grand aura of business 
and labor, the rather distinct place of legal 
professionals in general and attorneys in particular both 
in the Turkish society as well as in other societies due 
to the functions they perform can be regarded as the most
In Turkish political science literature there is only one study 
concerning the attorneys' role in politics. See Mine Tan, Siyasette 
Hukukçu (Ankara: Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Anvme İdaresi Enstitüsü, 1971).
significant point that gives the topic its uniqueness. In 
fact, the legal professionals, specifically the attorneys 
have some socio-political functions. These comprise the 
resolution of disputes among individuals, and between the 
individual and the state. Besides making the profession 
to be effective virtually at all levels of the society, 
the monopoly of the right to enforce the sanctions of the 
state as well as limiting them directly defines the 
position of the attorney vis-a-vis the state, 
specifically for the cases involving the individual and 
the state. While performing his profession, namely the 
defence of the individual, the attorney in a sense acts 
as a catalyzer in the reconfirmation of the status of the 
individual before the law and thus before the state. In 
this respect, the attorney inevitably steps in the 
political sphere.
A final point which gives the topic its uniqueness is 
the impact of the above mentioned structure of the 
profession at the associational level. It is this 
peculiar structure of the profession that largely 
differentiates the bar associations from other 
professional associations with respect to their relation 
with the state. Apart from defending the professional 
rights of their members vis-a-vis the state, specifically 
in conflicts relevant to public policy regulating 
professional practice which constitutes in fact a common 
theme for most of other associations, the bar 
associations also engage in a macro perspective on the 
socio-legal issues. This is true on the grounds of their
professional socialization both during the law education 
and during performing their profession. Thus the bar 
associations' influence radiates from the zones of 
primary concern -professional issues- to broader 
political and social issues. Among other things, in the 
Turkish case, the most frequently referred point in this 
respect is the notion of "justice." Interestingly enough, 
the bar associations have no clear cut definition, rather 
it is the notion of justice and other relevant notions- 
human rights, rule of law, the structure of the secular 
state and the like that give them an impetus to exist 
actively in the political arena. Constituting the areas 
where the state has a monopoly of power, however, the 
concentration of bar associations on these issues usually 
situates them in a position of interfering in the 
authority of the state and at times questioning its 
legitimacy. In this respect, a study of bar associations 
and the profession of attorneyship inevitably leads one 
to study the broader issues of societal change and socio- 
legal history, which for the Turkish case denotes the 
phenomenon of Westernization.
Within the framework of the present study, the 
historical periods of late Ottoman-Turkish Westernization 
is taken up as the basic point of reference in the 
analysis of the development and institutionalization of 
the profession of attorneyship as well as its interface 
with the state at the associational level.
Secularization which had firstly started to develop 
in the legal sphere in the nineteenth century, can well
be taken as the most significant component of the 
Ottoman-Turkish Westernization process. With the 
development of "secular" courts, previously unknown to 
the world of Islam, and with the initial efforts of 
adopting the European legal system during the period, 
there inevitably appeared a necessity of redefining 
justice. In a sense, this was the start of a new era 
during which the Western concept of justice based on a 
belief in objective truth, was injected into the Ottoman 
socio-political system. Since attorneyship as a modern 
profession had constituted a major element of this new 
adopted legal culture, the bar associations had by 
definition been the natural by-product of this novel 
political configuration.(Chapter 2)
One may say that the early Republican era had been a 
period during which the whole political and social 
configuration of the country were restructured. Among the 
efforts of this restructuration, the adoption of the 
Western (Continental European) legal system, in fact, has 
perhaps been the most salient feature of Republican 
Westernization which surely had played an indispensable 
role and provided a secure base for the continuation of 
process. Indeed, the mission of protecting as well as 
promoting this new secular European legal culture with 
all its implied meanings of "rule of law" was assigned to 
the Republican legal professionals (the judge, the 
prosecutor and the attorney) and to the bar associations 
which were to a large extent been reorganized and molded 
out of the secular ideology of the new regime. In fact.
such a perspective of the state as viewing the bars as 
the consolidators of the new regime under its tight 
control, rather than interest groups working to promote 
their own interests has been an indicator of the unique 
character of Ottoman-Turkish political culture, namely 
the strong state conception.(Chapter 3).
Indeed, the state-bar association relationship during 
the 1950-1980 and the post-1980 periods had largely 
carried in itself the signs of this uniqueness. In the 
political arena there appeared to be bar associations 
that devoted their efforts to free themselves from to the 
control of the state while the state elites were eager to 
extend their authority.
The relationship of the bar associations with the 
state during the multi-party years also had another 
aspect which is related to the identity of the bar 
associations acquired in the early Republican era. As 
mentioned above with the foundation of the Republic, the 
mixed legal system that had been inherited from the 
Ottoman Empire had been restructured, on the model of the 
Continental European system whose basic characteristics 
were value naturality, division of functions between law, 
politics, and economics, and independence and 
objectivity. A regime which has law so conceived is 
thought to be legitimate while one that does not is 
viewed by many, for variety of reasons, to be vulnerable 
to the charge that it is illegitimate.® To a very
 ^ See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 
trans. by Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1964), p.77.
considerable extent, in this context illegitimate means a 
politicized legal system. In this regard, identifying 
themselves with the system, that constituted a model for 
the early Republican elites, the bar associations had 
been in strict conflict with the state and political 
elites in the periods involving the signs of politization 
in the legal system. And from time to time this 
constituted an important aspect of the struggle of these 
associations during the 1950-1980 as well as post-1980 
periods.
And as a final point, throughout this relationship, 
perhaps one of the most important point had been the 
intra-associational transformations that these 
associations had witnessed, accelerating in 1950s and 
reaching its climax in the 1980s. It has to be kept in 
mind that, besides the developments in Turkish political 
life and the characteristics of the Turkish State, it had 
been these transformations, that was characterized with 
the rising professional and socio-political 
consciousness.(Chapters 4 and 5)
Thus, on the whole, being a period of rising 
professional and socio-political conciousness on the part 
of the bar associations, the history of the state-bar 
associations relationship in Ottoman-Turkish case evinced 
a basic struggle. The bars intended to abandon their 
subservient position and took the shape of more powerful 
interest organizations aiming to control, check and 
supervise the state policies in line with their
professional interests as well as values and notions 
deriving from the secular European legal culture.
A Terminological Clarification
In many studies on legal professionals conducted in 
English language, there appears to be some conceptual 
problems which usually become sources of semantic 
confusion. This has largely been the case due to the 
dissimilarities in the usage of legal terminology by 
authors studying this specific field. It is therefore a 
necessity within the framework of the present study to 
make some remarks on the deliberate choice of terminology 
for avoiding confusion.
For the Turkish term avukat there are various words 
used in Modern English legal terminology. These are 
mainly lawyer, attorney, attorney at law, barrister, 
solicitor and counsellor.  ^ Although usually being 
regarded as synonyms of each other, the meaning of these 
concepts show some differences whose delineation is quite 
significant for the purpose of this study.
In fact, the two most commonly used terms lawyer and 
attorney are not generally distinguished even by the 
members of the profession themselves. From the American 
point of view, "...attorney, attorney at law, and lawyer
 ^ Mustafa Ovacık, İngilizce-Türkçe Hukuk Sözlüğü (Ankara: Ayyıldız
Matbaası, 1964); Türk Hukuk Lügati (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu
Basımevi, 1965).
are synonymous t e r m s . f o r  all practical purposes. 
Technically, however, lawyer is a more general term 
referring to all those practicing law. It is a generic 
term and used for all persons who on the basis of a 
certain legal education, have obtained admission to the 
legal profession. A lawyer is an attorney only when he 
has a client.
Accordingly, in many of the studies, the authors use 
the term lawyer to refer to all those in the legal 
professional. For example, according to David Gold the 
term stands for "...all who had completed law school or 
for whom there existed other fairly evidences such as 
membership to the associations of legal professionals or 
service as a city a t t o r n e y I n  the same sense, 
Dietrich Rueschmeyer, while using the term in the 
broadest sense in his study where he has compared the 
socio-political status of the legal professionals, 
subcategorized lawyers into four branches —  lawyers in 
the judiciary, lawyers in private practice, lawyers in 
government, lawyers in private employment —  in order to 
avoid confusion.
G. Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics (1949) quoted in Bryan A. 
Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), p.74.
T. M. Bernstein, Careful Writer (1960) quoted in Garner, A 
Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, p.74.
David Gold, "Lawyers in Politics: An Emprical Exploration of
Biographical Data on State Legislators," Pacific Sociological Review, 
4 (1961), p. 85.
Dietrich Rueschmeyer, Lawyers and Their Society (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1973), p.30.
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In some studies, however the term lawyer is used in a 
narrow sense, equating it with attorney. The classical 
and most popular example of this usage can be found in De 
Toquevilles's Democracy in America where he used the term 
lawyer while explaining the reasons for the multiplicity 
of attorneys in American political life.^ '^
In some cases, this narrow usage of the term seems to 
have the potential of causing problems for the reader. 
This is specifically true with regard to the translated 
texts. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, translation of 
Max Weber's Politic Als Beruf constitutes a good example 
in this respect.In the original German text of his work 
where he delineates the relationship between attorneyship 
and success in political career Weber makes a distinction 
between die universitatgeschalten juristen and a 
subcategory die advocaten. It is the latter category the 
members of whom in Weber's opinion are superior in 
political skills. This distinction is maintained in the 
English translation but as a distinction between 
university trained jurists and lawyers instead of 
attorneys that Weber meant.
In the present study, for the purpose of avoiding 
terminological confusions due to its dual usage, the term 
"lawyer" is not employed. "Legal professional" is used
Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Random
House, 1966). First printed in 1835.
Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in Essays in Sociology, H.H. 
Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1962), pp.77-128.
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for referring all practicioners of law including the 
legal scholars. For the Turkish term avukat, which means 
a person with the power of attorney, the term "attorney" 
is employed.
Approaches to Interest Group Politics
One common theme in many currents of thought in 
Western political tradition had been the recognition of 
the idea that a direct relationship between the state and 
the individual was unrealistic and that conceptual models 
and should be developed to capture the reality of more or 
less independent bodies of organized interests and in 
general of groups capable of autonomous collective 
action. In fact, when the increasing number and 
significance of interest groups in linking the society to 
the state in contemporary democratic regimes are taken 
into account, such an assertion appears to be valid 
perhaps more than ever. As a matter of fact, much of the 
recent theoretical writings in the field of Political 
Science concerning the relationship between the state and 
society as well as societal functioning and change has 
concentrated on interest group politics, specifically 
focusing on the discovery and definition of appropriate 
models of interest group-state interaction. Out of these 
writings have emerged a number of competing models the 
most notable ones being pluralism and corporatism.
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Pluralist Model
For years the study of interest groups has been 
carried out within the framework of pluralist paradigm. 
Being one of the societal models which had dominated 
Western political thought since World War II, the 
pluralist perspective presumes a multitude of harmonious 
and interdependent groups in the political process.
Pluralism which substitutes the group for the 
atomized individual of early capitalism as the basic unit 
of analysis, is not a novel approach.The existence of 
various groups and the legitimacy of their action were 
recognized by the eighteenth century "social contract" 
theorists like John Locke and James Madison who are in 
fact taken as the precursors of the doctrine.However, 
as far as Political Science as a modern discipline is 
concerned, the origin of the pluralist perspective is a 
recent phenomenon. It goes back to the early twentieth 
century and confined to the "Group Theory of Politics" 
which was formulated by Arthur Bentley, and later 
elaborated as well as extended by David Truman and Earl 
Latham,
The ultimate purpose of group théoriciens as stressed 
by Bentley in his well known The Process of Government,
See Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: Norton,
1969), Chapter 2.
For J. Madison, "(the) regulation of the various and interfering 
intersts forms the principal task of modern legislation and involves 
the sprit of party, and faction in the necessary and ordinary 
operations of government." Quoted in Alexander Hamilton, James 
Madison, John Jay, The Federalist Papers Clinton Rossiter, ed. (New 
York: Mentor Books, 1961), p.l20.
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was to fashion a conceptual and theoretical tool for 
understanding the actual functioning of the political 
system.Turning away from a merely formal, legalistic, 
and constitutional approach of a static, descriptive, 
political morphology which the traditional studies 
adopted, the so-called group theory aimed at exploring 
the political dynamics and the process of decision 
making.
According to Bentley, politics which was conceived as 
the allocation of social values and resources, could only 
be understood by examining interest groups, due to their 
crucial role as real political forces and their potential 
to effect the decision-making process.Reducing politics 
to mere group activity, these political scientists looked 
at politics only in terms of various interests that were 
involved; the individuals who shared those interests; and 
the methods adopted for pursuing common interests.
This dynamic approach, evolved originally from the 
American experience and remained mainly in American 
academic milieu for the first half of the century, has 
founded sympathetic echoes in the post-war European 
political science, too. Everywhere professional academic 
interest was increasingly directed towards the role 
played by interest groups in policy formation. Besides
Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1908).
Ibid., pp. 208-209.
20 Ibid.
See Interest Groups on Four Continents Henry W. Ehrmann, ed. 
(Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1958).
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its analytical value in understanding politics and 
comparing political systems, the reassuring declaration 
by the proponents of pluralism that all was well within 
the democratic world was one of the important reasons for 
the lingering popularity of the pluralist perspective in 
the post-war democratic regimes.
In the framework of the pluralist model, the number 
of interest groups is in principle unlimited. This 
pluralism of groups and the boundaries between them 
correspond to what may be regarded as the natural 
divisions in society that is those generated by different 
roles in the economy and statues in the society. These 
groups, which are thought to be the prime means by which 
the mediation between the state and the individual is 
performed, are assumed to compete with each other on 
equal terms for membership, resources, access, and 
influence on governmental policy making. Although some 
authors acknowledge the advantageous position of some 
groups in controlling the key r e s o u r c e s , t h e  
preponderant view within pluralist perspective has been 
that all the groups, defined to be legitimate and active.
Noel o' Sullivan, "The Political Theory of Neo-Corporatism," in The 
Corporate State, Andrew Cox and Noel O'Sullivan, eds. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.4.
See E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereiqn People: A Realist's View 
of Democracy in America (Illinois: Dryden, I960); Charles E. 
Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
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have the possibility of making their interests known at 
some point in the policy making process.2“^
Accordingly, Truman mentions "the multiplicity of 
coordinate or nearly coordinate points of access to 
governmental decisions" and concludes that "the 
significance of these many points of access and of the 
complicated texture of relationships among them is great. 
This diversity assures various ways for interest groups 
to participate in the formation of policy.
Derived from Truman's and that of other group- 
oriented scholar's work is the notion of a pluralist 
state through which competition among interests will come 
to an equilibrium point defined as what best suits the 
public interest. That is, competition will produce 
policies roughly responsive to public interest and thus 
no single set of interests will be dominant in the 
political system. Therefore, as emphasized by a student 
of group politics,
(P)luralist theory assumes that within the 
public arena, there will be countervailing 
centers of power within the government 
institutions and among outsiders. Competition 
is implicit in the notion that groups as 
surrogates of individuals will produce 
products representing the diversity of
Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1956), p.l5.
25 David Truman, The Governmental Process (New Yorlc: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1951), p.45.
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opinions that might have been possible in the 
individual decision days of Athens.
Viewing politics as the interplay of competing groups 
that try to influence the decision making process, the 
pluralist theory to a large extent places the state on 
the political sidelines. The state's position within the 
political process is reduced to a "neutral arbitrator" or 
conciliator in the political competition. In fact, within 
the pluralist perspective, the state is reduced to a 
black box without any capacity and inclination of acting 
autonomously. The state only does what it does to be 
consistent with the societal parallelogram of demands and 
resources which prevails in civil society. The idea of a 
passive state and its subordinate position with respect 
to groups is best represented by Latham:
The legislative referees the group struggle, 
ratifies the victories of the successful 
coalition and the terms of the surrender, 
compromises, and conquests in the form of 
statues....Administrative agencies of the 
regulatory kind are established to carry out the 
terms of the treaties that the legislators have 
negotiated and ratified...The function of the 
judge is not unlike that of a bureaucrat.2®
Carole Greenwald, Group Power (New York: Praeger, 1977), p.305. 
David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: 
Wiley, 1965).
®^ Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1952), pp.35,38-9.
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Within this framework, the only legitimate criterion 
for the evaluation of the socio-political systems' 
performance turns out to be whether or not policy-making 
adequately reflect the interplay of interest groups. In 
this respect, the entire question of pluralist 
perspective is a matter of political representation and 
responsiveness.
Neo-Corporatist Model
The pluralist model of interest representation had 
many critics. However, it was not until the advent of 
neo-corporatist theory— a rehabilitated form of 
corporatism- in the late 1960s that the pluralist 
orthodoxy finally encountered a challenge. Questioning 
the group approach to politics and especially its 
inadequacy in analyzing political dynamics outside the 
United States, neo-corporatism has been inspired by the 
reflection upon different kind of a relationship between 
the state and interest groups which largely distinguished 
the European world from the United States. In this sense 
neo-corporatism offers a sharply different vision of 
reality from that offered by the pluralists.
As Brigitta Nedelman and Kurt G. Meir have pointed 
out, intentions of neo-corporatist theorization appear to 
be two fold. First the concept of neo-corporatism 
considers the conceptual framework of pluralism as 
empirically inadequate in describing the reality and 
directs criticisms against the pluralist vision of 
reality. Secondly, it offers an alternative model.
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constructed on the same level of analysis as that of 
pluralism, which constitute a macro model of political, 
institutional, and behavioral configurations, focusing on 
interest intermediation.2^
Historically, the roots of corporatism goes back to 
the idea of a hierarchically constituted societal 
structure associated with the preeminence of the Catholic 
Church and the estates and the guild systems of feudal 
times. The theorizing on corporatism was carried out 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; it was 
associated with the works of Emile Durkheim, La Tour Du 
Pin, Othmar Spann and Mihail Manilesco.^° Being nostalgic 
for the older values of a natural social harmony where 
all groups gain more from cooperation rather than 
conflict and concerned about the political and economic 
consequences of the pursuit of individual self-interest 
and mass democracy, the authors within this tradition 
presupposed a society divided into various corporations 
according to the functions they performed in the social 
division of labor. Organizations were created and 
licensed by the state to represent the interests in each
Birgitta Nedelman and Kurt G. Meier, "Theories of Contemporary 
Corporatism Static or Dynamic?" in Trends Towards Corporatist 
Intermediation, Phillippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, eds. 
(London: Sage Publications, 1979), pp.95-119.
For an analysis of Emile Durkheim's theory, see Frank Hearn, 
"Durkheim's Political Sociology: Corporatism, State Autonomy, and
Democracy," Social Research, 52 (1985), pp.151-177; Timothy V. 
Kaufman-Osborn, "Emile Durkheim and the Science of Corporatism," 
Political Theory 4 (1986), pp.638-659.
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category and exercise social control over the society 
enduring order and stability.As far as the actual 
experiences were concerned, the Italian model under 
Mussolini had been closest to this corporatist design.
With regards to the modern usage of the term, there 
appears to be considerable confusion and heterogenity of 
views. The term sometimes refers to a distinct economic 
system in which the state directs and controls a 
predominantly privately-owned business according to the 
principles of unity, order, nationalism, and success. 
Sometimes it refers to a form of state which develops 
alongside parliamentarism in a capitalist society, basing 
itself on functional representation; And sometimes the 
term refers to a system of interest group/state 
interaction.Among these three competing meanings of the 
term, the latter one has the widespread popularity among 
scholars and constitutes the most common usage of the 
term. Like their predecessors in the tradition, the neo- 
corporatists primarily concerned with the relationship 
between the state and interest associations. However,
For details, see Peter J. Williamson, Varieties of Corporatism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.16-74.
Wyn Grant, "Introduction," in The Political Economy of Corporatism 
Wyn Grant, ed. (London: Macmillan, 1985).
J. T. Winlcler, "Corporatism," European Journal of Sociology, 1 
(1976), pp.100-36.
Bob Jessop, "Corporatism, Parliamentarism and Social Democracy," 
in Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, Schmitter and Lehrobruch, 
eds., pp. 185-211.
See Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism," in 
ibid., p.7-48.
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when compared to their predecessors there appeared to be 
a quite different attitude on the part of the neo- 
corporatist with respect to the definition of the term. 
In this respect, the main problem arose from the need to 
distinguish between the two types of corporatism, namely 
the one associated with liberal democratic regimes and 
the one associated with authoritarian regimes. In fact, 
it had been the latter type which has preoccupied the 
predecessors of the t r a d i t i o n . I n  this sense,
corporatism was largely defined on the terms of its
relation with the authoritarian regimes. Basing his 
argument on the need of making a distinction between two 
types and rescuing the term from its authoritarian
connotations, Philippe Schmitter had categorized the two 
types as "state" and "societal" corporatism, the former 
one involving the state imposing corporatist forms while 
the latter referring to those voluntary structurations
within a framework of a process of pluralist d e m o c ra c y . 7^ 
Later this categorization was taken up by Lehmbruch as 
"authoritarian" and "liberal" corporatism. It has largely 
been the liberal form that the neo-corporatists had 
focused their attention. As Lehmbruch stressed this form 
found its roots in liberal constitutional democracies 
where there is freedom of association which enable the
36 See Martin M. Ross, "Pluralism and the New Corporatism,"
Political Studies, 31 (1983), pp.86-88.
7^ Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism," in Trends Towards 
Corporatist Intermediation, Schmitter and Lehmbruch, eds., p. 20.
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interest associations to enter voluntary relationships 
with the state as well as freely terminate it.^^
As far as the relationship of the neo-corporatist 
model to pluralism and the common usage of the term -i.e 
state/interest association relationship- are concerned, 
there also appear to be some heterogenity of views as it 
has been the case for the meaning of the term. In this 
respect, while some scholars take these two models as 
polar opposites, in other words as end points on a 
continuum, some others see neo-corporatism as a kind of 
pluralism stating that it is no more a "species of 
textbook pluralism."40 still others view the two systems 
as being totally different models of interest group 
politics. According to Schmitter who had a great 
influence among the neo-corporatists, the neo-corporatist 
model constitutes "an attractive alternative to the 
pluralist model, suggesting... a different institutional 
configuration in the relation between specialised 
interest associations and the political process..."4i
Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Liberal Corporatism and Party Government," 
Comparative Political Studies, 10 (1977), p.92.
Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Introduction: Neo-corporatism in Comparative
Perspective," in Patterns of Corporatist Policy-making, Philippe C. 
Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmburg, eds. (London: Sage Publications,
1983).
4® Ross, "Pluralism and the New Corporatism," Political Studies, 
pp.86-102; Charles F. Sabel, "The Internal Politics of Trade Unions," 
in Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism and 
the Transformation of Politics, Berger ed., p.213.
4^  Philippe C. Schmitter, "Introduction," Comparative Political 
Studies, 10 (1977), p.4.
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Indeed, Schmitter's definition which is the most commonly 
cited definition of corporatism, is based on such a 
dichotomous view. Schmitter defined the term as follows; 
...a system of interest representation in 
which the constituent units are organized into 
a limited number of singular, compulsory, non­
competitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, 
recognized or licensed by the state and 
granted a deliberate representational monopoly 
within their respective categories in exchange 
for observing certain controls on their 
selection of leaders and articulation of 
demands and supports. 2^
In this framework, when compared to pluralist model 
of interest representation, the neo-corporatist model 
represents a highly different picture of interest group 
politics. Firstly, as the above definition puts forward 
in neo-corporatist model, competition is mainly reserved 
to a small number of very large interest groups, usually 
peak associations, which have a monopolistic 
representational power in their respective social 
category, and in which membership can not be properly 
regarded as voluntary, since being excluded from their 
rank directly results with exclusion from key aspects of 
the policy-making process and thus condemnation to a kind 
of second class status.
2^ Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?," Trends Towards 
Corporatist Intermediation, Schmitter and Lehmbruch eds., p.l3.
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Second, the role of interest groups and the process 
of policy making is highly different in the neo- 
corporatist framework. In neo-corporatist theory, there 
appears to be a fusion of the representative role of 
interest groups with that of implementation. As Cawson 
points out, "...groups engage in bargaining with the 
state agencies over public policy outputs, and in 
exchange of favourable policies the leaders undertake the 
implementation of policy.
Thus, in corporatism groups become quasi-public 
bodies engaged in regular cooperative relations with the 
state and responsible for legitimating and implementing 
effected policy. According to Leonard Parri this 
cooperation and bargaining process that take place 
between interest groups and the state is the most 
important distinction between pluralist and corporatist 
models. In Parri's words, it is important that "the 
number and the nature of the intermediate bodies involved 
do not affect the neo-corporatist characteristics of the 
agreement since the essential feature is the presence of 
the concertation and of the connected stable political 
exchanges between the public and private actors.
Alan Cawson, "Corporatism" in The Blackwell Encyclopedia of 
Political Thought, David Miller, ed. (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1987), 
p .105.
Leonard Parri, Political Stability and Neo-Corporatism, Ilja 
Scholter, ed. (London: Sage Publications, 1987), p.71 quoted in O' 
Sullivan, "The Political Theory of Neo-Corporatism, " in The Corporate 
State Cox and O'Sullivan eds., p.8.
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In this process, interest associations continue to 
represent their members' interests but no longer seek to 
activate or mobilize their membership in support of or in 
opposition to particular policies. Instead they serve to 
legitimize those policies which they helped to shape. 
Thus in neo-corporatism, in exchange for securing certain 
ends, the participating groups accept joint 
responsibility for the order and progress of the system 
as a whole and undertake to help guarantee the ongoing 
commitment of their members for cooperation.'^^
Finally, the role of state in corporatist model 
presents high variances in comparison to the pluralist 
perspective. In fact it presents a different way of 
conceptualizing the role and the importance of the 
s t a t e . W h e t h e r  it be state -authoritarian- corporatism 
or societal-liberal- corporatism, the notion of state has 
a central place in neo-corporatist theory. The state 
plays a highly active part both in the formation and the 
definition of the interests of the groups through the 
authorization of their existence. Also in contrast to its 
position in the pluralist model as a neutral arbiter, 
standing above the groups in the society, the state in 
the corporatist model actively forms and sustains 
interest intermediation and interested in the control of 
the outcomes.
Colin Crouch, "Pluralism and the New Corporatism," Political 
Studies 31 (1983), p.457.
Schmitter, "Introduction," Comparative Political Studies, p.4.
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Based on the characteristics of the neo-corporatist 
perspective presented so far, one may argue that it is in 
a theoretical conflict with the pluralist model with 
respect to the distinction between the public and the 
private realms. In this respect, whereas the pluralist 
model is developed on the idea of a clear distinction 
between the state and the civil society, in the neo- 
corporatist model case such a distinction is largely 
blurred.State continually step beyond the public into 
the private realm in order to participate in interest 
group politics; and interest groups acquire a quasi­
public role by virtue of the privileged position they 
hold in policy formation and partly by virtue of the 
delegated powers they enjoy performing public tasks.
The Statist View: An Alternative to State-Interest Group
Relationship
A Statist Critique
The two perspectives delineated above, have to a 
large extent ignored the state as an independent 
explanatory variable.When taken broadly and generally, 
the pluralist perspective totally neglects the state as 
an actor in politics. A very substantial literature on 
the topic has been devoted to the issue of the
John Goldthorpe, "The End of Convergence: Corporatist and Dualist 
Tendencies in Modern Western Societies," in Order and Conflict in 
Contemporary Capitalism, John Goldthorpe, ed. (London: Oxford
University Press, 1984).
For a detailed analysis of the state in this respect, see J.P. 
Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," World Politics, 21 
(1968), pp.559-92.
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constitution of civil society, the nature of its 
component values and interests, self organization of 
groups within it, the impact of public policy on citizen 
satisfaction, and the formation of public policy during 
which the groups have the utmost authority in controlling 
the outcome. Being a society centered approach pluralism 
ignores the state in favor of focusing on configurations 
of the social actors.
Neo-corporatism on the other hand, when evaluated 
with respect to the question of the state, diverges from 
the pluralist perspective to a large extent. As mentioned 
above, the state has a central place in the corporatist 
theory of interest intermediation. Within the paradigm 
shift from the society-centered to state-centered 
approaches that took place in the Western social sciences 
during the 1970s, the studies of neo-corporatism had a 
dominant p l a c e . T h e  students of neo-corporatism place 
special emphasis on the crucial role of the state as an 
actor and credit it with initiatives, interests and 
policies of its own. However there still appears to be
Philippe C. Schmitter, "Democratic Theory and Neocorporatist 
Practice,” Social Research, 4 (1983), p.898.
Within this context, the state has been brought back in at least 
five different ways: studies of corporatism; Neo-Marxist state
theories; the public choice and property rights perspective in public 
sector economics; the statist perspective in international relations; 
and the new right criticisms of the state and its political 
influences. See John Dearlove, "Bringing Constitutions Back In,” 
Political Studies, 4 (1989), pp.521-39.
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some problems concerning the question of the state in the 
neo-corporatist theory.
Although, neo-corporatism has been credited with 
calling scholarly attention to many ways in which the 
structure and action of public authorities affect the 
identification and organization of interests, it does not 
say enough about the circumstances and motives under 
which these authorities intervene and change the ways in 
which individuals and groups perceive their interests and 
act collectively to defend them. Thus, it is a quite 
different thing to place the state in a theory and to 
have a theory of the state on the other hand.^^ This lack 
of a theory of the state has been taken as the weakest 
point in corporatist studies,
"Type of State" as a Determinative Variable
Within the context delineated above, significant 
contributions have been made to interest group studies by 
scholars who studied the state and political institutions 
during the 1980s. The movement to bring the state back 
into the analysis of politics can be regarded the 
rediscovery of the role the state plays in shaping public 
policy, the organization of interests, and the definition 
of interests.Such a rediscovery of the state within the
Philippe C. Schmitter, "Neo-Corporatism and the State," in The 
Political Economy of Corporatism, Grant, ed., pp.32.
52 O'Sullivan, "The Political Theory of Neo-Corporatism," in The 
Corporate State, Cox and O'Sullivan, eds., p.l9.
Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis 
in Current Research," in Bringing the State Back In, Peter B. Evans,
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discipline has in fact led to a growing appreciation for 
the proposition that "political institutions define the 
framework within which politics take place. On the 
whole what the state theory suggests is that assumptions 
about the bottom-up or society-centered explanations are 
incomplete. Rather, "the timing and characteristics of 
state intervention" affect "not only organizational 
tactics and strategies" but "the content and definition 
of interest i t s e l f . ^ s  a result, the structure and 
apparatus of the interest group system are very much a 
function of the organization of the state at any given 
period in its development.
Accordingly, as mentioned by Pierre Birnbaum, within 
the framework of corporatist theory the capacity of the 
state as an independent variable, affecting the type of 
interest representation in a country has to a large 
extent been neglected. Assuming that, the state must 
always be the same in capitalist societies and not 
distinguishing between the type of states in capitalist 
societies, the dominant approach to the state has
remained ahistorical and universalistic.
Dietrich Rueschemeyer^ and Theda Skocpol^ eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985); Graham K. Wilson, Interest Groups (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1990) .
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions (New 
York: Free Press, 1989), p.l8.
Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in
Current Research,” in Bringing The State Back In, Evans, Ruechmeyer, 
and Skocpol, eds., p.23.
Pierre Birnbaum, "The State versus Corporatism," Politics and 
Society, 4 (1982), pp.477-501.
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As many political scientists have come to accept the 
impossibility of a general theory of a capitalistic state 
or more specifically its historical forms^ "^  such an 
analysis of depriving the state of any particular history 
of the respective country where it came to existence may 
yield statements of a descriptive rather than explanatory 
nature . In fact, such a view point belongs to a broadly 
Weberian methodological paradigm which sanctions the 
construction of interest-group politics models of "ideal 
type" to be used in comparative as well as national level 
studies, where various elements of the types will be 
found to be more or less present and occasionally absent. 
While such an approach may yield interesting 
descriptions, in the final analysis it carries in itself 
the danger of comprising differing cases to the type 
without trying to explain differences. In such a setting, 
the consideration of the conceptualization of the state 
within the context of its historical formation appears to 
be a necessity in interest group studies since the nature 
of the state by itself effects the structure of interest 
group politics.Therefore, the "nature" of the
See Kenneth Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1980); Bernard Badie and Pierre Birnbauia, 
The Sociology of State, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1983) .
Skocpol, "Bringing The State Baclc In: Strategies of Analysis in
Current Research," in Bringing____ The State Back In, Evans,
Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, eds., p. 27. For such an account also see 
Pierre Birnbaum, States and Collective Action. The European 
Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.l08.
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relationship between the state and civil societal 
associations is largely bound with the type of state in 
question. To be more precise, as mentioned above in the 
text, the pluralist character of a given polity involves 
a state responsive to civil society. On the other hand, 
neo-corporatism necessitates a harmonious relationship 
between the state and civil societal associations, 
because it is based itself on a bargaining process 
between the two partners. Within this framework, state 
societies or societies having a strong state tradition 
can be regarded as being a fertile ground neither for 
pluralism nor neo-corporatism.
At this point, it is necessary to pin-point the 
concepts of autonomy and sovereignty of the state, as the 
major criteria both for an understanding of the state as 
such and its position vis-a-vis the civil society. As 
pointed out by Nettl who had been the pioneer of the 
state-centric approach, autonomy denotes the 
characteristic of a state as a "distinct sector" with an 
independence in managing out its functions, and
represents the primary role identification of being a 
state official in the society. Sovereignty on the other 
hand connotes the independence of the state in setting 
and attaining goals for the society. In fact, the notion 
of the sovereign state focuses exclusively on its
For such an account, specifically basing itself on British and 
French experience, see Birnbaum, "The State versus Corporatism," 
Politics and Society, pp.490-501.
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superordinate status vis-a-vis associations.^®
Accordingly, one can come up with polities high or low in 
stateness, depending upon the extent to which public 
policy are determined by those who claim to act in the 
name of general interest, independent of the civil 
society.
In this respect, whereas polities high in stateness 
the best example of which is France, the corporate life 
of the society is expressed through the persona of the 
state, in polities low in stateness the best examples of 
which are Anglo-American countries, it is the 
associations and the local community that perform this 
function. Accordingly, in Anglo-American world there has 
been a consequent tendency to view the state and public 
institutions in a pragmatic and instrumental manner. What 
is lacking in the latter polities is a strong sense of 
state which differentiates it from the institutions of 
civil society, namely a sense that there must be a 
distinct logic of public institutions. In fact, it is 
this point which has done so much to color the 
continental European politics more widely, but which has 
been peripheral to Anglo-American politics.
Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," World Politics, 
p.562, 564, 565, 582-3.
Ibid., p.276.
See H. Stuart Jones, The French State in Question (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.7. For an analysis of the state 
models of France and Britain, see Badie and Birnbaum, The Sociology 
of State, Chapters 7, 8.
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In the same strand of thought, Dyson strongly 
emphasized the importance of the historical dimension for 
drawing a framework for understanding the differences 
between continental Europe and the Anglo-American worlds. 
In this respect, the concepts of "state societies" and 
"stateless societies" have been central to his argument. 
And the existence or nonexistence of the historical and 
legal heritage of the state has been regarded as the most 
significant determinant in this respect. According to 
Dyson, the Anglo-American political tradition is 
characterized by its "statelessness." However, while 
referring them as "stateless societies", Dyson does not 
use the term in the antropologist's sense of a primitive 
community organized on the basis of clan or blood ties, 
but in the political scientist's sense of a modern 
society which lacks "a historical and legal tradition of 
the state as an institution that acts in the name of 
public authority... as well as a tradition of continuous 
intellectual preoccupation with the idea of the state. 
"State societies" on the other hand, belong to a type of 
political culture which accords the idea of the state a 
pivotal role in the political discourse. Thus having a 
state culture and belonging to a "state tradition," the 
most significant differentiating characteristic of state
societies is the existence of a historical and legal
heritage of the state as an institution of public
authority acting in the name of the public,
63 Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, p. viii.
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As far as the Turkish case is concerned, the state 
had a traditionally determined patronizing position over 
the (civil) society. While being the principle vehicle 
for the creation or maintenance of national identity, the 
public institutions have embodied principles which 
strongly differentiated them from the institutions of the 
civil society.As one of the leading students of Turkish 
politics had underlined: "[E]xperience in statecraft,
respect for the state, the importance of the state in the 
history of the Turkish Republic, endowing it with a 
degree of political gravitas, absent from most new 
countries"^^ very well indicates the strong state 
tradition in Turkish political culture.
When the Ottoman-Turkish experience is concerned with 
respect to the state-society relations, it presents a 
largely different picture from that in the West, which 
makes it particularly necessary to include the type of 
the state in the analysis of interest group politics in 
Turkey. There appeared to be mainly three stages that 
were common to the Western world with respect to the 
development of the state-civil society relations: (1) The
initial phase of estate representation during which the 
interests of the society coincided with the social 
system; (2) the period starting with the birth of
For a detailed analysis of such an assesment as well as a 
comparison of Ottoman-Turkish state tradition with that of its 
Western counterparts, see Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey 
(Walkington, England: The Eothen Press, 1985), pp.1-20.
65 Andrew Mango, "The State of Turkey," Middle Eastern Studies, 13
(1977), p.265.
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liberalism, in which representation was organized on an 
individual basis and association was entirely voluntary, 
fragmented and unstable; (3) the period from the end of 
the nineteenth century to the present which is 
characterized by the presence of mass parties and by 
stable organized interest groups with multiple 
objectives, professional leaders, and bureaucracies.^® 
However, it still must be mentioned that within the 
Western world, all societies did not show the same 
characteristics with respect to the interest group 
formation and their role in the political system. Such a 
distinction is clearly observable between the Anglo- 
American world and the Continental European countries. In 
this respect, while in the former the formation of 
interest organizations were regarded as the 
manifestations of liberalism, in the latter it had 
largely been delegation of state authority.®"^
The Ottoman-Turkish case shows a clear difference 
from this briefly sketched Western historical 
development. In general, in the Ottoman-Turkish polity 
one hardly finds well-organized civil societal elements
®® See Charles S. Maier, "Fictious bonds...of wealth and law: on the 
theory and practice of interest representation," in Organizing 
Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism and the 
Transformation of Politics, Berger ed., pp. 27-56; Alessandro 
Pizzorno, "Interests and Parties in pluralism," in ibid., pp. 249-59. 
®^  Maier, "Fictious bonds...of wealth and law": on the theory and 
practice of interest representation," p. 41.
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that wielded political influence.^® First of all in the 
Ottoman-Turkish polity the state neither faced 
countervailing forces nor experienced an estate
representation through which the interests of the society 
were transmitted to the state mechanism.^® The basic 
political conception underlying Tanzimat was the 
construction of a direct relationship between the state 
and the individual. The Tanzimat reforms signified no 
more than an effort of "saving the state." The 
establishment of the first bar association in Istanbul 
had been a product of the reforms within the legal 
sphere. Such a development was largely due to the need 
on the part of the Ottoman state to control the 
profession of attorneyship which had begun to gain a 
prominent place in the judicial system with the newly 
accepted European codes. As far as the Republican period
Şerif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman 
Empire," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 11 (1969), pp. 
258-81.
69 See Metin Heper, "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire with 
Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century," International Political 
Science Review 1 (1980), pp.81-105. In fact, as Stande and parliament 
remained alien to the Ottoman Empire, when invited to the 
Extraordinary meeting in 1845, the Ottoman local notables were so 
surprised that they did not know how to respond. Roderic Davison, 
"The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of 
the Ottoman Empire," in Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle 
East: The Nineteenth Century, W. R. Polk and R. L. Chambers, eds. 
(Chicago, 1968), p.lOO quoted in Metin Heper, "Extremely 'Strong 
State' and Democracy: Turkey in Comparative and Historical 
Perspective," in Democracy and Modernity, F. N. Eisenstadt, ed. 
(Lieden: Brill, 1992), p.l49.
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is concerned, although the mentality of controlling and 
checking the profession on the part of the state still 
continued to be the case, specifically after the 1960s 
it had to face more organized associations having 
multiple objectives. However, the bar associations did 
not constitute an exception in the independent status of 
the state in defining and attaining the goals of the 
society. Consequently neither pluralism nor neo­
corporatism could be developed.
'»Type of State", Juridical Sphere, and Legal 
Professionals
Within the general framework mentioned above, 
assessing the necessity of the consideration of the type 
of state for a study focusing on state-interest group 
relationship, a final point must be mentioned which have 
ultimate importance specifically for the case of bar 
associations. This is mainly related to the role of the 
state within the legal and judicial sphere which is 
accepted to be a variable related with the degree of 
stateness in a society. Accordingly, due to the 
significance of the legal and judicial issues as 
constituting one of the most significant areas with 
regard to the interface of bar associations with the 
state, the extent of the domination of the state on such 
issues have a strong potential for affecting the nature 
of the relationship. In fact, the structure of legal and 
judicial spheres, including the legal profession and
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attorneyship has been a significant reflector of the 
divergent traditions of state in different countries.^®
In Continental European legal tradition of which 
Turkey had been a part since the law reform in the early 
years of the Republic, law has little autonomy of its 
own, in fact it is largely an emanation of the state. 
Having been under the influence of the Roman tradition, 
in these "civil law" countries law had been tightly 
incorporated into the state in contrast to the "common 
law" of the Anglo-American countries. The distinction 
between "public law which pertained to the impersonal 
abstract character of the state, and private law, which 
applied to the relations of private individuals, ^s 
well as the establishment of a distinct administrative 
law in civil law tradition are exemplary in this respect.
However, among other things, the ·most significant 
point with respect to the purpose of the present study 
has been the impact of the incorporation of law into the 
state on the status and identity of legal professionals 
in general and attorneys in particular. In fact, it has
Nettl, "State As a Conceptual Variable," World Politics, p.534.
For example, the decisions of the judges constitute no more than 
the logical interpretation of law. Thus it is the state which speak 
through the court in interpreting its own legislation. Conversely, in 
the Anglo-American tradition, where law has an autonomy, the judges 
explain the law and develop it. And in a sense law becomes a 
courtroom game.
"^2 Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, p. 115
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been in the professional characteristics and the 
socialization of legal professionals that the extent of 
the dominance of state can be detected in a legal 
tradition. Accordingly as Nettl notes, in the Continental 
European tradition, legal professionals have more or less 
defined themselves as the servants of the state. The 
most significant determinant of such an identification is 
in fact the law education where the legal professionals 
are socialized. In Continental European tradition, the 
law education has largely been a path for a governmental 
career rather than a commercial career as it has been the 
case for the Anglo-American tradition. In this sense, as 
Nettl mentions, whereas the self identity of the latter 
is highly professional, the self identity of the former 
results from the association with the state.
As being a part of the continental European tradition 
of law, Turkey does not constitute an exception to the 
above mentioned framework. In this regard, in a system 
where the legal and judicial spheres has little autonomy 
of its own and thus incorporated with the state, there 
appears to be a potential of conflict between the bar 
associations and the state. Because any interference on 
the part of the bar associations in the legal sphere for 
the sound functioning of which they feel themselves 
responsible automatically brings them face to face with 
the state in an area under the latter's tight monopoly or 
perhaps the raison d'etre.
Nettl, "State As a Conceptual Variable," World Politics, p.584. 
Ibid., p.585.
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Chapter Two
EVOLUTION OF ATTORNEYSHIP AND BAR ASSOCIATIONS IN 
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
The Early Roots of The Profession
Attorneyship has been one of the oldest professions. 
Being intimately connected in all societies with the rise 
and development of legal systems, the roots of
attorneyship goes back to Ancient Greece and Roman times. 
In Athens, principally it was the right and obligation of 
each citizen to present his own case in the court. 
However this was the ideal situation. Even, in such a 
society where so much of the educational process was 
directed towards teaching rhetoric, not everyone had the 
same rhetorical skill. Thus, it was a necessity to have a 
class of people who would help in the preparation of 
arguments to be put before the Athenian court. Although, 
these people were not attorneys in the modern sense of 
the term, they did to a certain degree constituted a 
professional class and have been regarded as the 
precursors of the profession of attorneyship.^ With the 
development of Roman Law and its complex legal roles, the 
profession developed in the Roman city state and matured 
under the rule of Roman Empire. In Rome, attorneyship 
became much more important than it has been in Athens as 
it became common for legal defense to be handled by a
 ^ R. J. Bonner, Evidence in Athenian Courts (New York: Arno Press, 
1979), p.ll.
third party, even though payment was not supposed to be 
made for the service. However, although there was much 
more formal law then had been in the Ancient Greece, the 
attorneys' court presentations referred little to the 
rules of law; and attorneys resorted to techniques of 
persuasion rather than textual interpretation.^
It has been with the adoption of Roman law that, the 
profession emerged in feudal Europe and started to take 
its place within the European judicial mechanism, 
although having a quite different developmental path in 
each country. The formation of the bar associations on 
the other hand, has been realized late in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth Centuries in most of the these countries. 
However, up to the early nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, these associations proved to be local bodies 
and have tended to view their functions as the informal 
encouragement of collegiality among members and the 
facilitation of fruitful professional contacts rather 
than national associations lobbying for their collective 
interests
 ^ For further information concerning the historical evolution of 
attorneyship, see James Davies, Henry H. Foster, C. Fay Jeffery and 
S. Eugene Davis, Society and the Law (New York: Free Press Glencoe, 
1962), Part III; Faruk Erem, Eski Yunan ve Roma'da Avukatlık 
(Attorneyship in Ancient Greece and Rome) (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası,
1976).
 ^ Richart Abel and Philips S. Lewis, Lawyers in Society, three 
volumes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), vol.l, pp. 
60, 85; VOİ.2, pp.237, 272; Şinasi Devrin, "Muhtelif Memleketlerde
Avukatlık," (Attorneyship in Various Countries) Istanbul Barosu
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The rise of the profession in the Ottoman Empire has been 
more recent. Formally, the origins of the profession and 
its organizations are linked with the Tanzimat Reform 
Period(1839-1876) of the nineteenth century.
When the pre-Tanzimat period is taken into 
consideration, there was a group called arzuhalcis who 
were engaged in writing petitions and letters for the 
people. In some instances, while writing petitions, these 
people were in a sense performing a specific function 
reserved for attorneyship, namely written defense. In 
this sense, although functioning outside of the judicial 
mechanism and performing quite a different profession, 
arzuhalcis can to a certain extent be considered as the 
precursors of the profession in the Empire. Arzuhalcis 
were accepted as performing a kind of public service and 
thus certain criteria have been determined by the Ottoman 
state for the practice of the profession, which showed 
close parallelism with the rules applied for the 
attorneys during the Tanzimat period, as will be 
elaborated below.'*
Besides arzuhalcis who were partly functioning as 
attorneys only in some cases, there are evidences of the 
presence of some other people who might plead a case in 
the Ottoman legal system before the Tanzimat era.
Mecmuası, special issue published for the fifteenth anniversary of 
the establishment of the Republic (1938), pp.300-72.
 ^ "Istanbul Arzuhalcilerinin Usul ve Nizamlarına Dair Rüus," 
(Document Concerning the Procedural Rules of the Ardhaljis in 
Istanbul) Istanbul Barosu Mecmuası, special issue (1938), pp.375-6.
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Therefore, although Islamic law formally conceived no 
class of specialists in the representation of parties in 
litigation because litigants were supposed to defend 
their own cases in the court, a distinct group of court 
room pleaders existed.
Within the framework of Islamic law, defending
others' interest in court was considered formally as an 
application of the principle of legal representation,
vekalet r and the general term for the agent as the 
representative was vekil. The vekil was given a power of 
attorney which was filed before the judge hearing the 
case.^ However, no specifications had been made 
concerning the qualifications of the vekils in the law.^ 
Usually the relatives and friends of the litigants 
carried out this function. Apart from them the former
clerks of the courts as called muhzir, who were assumed 
to have knowledge on the court room procedures, acted as 
pleaders from time to time. Usually they were preferred 
by the litigants due to their close relationship with the 
Islamic Judge, kadi. Another group of people who were
preferred as pleaders were simply orators. These people 
were usually small shop-keepers living in the 
neighbourhood of kadis.
^ C. G. Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprundence (London: The Macmillan
Press, 1988), p.77.
 ^ For the details of the institution of wakala see Mecelle-i Ahkam-i 
Adliyye (Ankara: Güzel Istanbul Matbaası, 1959), Articles 1449-1530.
Ali Haydar Özkent, Avukatın Kitabı (Attorneys Book) (Istanbul: 
Arkadaş Basımevi, 1940), p.51.
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As a group, the vekils had developed a reputation of 
chicanery and had a negative image in the society. As 
stated by Ibn al~Uhuvva, an eighteenth century scholar, 
the vekils were usually hiding the truth from the court 
with their high degree of oratory and regarded to be 
liars, their only function being to confuse the minds of 
kadis.^ In this regard, they were usually tagged with 
unflattering names such as muzevvir^ ayak kavafı^ kağıt 
kavafır all of which had the connotations of forgery.^
When the role of vekils in the Ottoman legal system 
is compared with the three core characteristics of the 
role of attorneys in the modern sense of the term which
® Coşkun Üçok, "Savcılıkların Avrupa Hukukunda Gelişmesi ve 
Türkiye*de Kuruluşu,** (The Development of Prosecutorship in the 
European Legal System and its Establishment in Turkey) in Ord. Prof. 
S. Ş. Ansay Armağanı (Melange to the Memory of Prof. S. Ş. Ansay) 
(Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi, 1964), p.36.
 ^ Ali Haydar Özkent, Avukatlığın Memleketimizde Çok Kötü Tanınması 
(The Bad Reputation of Attorneyship in Our Country) (Ankara: 
Hapishane Basımevi, 1938), pp.6-7. However, the negative image of the 
attorneys was not specific to the Ottoman Empire. In many parts of 
the world similar phenomena were in effect. In Russia, for example 
attorneys were labeled with similiar negative names such as: Samuel
Kucherov Courts Lawyers and Trials Under the Last Three Tsars (New 
York: Praeger, 1953) . Also in many parts of the western world the
legal professionals, of which attorneys has been a part has usually 
been identified with the interests of the aristocracy and had 
developed a negative image within society due to performing their 
services for the powerful and defending the monarchial state. See 
Alexis de Tocqueville, The Ancient Regime, (New York: Doubleday,
1955), pp.222-3; Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the 
Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (New York: Harper and
Row, 1972), pp.383-5.
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are (1)specialized knowledge of legal rules, (2)partisan 
advice to clients not related by kinship, 
(3)representation of clients in relation both to other 
parties and to legal authorities, it can be said that 
the Ottoman vekils were far from being attorneys as they 
have hardly exhibited these characteristics. Thus when 
the professional features of the modern attorneyship is 
taken into account, probably there never existed in the 
Islamic legal system a professional group of people 
available for hire to serve as representatives in the 
court.
This lack of professional attorneys has been one of 
the most important difference between the Ottoman and 
Western legal systems. The lack of professional attorneys 
has been a phenomenon inseparable from other aspects of 
the workings of the courts in the Ottoman Empire, 
especially practice of kadi himself:
Within the Ottoman system, the law which the judges 
administered was primarily the Sacred law, as given in 
the Koran and the traditions of Mohammed, but especially 
as codified by the jurists of the school of Abu Hanifa 
which Sultan Selim asserted at the sixteenth century to 
be the compulsory official school in judicial matters in 
the Empire and as interpreted in collections of the 
fetvas of great jurists. Next the judges applied the 
Kanuns "which were an independent category of law derived
Dietrich Rueshmeyer, Lawyers and Their Society (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1973), p.6.
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directly from the sovereign will of the ruler''^  ^ and the 
customs and immunities of the regions in which they 
served.
Within the framework of this Islamic system, the only 
formal courts in the Empire were the Şeriat or Islamic 
law courts which exercised broad powers of jurisdiction 
covering all types of litigation. Besides, there were 
Cemaat courts handling the cases within the sphere of 
private law for non-muslims and consular courts having 
jurisdiction in trade disputes involving their own 
subjects and other matters reserved for them by the 
capitulation treaties.
The judge who administered justice in the Ottoman 
Empire was the kadi. In fact, the kadi was much more 
than a judge in the common sense. First of all in 
accordance with the classical Islamic legal tradition.
Halil İnalcık, "Turkey: The Nature of Traditional Society," in
Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Richard E. Ward and 
Dankward A. Rustow, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1964, p.57.
For an eloboration of Islamic law, see Halil Cin and Ahmet 
Akgündüz, Türk Hukuk Tarihi (Turkish Legal History) (Istanbul: Timaş, 
1990), pp.148-61; Noor Mohammad, "An Introduction to Islamic Law," in 
Modern Legal Systems Cyclopedia, Kenneth Redden, ed. (Buffalo: 
William S. Hein and Co., 1985), vol.5, pp.683-90; Hayrettin Karaman, 
Başlangıçtan Zamanımıza Kadar İslam Hukuk Tarihi (The History of 
Islamic Law from Past to Present) (Istanbul: Irfan Yayınevi, 1975); 
Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon,
1964).
13 Coşkun Üçok and Ahmet Mumcu, Türk Hukuk Tarihi (Turkish Legal
History) (Ankara; Sevinç Matbaası, 1976), p.330.
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the Şeriat covered every aspect of life^ '’ and so the kadi 
dealt at least in principle, with every aspect of life. 
The kadi, in the Ottoman system was the head of 
districts as called kazas, assessed and collected taxes, 
organized local security and thus, in a sense was the 
main link connecting the state with the mass of its 
citizens.
One of the most important characteristics of the 
Ottoman legal system, and one reason for the lack of 
professional attorneys was the process of reaching a 
decision in the kadi courts. In every court a single kadi 
sat, with clerks and other subordinates. Cases were 
presented by the parties and decisions were usually 
rendered immediately and in a very concise form. This 
process was informal and arbitrary in the sense that 
although kadi's court was praised and viewed as a major 
avenue for achieving justice, it could never be clear to 
the litigants just what had led to the kadi 's decision. 
In this regard, although in a limited number of cases 
the basis of kadi's decisions could be identified, in the 
overwhelming majority of the cases no authority was
Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, p.64.
liber Ortaylı, "Osmanli Kadısı: Tarihi Temeli ve Yargı Görevi,"
(The Ottoman Kadı: Historical Roots and Judicial Function) Ankara
Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, 1 (1975), pp.117-28; 
Stanford J.Shaw, History of Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Empire 
of the Gazis: the Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808, 
vol.l (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 193-6.
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cited, nor was any explanation of the decision given. 
Also the legal jurisdiction was quite confusing. The 
kadis themselves often did not know where to look for 
legal guidance and, in any case, were not educated enough 
to use the guides and precedents. In the final analysis, 
they acted on their own consciences and their sense of 
equity.Within such an atmosphere of uncertainty as well 
as under the dominance of monist mechanism, as the kadis 
being the sole authority, it was impossible to have 
professional attorneys.
See Haim Gerber, "Sharia Kanun and Custom in the Ottoman Law: The 
Court Records of the 17^^ Century Bursa," International Journal of 
Turkish Studies, 2 (1981), pp.131-47.
As it has been stated by the commission to redraft a part of civil 
law "Sacred jurispundance resembles a boundless ocean....and as 
difficult as it is to draw pearls from the ocean, so great ability 
and learning are required for a man to find always in the law the 
neccesary rules for the solution of each question"; W.E. Crigsby, The 
Medjelle or Ottoman Civil Law (London, 1895), pp.iii-iv quoted in 
Roderic Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963), p.251.
The absence of printing, which was not introduced into the Empire 
until the eighteenth century, aided further toward making a general 
use of the decisions of judges as precedents practically impossible.
It is this point which is the crux of Max Weber’s concept of kadi 
justice. See Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1962), p.400.
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Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the Ottoman 
state embarked on a wide ranging program of reforms, 
which had the twin aims of centralizing political 
authority and modernizing and rationalizing the state 
bureaucracy. Collectively known as Tanzimat, the reform 
package extended to military, administrative, 
educational, and legal spheres. As far as the development 
of modern attorneyship and bar associations are 
concerned, the reforms in the last category appears to 
have utmost importance.
Indeed, during the Tanzimat period, the Ottoman legal 
system underwent significant changes with the 
modernization and rearrangement of the laws and the 
judiciary. However it is important to note that the 
codification movement during this period, was based on 
grounds totally different from those in Western European 
states. While in the latter case, the notion of natural 
law, rationalism and the desire for the establishment of 
legal security for the individual informed the 
codification process, in the Ottoman Empire, the need for 
the adaptation to the commercial life of West European 
countries; the desire of Western powers to realize the 
legal security of their citizens working in the empire; 
the need for standardized and well organized body of
From Tradition to Modernity
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codes, being in harmony with the requirements of a 
centralized administration played the same role.2°
The main steps during the codification process can be 
summarized as follows: a commercial code (Kanunname-i
Ticaret) and a penal code (Ceza Kanunname-i Humayunu) 
based on French equivalents were promulgated in 1850 and 
1858 respectively and codes for civil (Usulü Muhakemati 
Hukukiye) and criminal (Usulü Muhakemati Cezaiye) 
procedure also French inspired, followed in 1879. The 
movement for codification in the Ottoman Empire also 
produced the Land Code (Arazi Kanunname-i Humayunu) of 
1858, which reorganized and explicated prior substantive 
law pertaining to immovable property in the empire. The 
issuence of the religious law on transactions (Mecelle-i 
Ahkam-i Adliye) , in 1877, after six years of work by a 
committee, has perhaps been the most significant step 
within the codification process. The code gave a clear
2*^ Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoglu, "Kanunlaştırma Hareketleri ve 
Tanzimat," (The Codification Movements and Tanzimat) in Tanzimat I 
(Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940), pp.167-9; Hıfzı Veldet 
Velidedeoglu, Türk Medeni Hukukunun Umumi Esasları (General Priciples 
of Turkish Civil Law) (Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaacılık, 1968), pp.63- 
4; Halil Cin, "Tanzimat Döneminde Osmanli Hukuku Ve Yargılama 
Usulleri," (The Ottoman Law and Civil Procedures in the Tanzimat Era) 
in 150. Yılında Tanzimat (Tanzimat in Its 150^^ Anniversary), Hakkı 
Dursun Yıldız, ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1992), pp.14-15; 
İlber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı (The Longest Century of 
the Empire) (Istanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1983), pp.140-2; Ülkü Azrak, 
"Tanzimat'tan Sonra Resepsiyon," (Reception After Tanzimat) 
Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol. 3 (1985), 
pp.603.
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and orderly exposition of the law of transactions derived 
from the Şeriat and clarified many controversial points 
in the Hanefi law,^^
Reforms pertaining to the reorganization of the 
court system were also made. Within the framework of the 
Tanzimat reforms, there appeared to be five different 
court systems operating in the empire, dispensing justice 
to different groups according to different methods and 
different laws. In this respect, enforcement of new 
secular codes was entrusted to new regalement (Nizamiye) 
courts. These courts were to handle criminal and civil 
cases among Ottoman subjects, except those matters of 
marriage, death, divorce,and inheritance which were still 
cared for Şeriat and Cemaat courts. A hierarchy of 
secular courts was formed, ranging from nahiye council of 
elders to kaza, sancak and vilayet capitals. Besides, 
trade courts were established which were to handle 
commercial disputes. These courts were supervised by 
different governmental authorities. In this respect. The 
Nizamiye courts and trade courts were under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice; The Şeriat
Velidedeoğlu, "Kanunlaştırma Hareketleri ve Tanzimat," in 
Tanzimat, pp.175-204; Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856- 
1876, p.251; Mumcu and Üçok, Türk Hukuk Tarihi; Stanford J. Shaw and 
Ezel Kural, History of Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey; Reform, 
Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975, vol.2 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp.245-7. Also see 
Siddik Sami Onar, "Islam Hukuku ve Mecelle," (Islamic Law and 
Mecelle) in Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol.3 
(1985), pp.580-7.
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courts were under ^eyhulislam's office; the Cemaat courts 
were under the foreign office at first and then the prime 
ministers office; and the consular courts remained under 
the supervision of the Foreign Office.22
Therefore, it can well be asserted that in the 
Tanzimat period, the traditional Islamic concept of 
justice of "securing each category of the ruled no less 
and no more than it deserved according to its function or 
state in the society" was reinterpreted. It now meant 
promulgation of secular legislation outside the 
jurisdiction of the Islamic traditions and autonomous 
from them. 23 The adaptation of foreign codes and the 
emergence of secular Nizamiye courts soon considerably 
stimulated the demand for new judicial roles in the 
administration of justice. Occupations based on 
specialized knowledge in law proved to be a necessity. 
At this point, one can detect a similarity between the 
early development of the institution of attorneyship in 
feudal Europe, especially in France and Italy, and in the 
Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat Period.
22 See Mustafa Reşit Belgesay, "Tanzimat ve Adliye Teşkilatı,"
(Tanzimat and the Judicial Mechanism) in Tanzimat I (Istanbul: Maarif 
Matbaası, 1940), pp.213-20; Cin, "Tanzimat Döneminde Osmanli Hukuku 
ve Yargılama Usulleri," in 150. Yılında Tanzimat, pp.24-31; Enver 
Koray, Türkiye'nin Çağdaşlaşma Sürecinde Tanzimat (Tanzimat Within 
the Process of Turkish Modernization) (Istanbul: Marmara
Üniversitesi, 1991), pp.49-52; Mumcu and Üçok, Türk Hukuk Tarihi, pp. 
330-5.
23 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: 
McGill University press, 1964), pp. p.94-95.
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Both in feudal Europe and in the Ottoman Empire, the 
early development of the institution of attorneyship was 
the result less of internal social conditions and 
necessities than the adoption of new codes and diffusion 
from more developed institutional centres. The Roman law 
and its complex legal roles grew out of archaic 
conditions, developed in the Roman city state and matured 
under the bureaucratic rule in the Roman Empire. It was 
imposed on the provinces and later conserved mainly in 
the institutions of canon law, in the contractual forms 
used by notaries in Italy and France, and in schools of 
law and rhetorics. It was revived under changed 
conditions in the reception of the Roman law in 
continental Europe. Cultural retention and diffusion of 
this kind are likely to introduce additional complexities 
into the relations between traditional norms and the more 
cosmopolitan legal system. It thus adds to the 
requirement of specialized expertise.
In the Ottoman Empire, the presence of an attorney 
in legal procedures was made necessary by some of the 
articles in the above mentioned foreign codes.However
Rueschemeyer, Lawyers and Their Society, pp.3-4.
In this respect, see "Usulü Muhakemati Ticariye," (Law of 
Coiniiiercial Procedure) in Düstur Birinci Tertip, vol.l. Articles 
28,39; "Usulu Muhakemati Hukukiye Kanunu," (Law of Civil Procedure) 
in Düstur Birinci Tertip vol.4. Articles 16, 41-42; "Usulu Muhakemati 
Cezaiye Kanunu," (Law of Criminal Procedure) in Düstur Birinci 
Tertip, vol.4.. Articles 249-250.
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the most important step in this respect, was taken with 
the enactment of a regulation known as Dersaadet Dava 
Vekilleri Nizamnamesi (Regulation of Attorneyship in 
Istanbul), in 1876.2^ It has been with this regulation 
that the Ottoman State for the first time, formally 
recognized as well as defined attorneyship as a legal 
profession.27 Besides formally establishing the 
profession, this regulation has also been the first step 
taken by the Ottoman state to supervise the practice of 
the profession whose members until then had developed a 
reputation of chicanery, a point made above. The
regulation aimed at improving the quality of the
profession by defining and tightening entrance
requirements. In this respect, the regulation required 
those engaged in legal representation before courts to 
register with the Ministry of Justice and be graduates of 
law schools.
Paradoxically, at the time, there were no secular law 
schools in the Empire. Legal education was primarily 
based on Islamic law and sponsored by Medreses and
For the original text, see "Mehakimi Nizamiye Dava Vekilleri 
Hakkında Nizamname," (Regulation on Attorneys in Nizamiye Courts) 
Istanbul Barosu Mecmuası, special issue (1938), pp.374-85.
27 When first enacted this regulation was only valid in Dersaadet, 
however, with an order enacted in 1877 it became valid for the 
otherparts of the Empire, too. See "Dava Vekili Nizamnamesinin 
Taşraya da Teşmili Hakkında İradei Seniye," (Sultanic Order on the 
Adoption of Regulation on Attorneys to Provinces) in ibid, p.386.
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religious schools that confined themselves largely to the 
recruitment of kadis. Besides, there was a school called 
Muallimhane-i Nuvvap, established in 1854 in Istanbul 
within the framework of which, law education showed no 
differences than it has been in the Medreses, basing 
itself on Islamic law. And finally there was a special 
class in Galatasaray Sultanisi which was established in 
1875, that taught law courses in French, but could 
function only for a short period of time.2® It was in 
1879, four years after the enactment of the regulation 
that the first separate law school Mekteb-i Hukuk, 
attached to the Ministry of Justice, was established.25 
Its major aim was the education of judges and vekils. In 
fact, after the law reforms realized within the framework 
of Tanzimat, the necessity of the establishment of a 
secular law school and thus the recruitment of legal 
personnel had been a point which was continuously 
emphasized among the reformers for the well functioning 
of the judicial mechanism. 2° However, due to this late
2® All Rıza Başaran, İstanbul Üniversitesi ve Hukuk Fakültesi ile 
İlgili Kanun, Tüzük ve Yönetmelikler (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi 
Hukuk fakültesi, 1979), p.3.
2^  This school eventually became the Faculty of Law of the University 
of Istanbul. See Kenneth Redden, Legal Education in Turkey (Istanbul: 
Fakülteler Matbaası, 1957), p.lO.
2*2 See Gülnihal Bozkurt, "Türkiye'de Hukuk Eğitiminin Tarihçesi," 
(History of Law Education in Turkey) in Hukuk öğretimi Sempozyumu 
(The Symposium of Law Education), Adnan Güriz, ed. (Ankara: Ankara 
Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi, 1993), pp.60-1.
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coining character of secular law education, law school 
graduates in the Empire were very few.^i This state of 
affairs forced the Ottoman state to make provisions for 
an examination, the passage of which substituted for a 
formal degree in 1885.32 Although this arrangement, 
provided some degree of control mechanism concerning the 
entry to the profession, it prevented the legal service 
turning into a modern profession as formal education is a 
sine qua non of a modern legal profession.
Perhaps even more ominous development was the 
Sultanic decree of 1886, which abolished the requirement 
of obtaining a licence for vekils in the law cases. 33 
Thus, by this decree the most important control mechanism 
was eliminated. And besides the qualified ones, the 
uneducated and unspecialized vekils of the pre-Tanzimat
31 However, it must be mentioned that, although secular legal 
training had been available from that time on, still a number of 
people seeking legal education prefered to study at European law 
faculties. Such a configuration, could be regarded as an evidence of 
the influence of Western legal system in the Empire. June Starr, Law 
as Metaphor. From Islamic Courts to the Place of Justice (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1992), p.38.
32 "Dava Vekillerinin İmtihanına Dair Nizamname," (The Regulation on 
the Examination of Attorneys) Türkiyede Savunma Mesleğinin Gelişimi 
(The Development of the Profession of Attorneyship in Turkey) 
(Istanbul: Yörük Matbaası, 1972), pp.37-40.
33 "Dava Vekaleti Ruhsatnamesi İstihsaline Dair 540 Sayılı İcra 
Vekilleri Heyetinin Kararnamesiyle Vaz'ı Karagir Olan 18 Kanunsan! 
337 Tarihli Nizamnamenin Bazı Maddeleri," (Some Articles of the 
Governmental Decree on the Licencing of Attorneys) Istanbul Barosu 
Mecmuası special issue (1938), pp. 391-2.
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era again started to play an active role in the 
courts . In the process, the role of most of the vekils 
became only that of relating arguments of the party its 
grievances and defences to the stylized procedure at 
court, a job of translation rather than one that could 
only be carried out by specialized experts, that is the 
solution of disputes.
However, this dualism in the structure of 
attorneyship had been totally in harmony with the general 
characteristics of the Tanzimat period and its aftermath. 
There was a dualism both in institutions and thinking. 
Medreses continued to exist alongside secular schools. 
Şeriat alongside new laws. Şeriat courts alongside 
Nizamiye courts, kadi alongside judges, müftü alongside 
governors and the uneducated, unspecialized vekils of 
pre-Tanzimat alongside modernized ones.
Indeed, the development of state law and secular 
courts during the period reflected, largely a struggle 
between Islamic and civil bureaucratic reformers. Within 
the field of law, the views expressed by the two 
prominent figures of the Ottoman legal history, Cevdet 
Pasha and Ali Pasha concerning law and judicial reforms 
during the Tanzimat period can be considered as a 
striking evidence in this respect. In fact, these two 
pashas, being strongly devoted to the Islamic and Western 
traditions of law, respectively, expressed the two 
distinct views then dominant among those engaged in 
legal issues. The dispute during the codification of the 
Mecelle, constitutes the most illuminating example for
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understanding their point of view. According to Cevdet 
Pasha, who had been the chairman of the commission 
responsible for the codification of Mecelle and an 
exceptional member of ulema with his closeness to the 
reforming statesmen, traditions and the preservation of 
Islamic identity must be given priority during the 
codification process. On the other hand, Ali Pasha, the 
grand vezir then, strongly favored the adoption of 
French Civil Code. As mentioned above, the debate was 
resulted with the victory of the former, indicating the 
still powerful position of the Islamic view at least in 
civil matters.
The Establishment of First Bar Association: 
Institutionalization of Professional Interests
One of the most important developments concerning 
attorneyship in the Tanzimat period, has been the 
establishment of the first bar association, namely 
Dersaadet Dava Vekilleri Cemiyeti ('Istanbul Association 
of Attorneys).3^  The association which was established in
Velidedeoğlu, "Kanunlaştırma hareketleri ve Tanzimat," in Tanzimat 
pp. 199-205. Also see Berkes, The Development of Secularism in 
Turkey, p.485-9; Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876, 
PP.251-3.
During this period there was a bar association in Istanbul called 
Société du Barraeau de Constantinople which was established in 1870. 
However this association was formed by the foreign attorneys working 
for the consular courts in the Empire. Thus Istanbul Association of 
Wakils is considered as the first "Ottoman" bar association and the 
year of the first general assembly meeting (1878) of the latter
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187 6 within the framework of Dava Vekilleri Nizamnamesi ^ 
has been the oldest professional association in the 
Ottoman-Turkish history. The major purpose of the 
association was that of supervising the profession on 
behalf of the Ministry of Justice. According to the 
Regulation the Association would act as a bridge between 
the ministry and the vekils.^^ It would enforce the 
disciplinary procedures and engage in the regulation of 
the fees of the vekils. Besides vekils should become 
members of this association in order to practice their 
profession.The association, in this sense had been an 
instrument of the state for controlling the practice of 
the profession. The Association had 62 members^^ when it
association is taken as the foundation year of Istanbul Bar 
Association. For the text of the regulation of Société du Barraeau de 
Constantinoplef see "İstanbul Barosu Derneği'nin Tüzüğü," (The 
Regulation of Istanbul Bar Association) Türkiyede Savunma Mesleğinin 
Gelişimi, pp.12-23.
In this respect, one can detect a similarity between the 
Association of Wakils and the Ottoman guild system, as both of them 
have been the handiwork of the state rather than the society, see 
Metin Heper, "The State and Interest Groups with Special Reference to 
Turkey," in Strong State and Economic Interest Groups, Metin Heper, 
ed. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), p.l3.
For details see "Mehakimi Nizamiye Dava Vekilleri Hakkında 
Nizamname," Istanbul Barosu Mecmuası, Articles 30-40.
For a complete list of the members, see Abdurrahman Adil, 
"İstanbul Türk Barosu ve Tarihi Teşekkülü," (The İstanbul Turkish Bar 
Association and its Historical Development) Istanbul Barosu Mecmuası,
4 (1930), pp.5-10.
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was firstly established and only twelve of its members 
were Muslim-Ottomans.
Even thirty years after its establishment, the 
Association of Attorneys, then still the only bar 
association in the Empire, has appeared to be largely 
ineffective and in some cases reluctant in defending the 
interests of the profession. This was due to both 
organizational and membership characteristics of the 
Association, on the one hand and the political dynamics 
of the time, specifically the attitudes of political 
authorities towards the association, on the other hand.
As far as the organizational and membership 
characteristics are concerned, it can be said that the 
association had been immaturely born, both in a
quantitative and qualitative sense. In this respect, 
besides not being many in number and differing in regards 
to nationality, the members' educational background also 
varied to a large extent. Being closely related with 
this heterogeneity of the vekils both in terms of 
religio-ethnic background and professional quality and 
also with the short history of the profession in the 
Empire, there was a lack of professional idealism and 
solidarity among the members of the Association. For 
example, during the general assembly meetings of the 
Association, the agenda almost always consisted of 
routine items like disciplinary and financial matters.
For details of the discussions during the general assembly 
meetings, see Özkent, Avukatın Kitabı, pp.77-81.
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There had rarely been discussions concerning the problems 
of the profession, or professional ethics which could be 
helpful in the socialization of vekils to the norms of 
the profession as well as the Association. The latter 
kind of activities have been regarded among the most 
vital functions of such organizations especially in 
Western Europe.'^®
The ineffectiveness of the Association was also 
related to the political situation in the empire during 
the late nineteenth century. Indeed, the year 187 6 which 
corresponds to the establishment of the first bar 
association, had been a significant date in the Ottoman 
political history, namely the promulgation of the first 
Ottoman constitution, known as Kanun-i Esasi and
paradoxically the starting point of the authoritarian 
reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II (1876-1909).
As far as the judiciary and the individual rights and 
liberties were concerned, the 1876 Constitution left 
little room for criticism. It is true that the
Constitution provided clearly the security of judicial 
tenure, public trial and absence of administrative 
interference with the courts. The individual rights and 
liberties were also mentioned, such as individual
liberties, freedom from arbitrary punishment, freedom of
In this respect, the Bar Association of Paris has been a good 
example. See Fernand Payen, Baro Vazife ve Sanat (Bar Association, 
Duty and Art) trans, by Ali Haydar ÖzIcent (Istanbul: Arkadaş
Basımevi, 1935).
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religion, and security of property and domicile. Although 
the Constitution failed to refer to the right of defence, 
the emphasis on individual liberties and importance of 
the individual in this respect, can well be viewed as 
having been in harmony with the professional position of 
attorneys in the polity. However, on the whole, the 
1876 Constitution created a limited autocracy. The 
Sultan retained extensive powers: he appointed ministers, 
members of the senate and most importantly, convoked and 
promulgated the parliament. He was declared to be caliph, 
non responsible of his acts and his person was 
considered sacred. Moreover, he had the exclusive 
authority to send to exile individuals considered 
dangerous to the state.
Soon Abdiilhamit II started to strengthen his 
position as sultan - first weakening the constitutional 
draft, then getting rid of the chief supporters of the 
constitution, and finally proroguing the chamber sine 
die, but never abolishing the Constitution. With the 
strengthening of Abdiilhamit's personal rule, the liberal 
political reform was forced to go underground. However, 
the reforms both at the cultural and legal spheres 
largely continued to be in the agenda of the Ottoman 
state.
For the original text of the 1876 Constitution, see Şeref 
Gözübüyük and Suna Kili, Türk Anayasa Metinleri 1839-1982 (The Texts 
of Turkish Constitutions 1839-1982) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi 
Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1982), pp.27-43.
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It is true that, there appeared to be a number of 
important reforms within the field of law and judiciary 
during the reign of Abdiilhamit II. The reorganization and 
the expansion of the Ministry of Justice; the 
reorganization of the court system along more secular 
lines; the opening of a new law school as mentioned in 
the text; and the publication of the first law periodical 
were the most significant ones.“^2 However the Sultan did 
not show the same eagerness and good will with regards to 
his relationship with the attorneys as a group.
The mentality of the absolutist rule of Abdiilhamit II 
did not constitute a congenial context for the 
flourishing of the true professional role of attorneys, 
which in the brodest sense can be thought of as mediating 
between the established normative order guaranteed by the 
state on the one hand, and the diverse interests of the 
individuals and groups in the society on the other hand.^^
^2 For the details of law and judicial reforms during the reign of 
Abdiilhamit II, see Shaw History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern 
Turkey: Empire of the Gazis: the Rise and Decline of the Ottoman 
Empire 1280-1808, vol.l, pp.246-8; Cin and Akgündüz Türk Hukuk 
Tarihi, pp.432-42.
“^2 The rather implicit contradiction between the professional role of 
attorneys and the absolute rule can also be observed in France during 
the reign of Napoleon. Napoleon's famous statement concerning the 
restriction of oral defense by the attorneys and his order to include 
a phrase for loyalty to the Emperor into the oath of attorneys can be 
considered as a crucial indicator in this respect. See Toulemon, 
Barreau de Paris, (Paris, 1966), p.ll and Garçon, L'Avocat et la 
Morale, (Paris), 1963), p.61 quoted in Faruk Erem, Sözlü Savunma 
(Oral Defence) (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1977), pp.3-4.
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Besides, the ideological stance of most of the attorneys 
who had been among the Western-oriented elites reacting 
against the traditional bureaucracy and the Sultan, 
further reinforced the Sultan's negative attitude towards 
the attorneys as well as to their Association. In fact, 
the Istanbul Association of Attorneys had always been 
viewed with suspicion by the Ottoman State. The Sultan 
was very much disturbed by the meetings and activities of 
the association, and had fears concerning the potential 
threat that the Association could pose to his reign. 
Thus, he tried to diminish its powers whenever possible 
as it has been the case in the abolition of the 
requirement of license for the law cases.
Search for a New Identity
The Second Constitutional period (1909-1918) opened 
up a new era in the Ottoman politics towards political 
liberalization. The inauguration of the new regime 
occurred in two stages. The first stage came with the
All Kazancigil, "Türkiye'de Modern Devletin Oluşumu ve Kemalizm," 
(The Formation of Modern State in Turkey and Kemalism) in Türk Siyasi 
Hayatının Gelişimi (The Development of Turkish Political Life), Ersin 
kalaycıoğlu and Ali yaşar Saribay, eds. (Istanbul: Beta Yayıncılık, 
1986), p.181.
In the defensive statement that the Istanbul Association of 
Attorneys had made in 1921 in relation to a circular in the name of 
the Sultan, they mentioned the "psycopathical fears" of the Sultan 
for enacting the code concerning the abolishment of licence for law 
cases in 1886. For the original text of the statement, see Özkent, 
Avukatın Kitabı, pp. 98-103.
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revolution of July 1908 by Young Turks, which effected a 
return the Constitution of 1876. The second stage 
followed the counter coup of April 1909, the deposition 
of Abdülhamit II, the accession to the throne of Sultan 
Reşat.
That the new period would be one of significant 
political changes quickly became apparent. A more liberal 
constitution, reducing the Sultan to a constitutional 
monarch, defining his prerogatives more carefully than in 
the past and extending the rights and freedoms of the 
individuals, was created through amending some Articles 
of the 1876 Constitution.'*^
This rather liberal environment brought new hopes for 
the Istanbul Association of Attorneys for enhancing their 
professional interests. Within this post-July 1908 
enthusiastic atmosphere, a meeting was held by the 
Association with the aim of making themselves known to 
the new government. A new membership list was prepared 
with 125 members. The major concern was the maintenance 
of the honor and dignity of the profession. In this 
respect, making efforts to improve the image of the 
profession by adopting ethical standards and bolstering
For a detiled analysis of the Young Turk era, see; Feroz Ahmad, 
The Young Turks : The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish 
Politics, 1908-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
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their political efficacy so as to be able to get the 
government enact favorable legislation, appeared to be 
the most immediate goals.
The new government also seemed to be eager in this 
respect. As a result, the Ministry of Justice, by taking 
into account the views of the Association, prepared a 
detailed draft code. Among other things, the word Muhami- 
then prevalent in Egypt- was decided to replace the word 
"Vekil" as a first step to formulate a new identity for 
attorneys. Meaning "the one who protects and helps the 
people," the term could have changed the negative image 
of the vekils in the society. It was used in the
proposal of the draft code where the role of muhamis was 
defined as "...not only consisting of conveying the 
arguments of the parties to the court, which has earlier 
been the common understanding in respect to vekil,. but 
rather as a specialized job, that requires knowledge of 
law in order to interpret the codes and to help the 
realization of justice while defending the parties and 
help solving the disputes."^®
The word had also been used as the title of the periodical which 
had been started to be published in 1911 by the Istanbul Bar 
Association. Such a development, has been regarded as a "national 
fest" among the attorneys which has been mentioned in the cover page 
of the first volume. Ahmet îyimaya, Ankara Barosu'nun Kuruluş Tarihi 
Üzerine Bir Araştırma (A Research on the Establishment Date of the 
Ankara Bar Association) (Ankara, 1993), p.8.
For the details of the original proposal, which has been an 
important document as far as the modifications that the new 
government aimed to make for the profession is concerned, see Sadi
66
Besides this terminological change aiming to create a 
new image for wakils, the draft code included many 
articles on the legal and ethical standards for the 
practice of the profession as well as on the association 
of the profession. In this framework, bar associations 
which were to be formed in places, where more than ten 
muhamis have been working, were assigned the monopoly 
of issuing licences to the muhamis who wished to practice 
the profession.
Conceiving the enactment of the code as a necessary 
step for the development of the profession, the Istanbul 
Association of Attorneys took an active part for the 
enactment of the code.^° In this respect, it conveyed to 
the Ministery of Justice its views regarding the code.
Soon committees were formed having members both from 
the Association and the Ministry in order to work on the 
code. However, in spite of these efforts, the draft code 
and some others that have been formulated by different 
groups during the committee meetings, could not be 
enacted. Only a few codes re-regulating the licence 
requirement for the practice of the profession and
Sagnak and Kemal Boralıdağ, Avukatlık ve Baro (Attorneyship and the 
Bar Association) (Ankara: Yeni Cezaevi Matbaası, 1939), pp.24-5.
49 Ibid., pp.26-30.
At the time, many articles were published in a periodical called 
"Muhamat," concerning the advantages that the enactment of this code 
would bring regarding the Westernization of the country.
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regulating the licensing of those uneducated but 
experienced muhamis had been enacted.
However, such a failure of creating a new image for 
the profession and its associations was in contradiction 
with the general spirit of the time which has been 
characterized with serious efforts of modernization in 
social, political and legal spheres. Under the Committee 
of Union and Progress program, law and judicial reforms 
had been initiated with the ultimate aim of achieving 
secularization and thus reducing the influence of 
religious law in the Empire. In this respect, apart from 
the developments concerning the reorganization of
religious courts and measures concerning the improvement 
of law education both with respect to quality and 
quantity and the promulgation of the Family Regulation 
{Hukuk-i Aile Kararnamesi) which had given many rights to 
women concerning marriage had been important s t e p s . I n  
fact, through these developments "the same empire that 
had been so impressive with it's emphasis on the Şeriat 
ultimately evolved in such a way as to prepare the legal
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), p.229. The most important point within the 
framework of this regulation had been that it allowed women, at the 
time of betrothal, to write into the written marriage contract that 
should the husband take another wife, her marriage was immediately 
null and void.
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and judicial foundations for the most secular Islamic 
state of the twentieth century.
As far as the Code of Muhamat is concerned, the 
reason for its refusal had not been made clear 
officially. The lack of unity among the jurists of the 
time, showing itself as a growing tension between the 
proponents of Islamic and Western legal systems seemed to 
be an influential factor in this respect. But it should 
be noted that, even the mere preparation of such a code 
can be regarded as a positive step for the evolution of 
the profession/ as the work done during the preparation 
process constituted a basis for the future developments 
in the field, specifically in the early days of the 
Republican era.
During the Ottoman era, the final development 
concerning the profession was totally disappointing: 
Within the framework of legal order (Mehakim-i Hukukiyede 
Vekaletin Serbest Olduğu Hakkında Tamim) that was enacted 
in the name of the sultan in 1921, all the standards for 
the practice of muhamat in the law courts were abolished. 
The reaction of the Istanbul Association of Attorneys to 
this circular was very impressive. They made a statement 
in which besides stressing the need for further reform 
in the fields of law, judiciary and the profession, the 
policies of the Ottoman state towards the Association 
were severely criticized:
52 Carter Findley, "Mahkama," in Encyclopedia of Islam, vol.6
(Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1986), p.6.
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The Association thinks that the 
authorities which in the past helped in the 
development of the profession of Muhamat 
has nevertheless always had doubts on 
whether the Association, promoted the 
public interest. In fact, they conceived 
the demands made by the Association a sign 
of self-interest as well as steps for the 
monopolization of the profession by the 
Association and hence they tried to prevent 
such a monopoly on the part of the
Association.
This lack of trust and hostility on the part of the 
state towards Istanbul Association of Attorneys, then the 
only well organized bar association, has to be evaluated 
in a wider context of the state-civil society 
relationship in the Ottoman Empire.
The Ottoman-Turkish state constitutes a good example 
of a strong state, highly lacking intermediary structures 
between the state and the individual -.54 in its long 
process of evolution, the Ottoman-Turkish polity was 
marked by patrimonialism in which "the periphery was 
almost subdued by the centre. The centre, on its own, set 
norms of the polity namely justice, or keeping everybody
53 For the original text of the announcement, see Özkent, Avukatın 
Kitabı, pp.98-103.
Metin Keper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington, England: 
The Eothen Press, 1985).
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in his place and protecting the s u b j e c t s . A n d  
specifically with the Tanzimat reforms, perceiving 
themselves as primarily the servants of the state, the 
bureaucratic elites "devoted themselves exclusively to 
the secular interests of the s t a t e , t h e  emphasis always 
being on general interest.
Being totally alien to a system of representation by 
the estates, dominant in feudal polities, where all 
interests represented were special interests, the centre 
in the Ottoman polity did not face countervailing powers 
and appeared to have an indiscriminate hostility towards 
representation of sectional interests. In this regard 
the social groups were always suspect in the eyes of the 
s t a t e . T h e  state's attitude to the attorneys had not 
been different.
Ibid.,p.15.
56 See Carter Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: 
The Sublime Porte (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).
See Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish 
Politics?," Daedalus, 102 (1973), p.293.
Metin Heper, "The Recalcitrance of the Turkish Public Bureaucracy 
to 'Bourgeois Politics': a Multi-Factor Political Stratification
Analysis," The Middle East Journal, 30 (1976), pp.485-500.
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Chapter Three 
THE KEMALİST HERITAGE
The Kemalist Revolution as a Socio-Cultural and 
Political Force of Change
The year 1923 has been a turning point in Ottoman- 
Turkish history. After four years of war and foreign 
occupation, under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk the
new republic was established in October 29, 1923 and the
process of state and nation building began, giving an end 
to an almost six hundred years long Ottoman dynasty.
However, the victory of the War of Independence and 
the triumph of republicanism over the sultanate
constituted only the first steps, in the process of
Turkish modernization. During the following years, 
series of reforms have been initiated within legal, 
educational, social and political spheres, with the
ultimate aim of creating a "civilized" society, which
would have no ties with the Ottoman past.
In the Turkish revolutionary terminology, the concept 
of "civilization" had a significant place, due to its
diagnostic role with regard to the aims and the program 
of the revolution. In Kemal Atatürk's view, the ultimate 
goal of the revolution was "to raise the republican 
people to a stage of contemporary and civilized society 
in its truest meaning and form."! According to him, as
! Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri (Speeches and Statements of 
Atatürk), VOİ.2 (Ankara: Türk înkilap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1959), p.217.
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frequently mentioned in his speeches, the main reason of 
the backwardness and suffering of the people was due to 
their distant position to the contemporary world. In this 
respect, the Turkish people were obliged to be civilized 
with all their ideas and intellects. "2 What is meant by 
civilization is Western in essence, which is believed to 
be the only model for modernization. Here it should be 
noted that. Westernization within the framework of the 
Republican revolutionary agenda, is quite distinct when 
compared to Tanzimat and Meşrutiyet periods. During the 
earlier periods when Westernization was perceived 
mainly as "saving the state" without questioning the 
system as a whole. In the case of Kemalist revolution 
however, "civilization" involved more than the adoption 
of some superstructura! institutions, or in Kemal 
Atatürk's words "wearing a European dress", but took more 
of a shape of a cultural revolution aiming at radical 
changes in terms of social mentality, life styles and 
world view. 2 For preserving the existence of the new 
Republic, the only condition was the elimination of the 
"antiquated mentality, chained to the past."^
Within the framework of Kemalist thought, this kind 
of a transformation or, in the broader sense, 
civilization in the above mentioned meaning of the term
2 Ibid.
2 Tank Zafer Tunaya, Devrim Hareketleri içinde Atatürk ve 
Atatürkçülük (Atatürk and Atatürkism within the Revolutionaty 
Movements) (Istanbul; Turhan Kitabevi, 1981), pp.143-7.
 ^Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, vol.2, p.l81.
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could only be achieved with the guidance of "science, " 
which in Kemal Atatürk's view was the "truest guide in 
life" and the essence of Western civilization.^
This mentality is very much related with the 
philosophical roots of Kemalist thought. The traditional 
Ottoman-Islam thought has been alien to the Western 
philosophical tradition. Although with the Tanzimat 
period the influence of Western thought began to spread 
the question was formulated around what could be taken 
from the West in order to save the state. Thus there did 
not develop a foundation for a wholesale project of 
transformation.^ In this respect the peculiarity of 
Kemalism comes to the fore as it was based on positivist 
thought. Reason and science, the basic tenets of
positivist thought, constituted a framework for
Kemalists, in formulating solutions for national and 
international problems.”^ This rational and scientific 
approach has been indispensable, specifically in 
respect to the profile of the new citizen which the 
revolution aimed to mould out. In this context, the 
republican individual was to be a rational and anti-
5 Ibid., p.l97.
 ^Taner Timur, Türk Devrimi: Tarihi Anlamı ve Felsefi Temeli (Turkish 
Revolution: Historical Meaning and Philosophical Basis) (Ankara: 
Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1968), p. 113.
 ^ İsmet Giritli, Atatürk'ün 100. Doğum Yıldönümünde Kemalist Devrim 
ve İdeolojisi (Kemalist Revolution and Its Ideology in the 100^^ 
Birth Anniversary of Atatürk) (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi, 
1981), p.90.
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clerical person, approaching all matters intellectually 
and objectively.
With these concerns, the effort to attain the basic 
ideal of Westernization has involved an objection to the 
political and social side of Islam, which was a dominant 
force both at the state and societal level. Involving the 
separation of the state from the institutions of Islam 
and the liberation of individual's mind from the 
restraints imposed by the traditional Islamic concepts 
and practices. Westernization accompanied a shift in the 
basis of political legitimization, symbols of the 
political community, as well as of the boundaries of the 
collectivity.®
In this respect, instead of an Islamic 
Weltanschaung, the Kemalists aimed at bringing in 
nationalism and secularism as the cultural basis of the 
new society. The "unity of language, culture and ideal"^ 
have constituted the main criteria for being a nation in 
the republican sense of the word, which were manifest in 
cultural reforms. Relying principally on a linguistic and 
cultural reconstruction, the Turkish revolution aimed at
® Samuel N. Eisenstadt, "The Kemalist Regime and Modernization: Some 
Comparative and Analytical Remarks," in Atatürk and the Modernization 
of Turkey, Jacob M. Landau, ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1984), p.9.
 ^ According to Atatürk, "a nation is a social and political 
formation comprising citizens linked together by the community of 
language, culture and ideal." See A. Afetinan, Medeni Bilgiler ve M. 
Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları (Civil Instructions and the Handwritings 
of M. Kemal Atatürk) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1969), p.l8.
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formulating a nationalist identity which would replace 
the spiritual commitment once reserved to religion.
An important step in this respect was the language 
reform, which involved the displacement of Arabic script 
by Latin script and aimed at the "Turkification" of 
language, the major goal being the elimination of the 
Ottoman heritage and replacement of the scholastic 
mentality of the past with a Western one. Within this 
framework, Arabic and Persian were eliminated from the 
school curriculums and words of foreign origin were 
replaced by those of purely Turkish origin, under the 
leadership of the Turkish Language Society established 
in 1932. Also, being a significant part in the creation 
of a new national identity, nationalist theories of 
language - such as Sun Language theory, according to 
which Turkish was the first language on earth, and 
history - maintaining that the Turks were the initial 
people and all human achievements were carried out by 
Turks - were attempted to be exposed under the leadership 
of the Turkish Historical Society established in 1930.
For an elaboration of the significance of language reform and the 
nationalist theories of history within the framework Turkish 
nationalism, see A. Afetinan, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Türk Devrimi 
(Turkish Republic and Turkish Revolution) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 
1977), pp.188-95; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp.420-31, 356. As an 
example of the nationalist interpretation of Turkish history, see 
Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları (Basic Features of Turkish History) 
(Istanbul: Devlet Matbaaasi, 1931). The book was published under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Education.
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In relation to the exposition of the nationalist 
doctrines at the cultural sphere, the role of religion as 
a factor of national cohesion has also been totally 
eliminated from the definition of millet (nation) which 
has referred essentially to religious communities in the 
Empire as well as iimmet which before the Kemalist 
revolution denoted the Islamic community.As mentioned 
in the Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution, "The people 
of Turkey, regardless of religion and race" were accepted 
to be "Turks with regards to citizenship." Thus, the 
people were to derive their civil status not as members 
of a religious community but as individual citizens of a 
state. There was no differentiation by religion, 
emphasizing the creation of a Turkish nation living on 
Turkish territory. This connoted the conversion of 
Turkish Muslims who had a sense of belonging to an 
international community of Muslim faith to Muslim Turks 
belonging to Turkish nation.
In the broadest sense, it is important to note the 
fact that, the Turkish revolution has brought two forces 
face to face; the forces of tradition which tend to
It must be mentioned that in the Republican era, the masses 
"accepted nationalism by identifying it with religion." See Kemal 
Karpat, Turkey's Politics; The Transition to Multi— Party Politics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p.254.
Hamza Eroglu, "Atatürk'e Göre Millet ve Milliyetçilik," (Nation 
and Nationalism According to Atatürk) in Atatürk Yolu (The Path of 
Atatürk) (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil Ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, 1987), 
pp.131-59; Suna Kili, Atatürk Devrimi: Bir Çağdaşlaşma Modeli
(Atatürk Revolution: A Model of Civilization) (Ankara: Türkiye îş
Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1983), pp.230-46.
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promote the domination of religion and sacred law and the 
forces of change- the Kemalists.^^ in this framework the 
major aim was formulated around the idea of reducing the 
influence of the religious class in controlling both the 
state and society.
At the state level, this was realized with the 
abolition of Caliphate in March 3, 1924. Abolition of the 
office of Şeyhülislam and the ministry of religious 
affairs and its replacement by religious affairs and 
religious foundations which were placed directly under 
the prime ministers office had been the complimentary 
steps.
At the societal level, the reflection of the above 
mentioned aim had been realized under the reforms carried 
out both at the social and legal spheres. Among the most 
significant ones were: the elimination of the religious 
schools from the educational sphere and the establishment 
of a unified system of national education under the 
Ministry of Education (March 3, 1924); the prohibition of 
the wearing of turban and fez and the adoption of hat as 
the proper headgear (November 25,1925); the replacement 
of Islamic time and calendar system with the 
international one; and the measures concerning the
Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: 
McGill University Press, 1964), p.6.
For a detailed analysis of the abolution of Caliphate, see Seçil 
Akgün, Halifeliğin Kaldırılması ve Laiklik (Abolution of Caliphate 
and Laicism) (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, no publication date
mentioned).
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betterment of the social and political status of women in 
society.
Apart from the above mentioned reforms, however, the 
reforms that had been made within the sphere of law and 
judiciary deserves particular attention. In this respect, 
while constituting a significant aspect of this study due 
to its being a frame of reference in analyzing the 
attorneys and their associations, the importance attached 
to the modernization of law and judiciary within the 
Kemalist reforms is largely related to their two- 
dimensional significance both at the state and societal 
level. In fact, the law and judicial reforms had been a 
manifestation of the new social and political formation 
by reformulating the relationship between the citizens as 
well as between the citizens and the state.
The Reform of Law and Judiciary
The Kemalist reforms within the sphere of law have 
constituted one of the most significant aspect of the 
Turkish modernization. Within the framework of the
For a detailed analysis of Kemalist reforms, see Afetinan, 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Türk Devrimi, pp.164-96; Stanford J. Shaw and 
Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: 
Reform, Revolution, and Republic; The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808- 
1975, VOİ.2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp.384-88; 
Ayferi Göze, İnkılap Tarihimiz ve Atatürk İlkeleri (Our History of 
Revolution and Principles of Atatürk) (İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 
1985), pp.447-57; Ahmet Mumcu, Türk Devriminin Temelleri ve Gelişimi 
(The Bases and Development of Turkish Revolution), 9^^ ed. (Istanbul: 
İnkilap Yayınevi, 1984), pp.145-70.
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project of civilization, the law reform constituted the 
major tool in trying to reconstruct the social practices 
and cultural habits of the new Turkish society, deviating 
to a large extent from the Tanzimat understanding during 
which the reforms in the specific field of law were 
perceived merely as a part of administrative and 
commercial measures.
Being in line with the revolutionists' desire of 
secularization and modernization of the institutions, the 
reforms of law and judiciary opened up a new era as far 
as of the Ottoman-Turkish legal history is concerned. In 
this respect, while the Tanzimat Reforms had given an end 
to a system which was entirely based on Islamic law and 
initiated a new system based on the coexistence of two 
totally different systems of law -European vs. Islamic-, 
Kemalist reforms of law, going a step further, 
terminated this dualism, and established a legal system 
based upon the Continental European model.
At the outset of the revolution, the law reform was 
formulated around the idea of the rearrangement of "the 
existing legal provisions" in a way which would match the 
needs of society and the changing order. In this regard.
Mümtaz Soysal, Anayasaya Giriş (Introduction to Constitution) 
(Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1969), p. 6- 
7. For a similiar assesment, also see Hifzx Timur, "The Place of 
Islamic Law in Turkish Law Reform," Annales de la Faculte de Droit 
d*Istanbul, 6 (1956), p.76.
Vakur Versan, "The Kemalist Reform of Turkish Law and It's 
Impact," in Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey, Jacob M. 
Landau, ed., p.247.
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the new government almost immediately set about the task 
of finding a substitute for Mecelle. For this purpose, in 
1923 two special commissions, Ahkam-i Şahsiye Komisyonu 
and Vacibat Komisyonu were established under the Ministry 
of Justice and a new draft on Family Law was prepared. 
However the work of the commissions , which had strong 
signs of influence of Şeriat and resembled the previous 
draft prepared in 1917, was not radical enough as far as 
the Kemalists desire of secularization was concerned.^® 
This strong influence of Islamic law was largely due to 
the dominance of conservative view among the legal 
professionals of the time. In this respect as indicated 
by Seyit Bey, then the Minister of Justice, laws were the 
reflections of the traditions of a society thus in a 
country where the traditions were reflected in religion 
the law and religion could not be separated.This line 
of thinking which in fact was an extension of the view 
represented by Cevdet Paşa during the Tanzimat era, stood 
in direct contrast with the idea of total secularization 
that started to gain significance among the Kemalist 
cadre. At this point, a choice was to be made between 
adoption of the Islamic and the Western legal systems. 
And the solution to this inherent contradiction lied in 
adoption of the latter course of action.
Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoglu, Türk Medeni Hukukunun Umumi Esasları 
(General Principles of Turkish Civil Law), vol.l (Istanbul: Istanbul 
Matbaacılık, 1968), pp.69-71.
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, p.508.
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"Superstition and arbitrariness within the sphere of 
law" has been regarded by Mustafa Kemal as "the most 
dangerous obstacle within the path towards civilization 
which must be totally eliminated, And for the 
realization of the ultimate revolutionist aim of 
civilization, "the existing provisions of the Turkish law 
should not fall below the laws of the civilized 
countries. "21 This view was also strongly evident in a 
speech given in 1925 by Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, then the 
Minister of Justice. According to him, the aim of the 
revolution was the acceptance of the Western 
civilizations. And all the forces which opposed this aim 
had to be destroyed. All the laws had to be adopted from 
the West.22
Soon in this framework, an extensive series of 
legislative activity were undertaken, which soon ended up 
as one of the most radical law reform of modern times.23 
The new civil code which was virtually a translation of
2*^ Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, vol.l, p.330.
21 Ibid., p.341.
22 Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, "Türk Medeni Kanunu Nasıl Hazırlandı?," (How
the Turkish Civil Code had been Prepared?) in Medeni Kanunun 15. 
Yıldönümü İçin (On the Occasion of the ISl-l^  Anniversary of the 
Promulgation of Civil Code) (Istanbul: Istanbul Hukuk Fakültesi,
1944), p.ll.
23 The Turkish law reform has been evaluated as being one of the most
significant event in the Middle Eastern history since the acceptance 
of Islam. See L. Ostrorog, The Angora Reform: Three Lectures
Delivered at the Centenary Celebrations of University College on June 
27, 28, and 29, 1927 (London: University of London Press, 1927),
p.l4, quoted in Velidedeoglu, Türk Medeni Hukukunun Umumi Esasları, 
p.87.
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the Swiss Civil Code of 1912, came into force with slight 
modifications, on October 4, 1926, promising very radical 
changes in Turkish society. The promulgation of the new 
code had been thought to be a significant instrument to 
"save the Turkish nation from false beliefs, traditions, 
and fluctuations since the Tanzimat. And in this respect, 
it had the potential of closing the doors of an old 
civilization. "2'^ Abolition of polygamy, introduction of 
judicial divorce, allowance of Muslims to change their 
faith were some of the most significant innovations 
indicating a complete break with the past.
Also the new code of obligations which followed 
textually the Swiss code of obligations and the new code 
of commerce borrowing provisions from German, French,and 
Italian codes, came into force on the same date with the 
Civil code and totally erased the influence of Islam in 
these spheres. On July 1, 1926, the new Penal Code came 
into force, replacing the 1858 French penal code with
Mahmut Esat, "Türk Kanunu Medenisi Esbabı Mucibe Layihası," 
quoted in Ferit H. Saymen, Notlu Sistematik Türk Kanunu Medenisi, 
Borçlar Kanunu ve Alakalı Hususi Mevzuat ile Tevhidi İçtiad 
Kararları, 5^^ ed. (İstanbul: Hak Kitabevi, 1957), p.lO.
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the Italian.By the early 1930s the reforms within the 
sphere of law have been more or the less completed.
In this regard, the judicial reforms which have been 
undertaken since the establishment of the Republic, had a 
great role in encouraging the process of recodification 
by forming an environment suitable for the application of 
the new codes. Thus the abolition of the religious courts 
together with Şeriat by the Judicature Reform Act of 
April 8, 1924, which became effective on May 1, 1924, was
the most significant step in this respect. With the 
abolition of the capitulations, the mixed courts which 
were responsible for solving the disputes among
foreigners living in the Ottoman territories were
nullified. 27
2^  For a detailed eloboration of the adoptation process of the new 
codes, see Özkan Tikveş, Atatürk Devrimi ve Türk Hukuku (Atatürk 
Revolution and Turkish Law) (Izmir: İstiklal Matbaası, 1975); Adli 
İnkılabın Ana Hatları (The Basic Features of Judicial Reform) 
(İstanbul: Alaeddin Kıral Basımevi, 1937), pp.9-23; Mustafa Aygün, 
Özel Hukuk Açısından Hukuk Devrimi (Law Reform from the Perspective 
of Private Law) (Ankara: Ajans Türk Matbaacılık Sanayii, 1983).
2^ The process of the adoption of Western legal system in Turkey had 
been regarded as constituting a clear contradiction of the dominance 
of power as the determinant of expansion or contraction of particular 
families of law during the world legal history. For the details of 
such an assesment, see John Schmidhauser, "Legal Imperialism: Its 
Enduring Impact on Colonial and Post-Colonial Judicial Systems," 
International Political Science Review, 3 (1992), pp.321-34.
27 Siddik Sami, "Lozan Muahedesinin Adli Teşkilatımızdaki Tesirleri," 
(The Impacts of Lozan Agreement on our Judicial Organization) 
Mülkiye, 28 (1933), pp.21-4.
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French courts were taken as a model in the 
reorganization of the republican courts. Under the Court 
of Cassation which was responsible for the review of 
questions of law, there were courts of first instance, 
the assize courts for more serious penal cases, the 
summary courts and the justice of the peace courts.28
This sudden launching of a totally secular system of 
law with so many new codes and the reorganization of the 
judiciary, had significant connotations for legal 
professionals. By introducing modern legal concepts and 
institutions to the legal system, the Kemalist law reform 
had inevitably resulted with confusion among the majority 
of the legal professionals and confronted the new 
government with the responsibility of recruiting the 
necessary personnel who will carry the republican 
ideology to the legal system.
Legal Professionals and the Kemalist Regime: A Tentative
Relationship
Legal Professionals: A Conservative Reaction
In Mustafa Kemal's view the republican legal 
professionals had to be one of the most important actors 
both in the establishment of the new Turkish society and 
preservation of the new regime. They had to be the true 
defenders of the republican ideology.29 However, from the
2® Siddik Sami, "Adliyemizdeki Yeni Temayüller," (New Trends in Our 
Administration of Justice) Mülkiye, 18 (1932), pp.2-8.
29 "Atatürk"ün Ankara Hukuk Fakültesi'ni Açış Nutku," (Speech made by 
Atatürk during the Opening Day of Ankara Law School) in Ankara Hukuk
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early days of the republic, it became clear that, they 
were far away from fulfilling such a mission, as the 
majority of them seemed to have an ideological stance in 
favour of the preservation of the old values and the old 
regime. This anti-revolutionary attitude shared by the 
majority of the Ottoman-Turkish legal professionals could 
to a certain extent be explained with the dominant view 
concerning the professional tendency towards conservatism 
of the legal professionals stemming from the nature of 
their profession.
In this respect, while interpreting legal texts or 
applying laws to specific cases, the legal professionals 
usually act within the framework of a form of thought 
and principles that has been formulated by the previous 
generations. And it can be argued that, their strict 
limitation by the pre-established rules while performing 
their profession, which renders them with certain habits 
of order and formalities, automatically causes a 
conservative trend in their world views, in a sense 
making them the servants of the tradition perhaps more 
than any other section in the society.At the political 
level, such a trend naturally renders them very hostile 
to the revolutionary spirit. Thus the ultimate aim
Fakültesi ve Mezunları (Ankara Law School and Its Graduates) (Ankara: 
Sevinç Matbaası, 1968), pp.4.
Harold J. Laski, A Grammer of Politics (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1929), p.572. For a similiar assesment, also see Harold D.
Laswell, Power and Personality (New York: W.W. Norton, 1948), p.l35.
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becomes the preservation of the existing o r d e r . Also, 
their close association with governments in power or 
regimes, due to the public character of the profession, 
like the institutions of army and education, has been an 
important aspect that makes the legal professionals 
supportive of the stability of regimes.
As far as the Ottoman-Turkish case is concerned, 
besides the conservatism inherent in the profession as 
discussed above, the infusion of Islam to the legal 
system and law has been among the most important aspects 
that explains the anti-revolutionist attitude of 
especially jurists and judges. Having had a religious 
education and being the interpreters of the sacred law, 
these people were largely endowed with an Islamic world 
view which made them one of the most tradition bound and 
conservative classes in the Empire. And of course, the 
Kemalist revolution basing itself to certain Western 
values was very much alien to their world view.
Moreover, these people, due to their special 
knowledge and monopoly of interpretation on sacred law 
had a separate station in society. Constituting a 
privileged body, they ranked among the highly honored 
classes in the Ottoman social system, and perhaps the
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Random
House, 1981), pp.322-3.
32 Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (Glencoe: 
Free Press, 1958), pp.7-8.
33 Albert Howe Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the 
time of Suleiman Maqnificient (New York: AMS Press, 1978), pp.220, 
225. First printed in 1913.
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closest one to the regime in terms of identification with 
its values. In this respect, the Kemalist revolution very- 
much contradicted with their interests.
As far as the case of attorneyship is concerned, 
there appears to be a slight deviation. As mentioned 
above, attorneyship has been a rather new profession 
which has been imported to the Ottoman judicial system 
from the West during the Tanzimat period. In this regard, 
when compared to other legal professionals, attorneys 
have been much more Western oriented both with respect to 
their world view and professional commitments. Together 
with army officials, civil servants and journalists, they 
have been regarded among the major groups that had played 
a prominent role during the development of modern 
T u r k e y . I n  this regard, as far as their professional 
interests and status are concerned the Kemalist 
revolution would have positive implications since the 
revolution established a secular and modern Turkey. 
However, there still appears to be some question marks 
concerning their attitude towards the Kemalist ideology 
and Turkish nationalist movement.
The division within the Istanbul Bar Association 
which resulted in the establishment of Elinikon (Greek) 
and Armenian Bar Associations is worth mentioning. Also, 
the ideological stance of some Muslim attorneys in favor 
of the European powers and their anti-nationalist 
activities had been significant issues that raise
34 Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp.455-56,
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question marks concerning the position of the bar 
associations during the Kemalist Revolution. 5^
Besides these points, however, the election of Lütfü 
Fikri Bey as the chairman of the Istanbul Bar
Association constitutes the most illuminating indicator 
concerning the stance of the attorneys. Being one of the 
well known attorneys, educated in France, and deputy 
during the Second Constitutional Era, Lütfü Fikri was 
very much in opposition to the abolition of Caliphate as 
well as to the establishment of the new regime and 
identified himself with the precepts of constitutional 
m o n a rchy.In his open letter to the Caliph which was 
published in one of the well known newspapers of the 
time. Lütfü Fikri briefly mentioned his concerns related 
to the abolition of Caliphate and accused the new regime. 
By defining the Caliphate as the most precious spiritual 
inheritance for the Turks, he interpreted the Kemalist 
desire for its abolition as a shameful betrayal coming
All Haydar Özkent, Avukatın Kitabı (Attorneys Book) (Istanbul: 
Arkadaş Basımevi, 1940), pp.111-3.
Lütfü Fikri, "Necmettin Sadık Bey"e Cevabimdir," (My Response to 
Sadık Bey) Akşam (İstanbul daily), November 15, 1923 quoted in Murat 
Çulcu, Hilafetin Kaldırılması Sürecinde Cumhuriyetin İlanı ve Lütfü 
Fikri Davası (Establishment of the Republic and the Case of Lütfü 
Fikri Within the Process of Abolution of Caliphate) (Istanbul: Kastaş 
Yayınları, 1992), pp.101-6. For a detailed elaborating of the 
political standing of Lütfü Fikri Bey, also see the court records of 
the trial of Lütfü Fikri Bey in the Tribunals of Independence quoted 
in ibid., pp. 167-271; Lütfü Fikri Bey'in Günlüğü "Daima Muhalefet” 
(The Diary of Lütfü Fikri Bey "Continuous Opposition") (Istanbul: 
Arma Yayınları, 1991).
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from the Turks themselves.^ 7 in Mustafa Kemal's view, "the 
election of such a person who has proudly declared 
himself as being on the part of the Caliphate as the 
chairman of the Bar Association by the well-educated and 
the highly specialized members of the Association 
constituted a strong evidence of the attitudes of "the 
outdated legal professionals of the outdated law" towards 
the Republican world view.^s
Molding Out the New Profile of the Profession
The Reflections of The Distrust: The Case of the 
Tribunals of Independence
Regarding the legal professionals as the "greatest 
and the most deceitful enemies of the republican 
regime,... aiming to sentence both the principles and the 
defenders of the r e v o l ution,the Kemalist cadre was 
very much irritated by the potential harm that this 
attitude could cause to the new regime. There was an 
ongoing distrust on the part of the new regime towards 
the judiciary and its personnel.
7^ Lütfü Fikri, "Huzur-u Hazret-i Hilafetpenahiye Açık Arıza," Tanin 
(Istanbul daily), Noveinber 10, 1923, quoted in Çulcu, Hilafetin 
Kaldırılması Sürecinde Cvunhuriyet'in İlanı ve Lütfü Fikri Bey Davası, 
pp.66-72.
"Atatük'ün Ankara Hukuk Fakültesini Açış Nutku," in Ankara Hukuk 
Fakültesi ve Mezunları, p.3-4. For a similar assessment of Atatürk 
concerning his reaction towards the legal professionals due to their 
conservative attitutes, see Atatürk"ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, vol.2, 
pp.238-9.
"Atatürk'ün Ankara Hukuk Fakültesini Açış Nutku," in Ankara Hukuk 
Fakültesi ve Mezunları, p .4.
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In this respect, the establishment of the Tribunals 
of Independence which were permanent courts (1920 -1926) 
aimed to protect the revolutionary government against any 
reactionary movement and thus eliminate persons that the 
regime classified as undesirable, can be considered as 
the significant indicator of the suspicion the Kemalists 
towards the judiciary and its personnel.
It can be said that, as interpreters of laws and 
facts, the ideological stance of judges prove to be very 
influential during the process of conflict resolution due 
to their potential of being prone to have preconceived 
political v i e w s . A s  long as the system was an autocracy 
and Ottomans as a rule were for autocracy, judges were 
royal to the autocracy as a matter of course, and their 
conservative interpretations raised no problems. But once 
Turkey became a Republic, there appeared to be a 
possibility of the judges remaining autocratic at heart; 
their legal interpretations could tend to oppose the 
basic principles of the republic.The parliamentary 
representatives of the people were to have ultimate 
authority over the judiciary. Being instriaments for the
For example, in a case study on British judiciary, it has been 
stated that "The monopoly of the judiciary by anti-trade union judges 
in Britain has perpetuated a legal framework in which workers' 
interests have remained threatened during the Conservative Party rule 
in 1979". See Frank Belloni, "The Labour Community and the British 
Judiciary," International Political Science Review, 3 (1992), p.270.
Such a distrust was very much evident in a speech of Mustafa Kemal 
that he made in Eskişehir in 1925, see Atatürk'ün Söylev ve 
Demeçleri, vol.2, p.254.
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consolidation of the Republic, these courts were 
directly responsible to the Grand National Assembly. And 
most importantly, all the judges were appointed from 
among the members of the Grand National Assembly. These 
people, having different occupational backgrounds 
including law, had strongly committed themselves to
Kemalist values.
Moreover, the negative attitude of the judges towards 
the attorneys during the cases within the Tribunals of 
Independence, can be considered as a very questionable 
issue that must be mentioned. In this respect, although 
there had not been an article that prohibited the right 
of defense by an attorney, within the framework of the 
Code on the Tribunals of Independence (İstiklal Mehakimi 
Kanunu), in many cases the demand of the convict in this 
regard had been refused.In this respect, while bringing 
into the agenda the question of the legality of the 
procedures that were employed during the cases in the 
Tribunals of Independence, such an attitude can well be 
interpreted as a manifestation of a rejection of the 
significance of the mechanism of defense and the role of
^^On Tribunals of Independence, see Ergun Aybars, İstiklal 
Mahkemeleri (Tribunals of Independence) (Ankara: Bilgi Basımevi, 
1975).
Mete Tunçay, T.C 'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması (1923-1931) 
(The Establishment of Single Party Administration in the Turkish 
Republic 1923-1931), 3^^ (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992), p.l70.
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the attorneys together with a distrust towards the 
group.
Within such an atmosphere of distrust, towards the 
ordinary jurisdiction and legal professionals, Kemalists 
were aiming to mold out a totally new profile for the 
group which would have the necessary qualifications 
needed for the survival of the new legal system and
regime.
Steps Towards Creating "Republican Type" Jurists
Kemalists were eager in reminding the legal
professionals their mission and responsibilities by
certain warnings and speeches. In a sense this was an 
effort for the creation of the above mentioned 
"republican-type" professionals through indoctrination. A 
clear example of this was the regulation which was sent 
to public prosecutors in 1928 by Hamdullah Suphi 
Tanriover, than the Minister of Justice. Tanriover was
warning the prosecutors by calling their attention to 
their ultimate mission with the following words: "You the
republican prosecutors! I once again want to remind you, 
your primary and most significant responsibility. Don't 
you ever forget that you are given the mission of
During one of the cases in the Tribunals of Independence, the 
attorneys who were present in the court room had been arrested just 
because of their explanation that they were there to defend the 
convicts. Perhaps, this has been the most extreme example showing the 
negative attitude of the judges in the mentioned tribunals towards 
the attorneys. See Halikarnas Balıkçısı, Mavi Sürgün (Blue Exile) 
(Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1971), p.62.
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protecting the republic and you have to fulfil this goal 
in spite of all the obstacles you may face."'^ ^
Within this framework of the wish to create a new 
generation of legal professionals some measures were 
taken by the government. For instance the Turkish 
translations of some of the Swiss commentaries on the 
Swiss civil code and Italian commentaries on the Italian 
penal code were published; some Turkish jurists that have 
studied abroad, especially in France and Germany were 
employed in key positions related to judicial affairs; 
the libraries particularly that of Grand National 
Assembly acquired numerous volumes on Western law.^^
Besides these efforts, steps taken in the field of 
law education for instance the establishment of a new law 
school in Ankara and the reform of Istanbul Law School. 
Due to their long term implications these steps deserve 
special attention here. Since the early days of the 
Turkish Revolution, the establishment of a law school in 
Ankara - the capital of the new republic -, had occupied 
a significant place in the policy agenda of the 
government. Besides being regarded as a precondition 
for the consolidation of the new legal system, the new
Baha Arikan, "Cumhuriyet Savcısı," (Republican Prosecutor) 
Cumhuriyet (Ankara daily), November 25, 1964.
Manley O. Hudson, "Law Reform in Turkey," American Bar Association 
Journal, 13 (1927), p.8.
Such a project of establishing a "revolutionist" law school at 
Ankara has been an issue for Mustafa Kemal as early as 1921. See 
Tunaya, Devrim Hareketleri İçinde Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük, p.l53.
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school's potential of being an alternative to Istanbul 
Law School in educating republican and revolutionist 
jurists and the inefficiency of the judicial mechanism in 
terms of personnel, especially the insufficiency of
judges both qualitatively and quantitatively, had 
constituted the basic motive in the decision to open this 
new school.^®
Being a strong indicator of the priority assigned to 
the issue, Ankara Law school has been established as the 
republic's first higher institution of education on 
November 1925.'^ ® As mentioned by Mustafa Kemal in his 
speech at the opening ceremonies, the aim of this new
institution was "to train a new generation with new legal 
principles who will be the real scholars of the Turkish 
republic and leaders of the new Turkish social life".^®
As a reflection of such a disposition at the
institutional level, the newly-established law training 
center had turned out to be the first and the main
The Istanbul Law school, with approximately forthy graduates a 
year, had a rather low capacity for filling the gap in the judicial 
cadres. Cemil Bilsel, "5 İkinciteşrin ve Mahmut Esat Bozkurt," 
(November 5 and Mahmut Esat Bozkurt) Ankara Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, 
3 (1944), p.310.
For the parliamentary discussions concerning the establishment of 
the school, see T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi, vol.l4 (1341), pp.310-311, 
314, 328, 330-331, 334-344. For the details of the historical 
evolution of the school, see M. Cemil, "Ankara Hukuk Fakültesinin 
Kuruluşu," (The Establishment of Ankara Law School) Hukuk Aylık 
Mesleki Mecmua, 1 (1933), pp.1-39.
"Atatürk"ün Ankara Hukuk Fakültesini Açış Nutku," in Ankara Hukuk 
Fakültesi ve Mezunları, p.4. Emphasis is mine.
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example of the Kemalist higher educational policy which 
was formulated along the idea of the reconstruction of 
educational institutions in accordance with the aims and 
needs of the regime.This was clearly observable both at 
the structural and academic levels.
In this respect, in contrast to the Istanbul Law 
school, the new law school had very close ties with the 
government. During the first ten years after its 
establishment, the law school - its first official name 
being "A Higher Professional School of the Ministry of 
Justice" has been attached to the Ministry of Justice 
both financially and administratively.^^ In fact, the 
location of this institution in the capital of the new 
republic can be considered as a sign of the intention of 
the government in supervising and controlling it.
Moreover, when the academic staff is concerned, 
although very few in number at the beginning, all of them 
were closely identified with the Kemalist world view, 
being either chosen by the Ministry of Justice from among 
the jurists that had studied abroad or the ones holding 
the key positions in the Ministry of Justice, including
Tuğrul Ansay, "Hukuk Eğitiminde Reform," (Reform of the Law 
Education) Ankara Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, 26 (1969), p.263.
In 1927, as a result of a decision by the Council of Ministers, 
the name was changed to Ankara Law Faculty. On July 13, 1946, the 
University of Ankara was founded and the Ankara Law faculty was 
incorporated into the University as one of its basic Faculties.
53 3gg "Ankara Adliye Hukuk Mektebi Talimatnamesinin Mer'iyete Vaz'ı 
Hakkında Kararname No. 2740," (The Decree on the Entry into Force of 
the Regulation Concerning the Establishment of Ankara Law School No. 
2740) Düstur, Üçüncü Tertip, vol.7, pp.104-107.
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the Minister of Justice himself as well as the deputies 
of Grand National Assembly. Being in line with the 
general outlook of the new school, there were also 
significant variances concerning the curriculum when 
compared to the Istanbul Law s c h o o l . I n  this respect, 
besides the major law courses that were in accordance 
with the new legal system, various courses on history had 
been integrated to the new curriculum. Among them, 
especially the inclusion of the course concerning the 
history of Turkish revolution deserves considerable 
attention as being a manifestation of the intention to 
transmit the official ideology to the new generation of 
legal professionals.^^
The establishment of a state dominated school has 
been the most important step in the path towards creating 
the "republican type" legal professional who will act as 
the guardian of the values of the new regime. However, it 
was not until the reformation of Istanbul Law School
For a detailed elaboration of the new law-training system with 
respect to methodology, see M. Emin Erişirgil, "Cumhuriyette Ekonomi 
ve Hukuk Tedrisatı," (Instruction of Economy and Law in the Republic) 
Siyasi İlimler, 91 (1938), pp.343-5; M. Emin Erişirgil, "Hukukun Üç 
Cephesi ve Hukuk Tedrisatı," (Three Faces of Law and Law Instruction) 
Siyasi İlimler, 82 (1938), pp.588-95.
For the details and a full list of instructors and courses during 
the early years of the new school, see Hüseyin Cahit Oğuzoğlu, 
"Ankara Hukuk Fakültesinin Kuruluş ve îlk Yılları," (The 
Establishment and the Early Years of Ankara Law School) Ankara Hukuk 
Fakültesi 40. Yıl Armağanı (Melange to the 40^^ Anniversary of Ankara 
Law School) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi, 1966), pp. 
12-37.
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under the broader program of the transformation of 
Darülfünun to Istanbul University, has this process been 
completed.
Being a part of Darülfünun which has been the oldest 
higher institution of learning with its roots in the 
Tanzimat period, Istanbul Law school, when compared to 
the new school, had a rather archaic structure both in 
its attitude concerning the Kemalist values and in its 
approach to current developments in the legal system.
This outmoded structuration had its clear reflections 
in the curriculum of the school. The appearance of the 
course on Islamic Law in the curriculum which was 
disregarded by Ankara Law School as well as the 
negligence of the courses of the History of Turkish Law, 
History of Turkish Revolution had been significant 
indicators of the conservativeness of the school.
As mentioned by Reşit Galip Bey, who had undertaken 
the reformation project of Darülfünun in 1933 as the 
Minister of Education, "Darülfünun had showed a strong
For the details of the transformation process, see Mete Tunçay and 
Haldun Özen, "1933 Darülfünun Tasviyesi veya Bir Tek Parti 
Politikacısının Önlenemez Yükselişi ve Düşüşü," (The 1933 Expulsion 
of Darülfünun or an Avoidable Rise and Fall of a Single Party
Politician) Tarih ve Toplum, October (1984), pp.222-236; E. Hirş,
Dünya Üniversiteleri ve Türkiye'de Üniversitelerin Gelişmesi 
(Universities in the World and the Development of Turkish
Universities), two volumes (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 1950).
For a complete list of the courses, see İstanbul Üniversitesi 
Kuruluş, Tarihçe, Teşkilat ve öğretim Üyeleri, 1453-1981 (The
Establishment, History, Organization and Instructors of İstanbul 
University) (Istanbul: Istanbul University, 1983), pp.25-6.
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detachment towards the Kemalist Revolutions.... There 
appeared to be radical transformations in the field of 
law, but it just stayed uninterested and indifferent, 
never trying to adapt itself to these changes...."58 
According to some republican intellectuals, this 
indifference among the majority of the staff members of 
Darülfünun, was surely a reflection of their anti- 
Kemalist and conservative world view, which was regarded 
as a very dangerous and unacceptable attitude, especially 
in the case of political science and law s c h o o l s .59
"The education of the future generations could no 
longer be undertaken by such an institution that closed 
all its doors to the revolutionary developments."5° Thus, 
within the framework of the law dated July 31, 1933, 
Darülfünun was abolished, and left its place to Istanbul 
University with a brand new outlook. As it has been the 
case in other faculties of the new University, in the law 
faculty, most of the academic staff were dismissed and
The statement by Reşit Galip, Minister of National Education, 
Hakimiyeti Milliye (Istanbul daily), August 1, 1933, quoted in ibid., 
pp.312.
5® Burhan Asaf, "Arkada kalan Darülfünun," (Darülfünun Which Lagged 
Behind) Kadro, August (1932), pp.47-48. For similiar assesments, also 
see Burhan Asaf, "Üniversite'nin Manası," (The Meaning of 
University) Kadro, August (1933), pp.24-28; Şevket Süreyya, 
"Darülfünun înkilap Hassasiyeti ve Cavit Bey İktisatçılığı," (The 
Revolutionary Sensitivity of Darülfünun and the Economy of Cavit Bey) 
Kadro, February (1933),p.8.
The Statement of Reşit Galip, the Minister of National Education, 
in Hirş, Dünya Üniversiteleri ve Türkiye'de Üniversitelerin Gelişimi, 
p.312.
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the curriculum had been revised, including the 
Turkification of the texts and adoption of new courses.
Kemalist Model of Attorneyship and Bar Associations: 
State Imperative in Effect
Initial Steps Within the Process of Reorganization
Within the climate delineated up to now, the 
reorganization of attorneyship and bar associations have 
been among the major issues that was given priority by 
the new regime. Just as the judicial and legal reforms 
were regarded as indispensable for the modernization of 
the new republic, the reorganization of the profession 
and its associations was viewed as a necessity for a 
well-functioning judicial mechanism by the Kemalists.^^
For the realization of this project, 
institutionalization of the profession both at the legal 
and societal levels was necessary. As for the former the 
Ottoman heritage of legal uncertainties concerning the 
practice of the profession had to be eliminated and 
attorneyship had to become an integral component of the 
judicial mechanism. This meant the adaptation of certain 
regulations concerning the specifications related to the 
nature and the practice of the profession and its
For detailed information concerning the instructors who had been 
dissmised from the Law School, see Mete Tunçay and Haldun Özen, 
"1933 Darülfünun Tasviyesi," (The 1933 Expulsion of Darülfünun) Yeni 
Gündem, October (1984), pp.16-9.
Statement made by the Minister of Justice Necati Bey, in the Grand 
National Assembly, quoted in Sadi Sağnak and Kemal Boralıdağ, 
Avukatlık ve Baro (Attorneyship and the Bar Associations) (Ankara: 
Yeni Cezaevi Matbaası, 1939), p.54.
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associations. As far as the latter one is concerned/ it 
entailed the reinstitutionalization of the profession as 
an honorable, earnest and nationalist one, which would 
give an end to the suspicion inherent both in society and 
the regime concerning the professional and political role 
of attorneys as well as their associations respectively.
Nevertheless, account must be taken of the fact that, 
the urgency attached to the issue, was also largely 
related with the discomfort caused by the anti­
nationalist and anti-Kemalist attitudes of some of the 
attorneys - especially within the Istanbul Dava Vekilleri 
Cemiyeti- during the National War of Independence and 
establishment of the Republic a point made above. Thus,
the priority given to the restructuration and
reorganization of Bar associations can well be
interpreted as the manifestation of the latent aim of
forming pro-regime associations which would work in
harmony with the new regime.
Celal Akyürek, "Avukat Nedir," (What is an Attorney) in Türkiye'de 
ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri *nde Barolar ve Hukukla İlgili Mesleki 
Teşekküller Hakkındaki Kongrenin Zabıtları (The Minutes of the 
Congress on Bar Associations and Professional Associations related 
with Law in United States and Turkey) (Ankara: Balkanoglu 
Matbaacılık, 1957), p.97. In fact, the formation of pro-regime 
associations on the part of the new government was not unique to Bar 
associations but included some other professional associations too. 
See Tank Zafer Tunaya, Siyasi Müesseseler ve Anayasa Hukuku 
(Political Institutions and Constitutional Law), 3^^ ed. (Istanbul: 
Istanbul Üniversitesi, 1975), p.493.
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In this respect, the Code of Muhamat which came into 
force on April 7, 1924 has been the first step.^^ Although 
very concise, it provided a general framework for the 
actualization of the above mentioned points and formed a 
basis for further regulations in the field. This new code 
opened up an era of reformation within the history of the 
profession. It was informed by the short term goal of 
giving an end to the dual structure of the bar 
associations in terms of qualifications of its members, 
inherited from the Ottoman era. In order to have a 
better understanding of the model that was aimed to be 
created by the Code of Muhamat, some its provisions need 
a more detailed elaboration.
The Process of Nationalization of Bar Associations
The refinement of the existing bar associations along 
the lines determined within the Code of Muhamat 
constituted one of the most important aspects of the 
process of forming the new republican identity of the 
profession and its associations.
In this respect, according to the Article 12 of the 
code, within two months after the enactment of the code, 
committees had to be formed and these committees had to 
start investigations on whether the members of the bar 
associations - which were established within the 
framework of the Regulation of Istanbul Dava Vekilleri 
(1876) - had the reiuired qualifications foreseen in the
For the original text of the code, see "Muhamat Kanunu No. 460," 
(Code on Attornyship No.460) Düstur, Üçüncü Tertip, vol.5, pp.384-7.
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code. The ones who had been assessed as non eligible were 
to be dismissed.
Following the enactment of the code, committees, 
composed of a top civil servant from the Ministry of 
Justice, four Judges and four attorneys from the 
association under investigation, were formed in several 
cities - Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa, Konya, Antalya, 
Samsun, Adana and Eskişehir - where the bar associations 
were l o c a t e d . T h e  preconditions which were specified 
under the Article 2 of the Code of Muhamat had 
constituted the main criteria for the committees" 
evaluations. In order to have the right of practicing the 
profession and thus being a member of the bar one had to 
be a Turkish citizen, must have the proper law training 
and practice as specified in the code, and have a 
reputation that was in line with the honor and dignity of 
the profession.
Among these criteria, some of which were very similar 
to the ones that had been put into effect in the former 
regulation (1876), the requirement of citizenship has 
been very significant as far as the nationalization of 
the bar associations are concerned. By giving an end to 
the cosmopolitan structure of the bar associations, in a 
way the inclusion of this new criterion had transformed 
them to a position of providing channels that enhance the 
sense of citizenship rather than being the mirrors of
Sağnak and Boralidag, Avukatlık ve Baro, p.56.
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racial, ethnic or other cleavages in society.Thus, 
serving as an integrating force among the members, in the 
long run, this new criterion had the potential of 
developing a new outlook for the bar associations both 
interms of defending the professional interests as well 
as promoting sensitivity towards the national problems.
While carrying out the investigations, apart from the 
explicitly defined criteria which citizenship formed a 
part, the committees also employed some moral standards 
which were related with the past reputation of the 
attorneys. In this respect, two criteria had been 
specified: treason which, in the broadest sense implied 
the anti-Kemalist and anti-nationalist stances during the 
national War of Independence and violation of allegiance 
to the professional ethics which denoted unfaithfulness 
to the clients and employment of illegal means during the 
practice of the profession.
It has with a view to these criteria that the 
cleansing of the bar associations had been completed 
giving way to the dismissal of many attorneys from the
The elimination of the Jews from the legal profession under the 
Nazi regime and the proof of "aryan" ancestary as a criteria for 
becoming a member of the bar associations can be considered as a good 
example of the bar associations to serve as aggravators of the ethnic 
conflicts in the society. See Hasan Şükrü, "Beynelmilel Avukatlar 
Birliği ve Beşinci Kongresi," (International Union of Bar 
Associations and Its Fifth Congress) Mülkiye, 3 (1933), p.36; 
Reinhard Bendix, From Berlin To Berkeley (New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
Transaction Books, 1986), p.ll6.
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profession.67 In this respect, the "refinement" that has 
been realized within the Istanbul Bar Association 
constitutes a striking example in understanding the 
extent and scope of the project; the latter has ended up 
with the dismissal of 374 attorneys out of a total of 
805.68
Having had a quite distrustful relationship with the 
majority of the legal professionals as well as the 
attorneys during the establishment of the new regime, for 
the Kemalists refinement of the bar associations 
constituted an important step in eliminating the 
opposition of this group to the new regime. However, when 
evaluated from the perspective of the bar associations 
such a refinement has automatically been regarded as an 
interference in their internal affairs and an attempt 
towards eliminating their autonomy. This was specifically 
evident for the Istanbul Bar Association, it being the 
most institutionalized bar. Such a reaction was very much 
evident in a telegram of Lütfü Fikri - the head of the 
Istanbul Bar Association - which he had sent to the 
Minister of Justice Necati Bey, under whom the project
67 Such a refinement - with the same political and professional 
concerns - had also took place in Italy under the guidance of the 
Ministry of Justice in 1926. See, Şinasi Devrin, "Avukatlık Mesleği 
Hakkında Yeni Cereyan ve Temayüller," (New Developments and Trends 
Concerning the Profession of Attorneyship) Istanbul Barosu Mecmuası, 
special issue published for the fifteenth anniversary of the 
establishment of the Republic, (1938), p.318.
6Ö Vatan (Istanbul daily), August 26, 1340(1934), August 29, 1340 
(1934), quoted in Tunçay, T.C.'nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 
(1923-1931), p.82.
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had been initiated, before the realization of the 
refinement. By protesting the interference of the state. 
Lütfü Fikri strongly criticized the policy of the state 
and mentioned his discomfort and opposition in a fierce
way. 69
However, although faced with an opposition from the 
bar, the suspicion inherited from the past experience 
largely shaped Kemalist policy towards the associations, 
bringing in the necessity for supervising the profession 
and it's associations. Perhaps the election of Lütfü 
Fikri who had an anti-Kemalist attitude as mentioned 
above, as the head of the bar association for eight 
consecutive times since 1920, and continuing even after 
the refinement, had been a significant factor in 
strengthening this suspicion and shaping the policy 
agenda of the state towards the bar associations during 
the 1930s.71
Mehmet Reşit, "Meşrutiyet Muhalefetinden Bir Sayfa: Lütfü 
Fikri*nin Siyasi Mücadeleleri^" (A Page from the Opposition in the 
Constitutional Era: The Political Struggles of Lütfü Fikri) Hürriyet 
(Istanbul daily)^ 2-3 October 1952^ quoted in Lütfü Fikri Bey*in 
Günlüğü  ^ p.l89.
Ali Haydar, "Lütfü Fikri Bey*in Ölümü," (The Death of Lütfü Fikri 
Bey) İstanbul Barosu Mecmuası, 13 (1934), p.4432.
In fact, the state policy towards the bar associations did not 
constitute an exception to the general trend on the part of the state 
in controlling other professional associations. In this respect, 
specifically there appears to be a paralelity between the Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry and the Bar Associations with respect to their 
organization and the established state control mechanism, see Ayşe 
Öncü, "Cumhuriyet Devrinde Odalar," (The Chambers in the Republican
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The New Restructuration of The Bar Associations: An 
Institutional Perspective
It has been within the framework of this new code 
that, for the first time in the Ottoman-Turkish legal 
history, attorneyship has been regarded as a profession, 
having legally defined rights duties and 
responsibilities. In this respect, the réintroduction of 
licensing as being the prerequisite for being able to 
practice the profession can be considered as the most 
significant step within the process of the modernization 
of attorneyship and its reinstitutionalization as a full­
blown profession. Having lifted the profession to status 
longed for since the Ottoman era, the new code had also 
provisions concerning the organization and authority of 
the Bar associations. However, although there were 
significant differences in this respect when compared to 
the Ottoman era, the new code has shown strong signs of 
being the extension of the view of closely supervising 
the professionals through their associations.
In this regard, the establishment of bar 
associations in places where the number of attorneys 
were ten or more and membership to these associations in 
order to be able to practice the profession legally were 
made compulsory. Apart from constituting a basis for the
Era) Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi  ^ vol.6 (1984), pp. 1566- 
70.
For a detailed comparison of the 1876 Dava Vekilleri Nizamnamesi 
and the Code of Muhamat, see Hamdi Halim, "Cumhuriyet Devrinde 
Avukatlık Müessesesi, * (The Institution of Attorneyship in the 
Republican Era) Istanbul Barosu Mecmuası, special issue (1933), 
pp.324-34.
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future effectiveness of the bar associations by 
encouraging an organizational structure covering nearly 
whole of the country this code established a mechanism 
for state-wide control of the profession.
As noted, the new code made membership to bar 
associations as a necessary condition for the practice 
the profession. In this respect, the candidates were 
obliged to make their applications for membership to the 
bar association in order to practice their careers. 
However, although bar associations have been defined as 
the official institutions where the applications had to 
be made, their authority within the process of licensing 
has been very much limited. The Ministry of Justice came 
to have a direct control of the process and the 
associations' authority was limited to the submission of 
a report to the Ministry of Justice on the assessment of 
the suitability of the candidates' qualifications for 
taking a license, the possession of which automatically 
resulted in membership to the association.
Besides the process of licensing which was an 
effective means for the Ministry of Justice to dominate 
the profession, an auto-control mechanism has also been 
established within the bar associations. The bar 
associations were ordered to establish disciplinary 
commissions which would have full autonomy in carrying 
out disciplinary investigations on members whose 
reputation were regarded not to be in line with the honor 
and dignity of the profession. The individual member who 
was decided to be dismissed from the association had the
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right to apply to the courts. Despite this overt increase 
in the authority of bar associations in controlling their 
members when compared to the licensing process, there 
still appeared to be some reservations on the part of the 
state in enhancing its own authority which became evident 
in a new code enacted in 1928. Within the framework of 
this code, the public prosecutors were given the right to 
initiate disciplinary investigations through disciplinary 
committees.
Consolidation of the New Model
As elaborated above, the Code of Muhamat had 
constituted the first step in the restructuration process 
of attorneyship and bar associations. In this respect, 
while forming the legal basis of the Kemalist project, 
aiming to replace the Ottoman identity of the profession 
and its associations with a republican one, the Code of 
Muhamat had set out the basic premises of the republican 
model whose cornerstone had been the state-wide control 
of the profession. However, despite its significance as a 
frame of reference for understanding the policy 
orientation of the new regime concerning the issue, the 
code seemed to have some shortfalls as far as providing a 
radical transformation in accordance with the Kemalist 
task at hand was concerned.
There were gaps in the code; they were gradually 
tried to be filled. However, the consolidation of the
Fuad Sedad Peçelioğlu, "Cumhuriyet ve Avukat," (The Republic and 
the Attorney) Istanbul Barosu Mecmuası, 10 (1943), p.602.
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State control and restructuration of the profession were 
not to be fully achieved till the enactment of Code of 
Attorneyship (Avukatlık Kanunu) in 1 9 3 8 . Apart from 
being a very detailed one when compared to the previous 
regulations in the field, the latter has been designed in 
such a way as to embody the Kemalist premises in the most 
comprehensive manner.
In this regard, according to Şükrü Saraçoğlu who had 
been the Minister of Justice then and had a prominent 
role in the enactment of the 1938 code, the 
reorganization of the profession within the framework of 
the mentality of the new regime constituted a necessary 
component for the full accomplishment of the Kemalist 
restructuration within the judicial and legal sphere and 
integration of attorneys to the new system.In fact, the
For the original text of the code^ see "Avukatlık Kanunu No. 
3499," (Code of Attorneyship No. 3499) Düstur, Üçüncü Tertip ,^ vol.l9, 
pp. 685-715. There had been many discussions in the parliament 
during the enactment of the Code of Muhamat in 1924, concerning the 
substitution of the arabic word muhamat with its latin rooted 
counterpart avukat for denoting attorney. Such a change was achieved 
within the framework of a code (no:708) in 1926 - after two years of 
the enactment of the Code of Muhamat - due to the conservative 
reaction within the parliament. Although being a minor aspect within 
the process of changing the profile of the profession, this 
sementical change can be considered as a significant indicator of the 
Kemalist project of modernizing the profession in all respects. For 
the above mentioned parliamentary discussions, see T.B.M.M. Zabıt 
Ceridesi, vol.8 (1340), pp.286-7.
*75 "Avukatlık Kanunu Layihası - Adliye Vekilimizin Nutku," (The Draft 
Code on Attorneyship - The Speech of Our Minister of Justice) 
Istanbul Barosu Mecmuası, 8-9 (1936), p.347.
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invitation of the representatives of the existing Bar 
associations’^^  to a meeting which was held by the ministry 
for the purpose of discussing the articles of the code 
before its enactment has been regarded by the minister 
himself as a manifestation of the integration desired by 
the new r e g i m e . Saraçoğlu mentioned the necessity and 
significance of such a rearrangement in a speech he had 
made during the mentioned meeting as follows;
In every country where a new regime has 
been established, the reorganization of the 
attorneyship along the principles of the 
regime has always appeared to be a 
necessity. Thus just as the Italian Code of 
Attorneyship has been drawn up with a view 
to the requirements of fascism and the 
German Code had strong signs of national 
socialism. In this respect, we have tried 
to prepare this code with the aim of 
restrenghening the profession along 
republican, nationalist, secular, statist 
as well as realist lines, that is of along 
Kemalist premises.
When evaluated within the above mentioned framework, 
there appears to be two closely related issues which
There were representatives from sixteen bar associations as well 
as from Turkish Attorney's Union See ibid., p.351. For the location 
of these associations, see Özkent, Avukatın Kitabı, p.l34.
"Avukatlık Kanunu Layihası- Adliye Vekilimizin Nutku," İstanbul 
Barosu Mecmuası, p.347.
Ibid., p.348.
111
deserve special attention - the first one being the newly 
recognized "public service character" of the profession 
which can be regarded to have laid down the
legitimization grounds for the second, that is the
extension of the state control on the profession and the 
bar associations.
The Quasi-Public Status of the Profession: Public 
Service-Private Gain
Under the new code, attorneyship has been regarded as 
a much valued profession, having a public service 
character. Within the framework of the code, the
dedication to legal knowledge and experience to attain 
justice were considered as the ultimate aim of the
profession. Being viewed as the agents of legal order 
because of their newly defined role as the legal co­
partners of the judge during the settlement of disputes 
in the court, profession was attributed a public service 
character having public obligations.
Despite this public status of the profession however, 
the attorneys were not actually officials of the state 
apparatus as their incomes consisted of fees paid by the
clients, unless, of course, they were employed by the
state. In this regard, on the one hand all properly 
accredited attorneys were to regard themselves as an 
integral part of the new republic, on the other hand they 
were a part of the commercial society.
In fact, such a disposition of placing the attorney 
in a dual position of pursuing a free profession and
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performing a public service had been an issue of great 
debate during the enactment process of the code and 
afterwards. There were mainly two different views. 
According to one view, attorneyship had to be organized 
as a free profession in the full sense of the term. The 
source of motivation while performing the profession was 
regarded as entrepreneurial spirit rather than the 
attainment of justice. Thus in this framework, the code 
was blamed for its endowment of the profession with 
special privileges that it did not deserve. The
alternative view was the statization of the profession 
and its establishment as a part of the civil service. 
Being a reflection of the etatist policies in the 
economic sphere, this view did not gain much ground as it 
was mentioned in the proposal of the Ministry of Justice 
that such a system had been tried in USSR just after the 
October 17 revolution, but did not work effectively.
The new code was midway between these alternative 
positions by combining their basic features. The 
authorities in the Ministry of Justice had analyzed the 
codes of many countries during the preparation process 
from which certain points had been integrated to the new 
code. Among them, however, the German Code of 1878 had
For an elaboration of the mentioned views, see T.B.M.M. Zabıt 
Ceridesi, vol.26 (1938), pp.345-351; Ali Şevket Erkün, "Avukatlık 
Mesleği ve Devletçilik Rejimi," (The Profession of Attorneyship and 
the Regime of Etatism) Hukuk Dünyası, 1 (1944), pp.44-45, 48.
"Avukatlık Kanunu Layihası ve Adliye Encümeni Mazbatası, (1/962)," 
(The Draft Code on Attorneyship and the Report of Judicial Counsel) 
in T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi, vol.26 (1938), p.2.
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been the most influential one and served as a model 
specifically on disciplinary issues.si Although not 
mentioned officially by the authorities, the code also 
resembled in some respects the one that had been prepared 
during the Nazi Regime.S2
Being defined as a free profession having public 
service characteristics and a quasi-public status the 
main characteristics of attorneyship within the framework 
of the new code can be summarized as follows. The
pursuit of attorneyship was free, but at the same time it 
depended upon admission to the bar by public authority; 
the attorney was subject to disciplinary authority but, 
on the other hand, he had no official superior, nor did 
he have any civil service obligations. He had a public
status®^ and yet he was no civil servant. He held that
office not by virtue of his duties of service, but
instead made a trade of transactions whose pursuit 
belonged to that office.
With regard to this special status, attorneys were 
expected to give priority to the interests of the 
republican regime - widely believed by the Kemalists to
Ibid.
For the original text of this code, see "Alman Avukatlık Kanunun 
Son Muaddel Şekli," (The Text of the German Code on Attorneyship with 
Its Final Amendments) Istanbul Barosu Mecmuası, 10 (1936), p.209-37.
For example, according to the Article 48 of the code, the related 
articles of the Turkish Criminal Code which are applied to the 
fellonies committed against the civil servants, are defined to be 
valid also for the fellonies which are committed against the 
attorneys during the practice of the profession.
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correspond to those of the public - while performing 
their professional duties, as it had been the case for 
the civil servants. According to Article 117 of the code, 
attorneys were forbidden to defend persons accused of 
acts committed against the basic tenets of the new 
Turkish state®“* including national unity. Promoting 
fundamentalism was considered such an act. Communist 
activities had also been regarded as being among the 
acts against the state during the initial discussions of 
the code in the Ministry.®® However, it has been omitted 
from the code largely due to the salience of the idea 
that the inclusion of the word "communism" as being an 
act committed against the state could have the potential 
of affecting the Turkish-Soviet relations adversely.®®
While being regarded as an automatic outcome of the 
public service label attached to the profession, such a
®^  These are defined as republicanism, nationalism, populism, 
etatism, laicism, and revolutionism-reformism in the Article 2 of the 
1924 Constitution and accepted as being the basic policy instrviments 
of the Republican Peoples Party in 1935. For the original text of the 
Constitution, see Şeref Gözübüyük and Suna Kili, Türk Anayasa 
Metinleri 1839-1980 (The Texts of Turkish Constitutions 1839-1980) 
(Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1982), 
pp.111-37. Also see Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Program (Ankara, 1935), 
p. 7.
®5 "Avukatlık Kanunu Layihası ve Adliye Encümeni Mazbatası," (1/962), 
in T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi, vol.26 (1938), p.38.
®® Özkent, Avukatın Kitabı, p.l68. Such a restriction had also been 
ineffect under the Nazi regime in Germany. The legal defense of a 
communist in Germany for example, was forbidden because it was too, 
considered as of communist activity, see Bendix, From Berlin To 
Berkeley, p.ll6.
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disposition can be interpreted as having significant 
connotations at two different levels.
As far as the nature of attorneyship is considered, 
such a restriction doe not square with the very raison 
d'etre of the profession - the defence of the accused-. 
It disregards the professional obligation of the 
attorneys both to his clients and public. Also, while 
limiting the freedom of action of the attorney in his 
choice concerning the cases he would like to defend, the 
regulation had the potential of affecting the 
professions" position within the market negatively.
Besides these points, when viewed from a wider 
perspective, this restriction can also be interpreted as 
reflecting a dilemma concerning the very identity of the 
attorneys as formulated by the Kemalists. There appears 
to be a paradoxical relationship among the roles 
attributed to the attorney. On the one hand, attorneys 
are endowed with a public obligation of being the agents
of the legal order and keynoters in the attainment of
justice and, on the other hand. with a political
obligation defined as "to be the guardians of the
Republican values and the new regime." However, by
putting a reservation for the defense of the acts
committed against the regime. the attorney's public
obligation has largely been neglected in favor of the 
political one. In fact, such an approach can be 
considered as an indication of a shift in the attorney's 
role from the sphere of justice to politics, of viewing 
this group of professionals as instruments of the regime.
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Here the attainment of justice appears to be the 
secondary objective/ the primary purpose of the judicial 
system and legal professionals becomes the fulfilment 
of the needs of the regime.
And perhaps most important of all, the restriction 
of the right of defense is diametrically opposed to the 
very concept of justice. Restricting the freedom of the 
accused to represent certain clients, totally disregards 
the basic principle that a suspect is innocent until 
proven guilty.
Control Mechanism of the State
With the 1938 code, the control of the state over the 
profession was consolidated in the sense that the 
framework drawn by the early regulations had reached 
their ultimate recourse, with the recognized quasi-public 
status of attorneyship, forming the legitimization bases 
of the whole process. According to the Kemalists, for the 
profession to be an integral part of the judicial 
mechanism, the professionals had to be under the direct
The roots of this conflict about the aim of the judicial 
mechanism and its professionals - the primary objective of the 
judicial mechanism being the attainment of justice based on fair and 
objective procedures, and its being the consolidation of regimes - 
can be searched in the legal theories of Max Weber and Karl Marx, 
respectively. For an adequate summary in this respect, see John R. 
Schmidhauser and 1. Berg, "Toward an Understanding of Mediterranean 
Legal Culture in the Contemporary World Capitalist Economy," in The 
Contemporary Mediterranean World, C. Pinkele and A. Pollis, eds. (New 
York: Praeger Publications, 1983), pp.332-56.
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control of the state even as tightly as the civil 
servants working for the state.
The reflections of such a concern had proved to be 
very evident and found concrete grounds within the 
framework of the state-bar association relationship. It 
became institutionalized along clearly defined lines with 
the overwhelming presence of the former vis-a-vis the 
latter, which would in turn leave its marks for the 
future developments. In fact, underlying such a model was 
the perception, on the part of the state, of the bar 
associations as instruments of the state through which it 
could check and control the profession rather than 
professional associations as representing the interests 
of the profession at the official level and working for 
the development of the profession.
However, as noted above, this tendency did not 
constitute an exception to the general approach on the 
part of the state towards other professional 
associations. In this respect, while the distrust towards 
the legal professionals forms one specific aspect of the 
state policy, from a wider perspective, the Kemalist 
model of the state-society should be taken up from a 
wider perspective for a better understanding of the 
mentality which informed of the state control mechanism.
In general, the existence of different professional 
groups and their associations in society as well as the 
representation of their interests had been an important
88 T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 26 (1938), p.346.
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issue within the Kemalist model of society. As compared 
to the situation in the Ottoman times, under Kemalists, 
although there appeared to be a much more flexible 
environment concerning the formation of associations, the 
mentality concerning the associations" relationship with 
the state turned out to be more or less the same.^^
In the Kemalist model, the groups were conceived as 
equals; the state had to meet their demands in an 
equalitarian fashion. This was done in the name of 
protecting the general interest, which was defined by the 
state itself and which, in the final analysis, has been 
regarded to be above the sectional interests.In such a 
setting, the possibility that certain sectional interests 
can outweigh public interest had brought the issue of 
state control into the policy agenda. The suspicion 
towards the associations characterized the Republican 
state.
In the case of bar associations, the Minister of 
Justice"s right of tutelage over the profession as 
spelled out in Article 81 of the 1938 code constituted 
the major dimension of the state control mechanism. 
According to the then Minister of Justice, " the control 
mechanism had been designed in such a way so as to 
deprive the members of the bar who would not act in
Siddik Sami, "Bizde Cemiyet Fikri ve Hayatı Niçin İnkişaf 
Edemiyor?," (Why the Notion of Society and Social Life Could Not Form 
in Our Country?) Mülkiye, 22 (1938), pp.6-7.
Afetinan, Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler (Civil Instructions for 
the Citizen), vol.l (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931), pp.45-6.
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accordance with the honor and dignity of the right to 
practice their profession. The acts which violated with 
the aims of the regime also led to the legal 
professional's losing their right to practice their 
profession.
As laid down in the mentioned Article, the Minister 
of Justice, having the right of tutelage both over the 
attorneys and the administrative boards and heads of the 
bar associations, could use his powers in the case of 
attorneys through administrative boards of the concerned 
bar association and in the case boards and associations 
through supreme judges. The model had largely been 
designed as with a view to the disciplinary process, 
which was no longer to be an auto-control mechanism but 
was to be achieved through state-control.
The supreme judge was made the final supervising 
authority over the decisions of the administrative board; 
the board, among other things was empowered to pass 
disciplinary measures vis-a-vis the attorneys. The 
supreme judge was also empowered to adopt certain 
disciplinary measures vis-a-vis the members of the board, 
including the head of the bar. In this respect, the 
minister too, had authority to supervise the decisions of 
the administrative board in disciplinary matters.
The minister himself was also granted the ultimate 
authority to dissolve the administrative board when he 
observed negligence or abuse of power as regards the
T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi, vol.26 (1938), p.350.
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board's role in protecting the honor and dignity of the 
profession. These provisions made it possible for the 
minister to directly supervise the disciplinary process 
when he deemed it necessary and interfere in that 
process.
In the final analysis, there was now a hierarchical 
relationship both between the judge and the attorney as 
well as the state and the bar association. Consolidating 
the dominance of the state in its relationship with the 
bar associations, such a model reflected an inclination 
on the part of the rulers to view these associations as 
instruments of the state.
The model did not give rise to much criticism
among the bar associations of the time. The associations 
largely remained indifferent; they had a rather 
conformist attitude concerning this policy line on the 
part of the state. The rationale underlying their
position can be explained as follows:
Firstly, the lack of a unified policy line due to 
the variations among the views of the members of the 
Istanbul Bar Association, which was the most extensively 
organized bar association, played a role here. There
appeared some views that regarded the model as an
interference to the autonomy of the associations. Within 
this framework, the state control policy was considered 
as another barrier to the decades-long struggle of 
establishing autonomous associations which would exercise 
auto-control. According to another view, the state 
control mechanism was as an effective means of
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supervising the profession. And although it interfered 
with the autonomy of the associations, state control was 
necessary for the future development of the profession. 
Here, the model was viewed as having the potential of 
eliminating those members who would not act with honor 
and dignity befitting profession. In the long run such a 
control by the state would create a new image for the
attorneys that would eliminate the prejudice which had
been salient both at the state and societal level since 
the Ottoman era.^^ The appearance of two strictly 
different approaches has been one of the most
significant cause that prevented the bar associations 
from initiating a counter argument in this respect. 
Besides, the other measures in the code which were 
related to the modernization of the profession and the
motto of its transformation to a full-blown profession 
were regarded to be so well organized that, even those 
who were in opposition for the control mechanism had 
disregarded the issue.
For the details of these two contrasting views, see Galip Bektaş, 
"İstanbul Barosu Yüksek Reisliğine," (To the Presidency of Istanbul 
Bar Association) Istanbul Barosu Mecmuası, 6-7 (1936), p.249; Ali 
Haydar Özkent, "Avukatlık Kanunu Layihası Münasebetiyle" (On the 
Occasion of the the Preparation of the Draft of the Code on 
Attorneyship) in ibid., pp.246-7; Hamdi Halim Molaçka, "Avukatlık 
Kanunu Layihası Hakkında Düşünceler," (Views on the Draft Code of 
Attorneyship) Istanbul Barosu Mecmuası, 8-9 (1936), pp.280-1;
"Baromuzun 26.12.936 Tarihli Heyeti Umumiye Zaptı," (The Minutes of 
the General Assembly of Our Bar Associations Held on December 12, 
1936) Istanbul Barosu Mecmuası, 10-12 (1936), pp.306.
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Secondly, the prematurity of the bar associations 
in terms of both organizational and inter-organizational 
structuration must be mentioned. As far as the former one 
is concerned, perhaps with the exception of the Istanbul 
Bar Association, there appeared to be a lack of group 
identification with the bar associations. This was 
largely due to the dominance of the state initiative 
during their establishment and short history of the 
associations. Many of the associations had been 
established within the framework of the 1924 Code. The 
lack of group identification had been one of the most 
important factors underlying the deficiencies in the 
process of defining their interests as well as 
formulating relevant policies and struggling for the 
realization of their g o a l s . A s  for prematurity in terms 
of inter-organizational structuration, the lack of a 
nation-wide organizational structure^^ and the existence 
of a loose relationship between the existing bar 
associations prevented the association from formulating 
unified policies in their relationship with the state. 
Being aware of the importance of inter-associational 
relationship for protecting the interests of the 
profession and increasing the effectiveness of the
The lack of a group identity and inter group discipline had also 
been an aspect of other professional associations during the time. 
See Siddik Sami, "Bizde Cemiyet Fikri ve Hayatı Niçin İnkişaf 
Edemiyor?," Mülkiye, p.".
In 1939, there appeared to be thirty two bar associations and 1600 
attorneys. See "Mesleki Haberler," (News on the Profession) Istanbul 
Barosu Mecmuası, 13 (1939), p.l81.
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associations at the official level, the Turkish 
Attorneys' Union had been established in 1934 in Ankara. 
However, this union proved to be far from realizing its 
goals. And it was not until the 1960s - that the bar 
associations became fully organized both to defend their 
professional interests within the market as well as to 
counter the state policies within the sphere of law and 
justice.
All Haydar Özkent, "Türkiye'de Avukatlık Mesleğinin ve Baro 
Teşkilatının tarihçesi," (The History of the Profession of 
Attorneyship and Bar Associations in Turkey) in Türkiye ve Amerika 
Birleşik Devletlerinde Barolar ve Hukukla İlgili Mesleki Teşekküller 
Hakkındaki Kongrenin Zabıtları, p.32.
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Chapter Four
STATE vs. BAR ASSOCIATIONS IN THE POST-KEMALIST ERA; FROM 
A UNILATERAL TO A MULTILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
The Democratic Party Rule and the Bar Associations 
The Policies Towards the Judiciary and Its Personnel
Turkish politics, during the late 1940s witnessed a 
major shift with the transition to multi-party politics.^ 
The Democratic Party (DP), formed in 1946 by the 
opposition faction within the Republican People's Party 
(RPP), won the majority of the seats in the parliament at 
the first genuinely free elections in Turkish political 
life held on May 14, 1950.2 This was the end of more than 
two decades single-party rule by the RPP.
Although with the coming to power of the DP in 1950 
Turkish politics entered a period of relative liberalism, 
there appeared to be a very clearly observable
 ^ For a detailed analysis of the political developments during the 
late 1940's, see Kemal Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition To 
Multi-Party Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1959); Metin Toker, Тек Partiden Çok Partiye 1944-1950 (From 
Single Party To Multi Party 1944-1950), 3^ *^  ed. (Ankara: Bilgi 
Yayınevi, 1990), pp.82-125.
 ^ The first general elections, was held on July 12, 1946. However, 
there appeared a vociferation on the part of the Democrats as the 
returns from where the Democrats had the lead, were overwhelmingly in 
favor of the Republican Peoples Party. The government was accused of 
having changed the election results in the district election boards 
which were under the supervision of government officials. For 
details, see Cem Erogul, Demokrat Parti (Tarihi ve İdeolojisi) 
(Democrat Party(History and Ideology)) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi 
Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1970), pp.17-9.
authoritarian attitude on the part of the party 
concerning the sphere of law and judiciary which largely 
contradicted the party's liberal rhetoric. This, had 
strong implications in the party's position towards the 
legal profession; from time to time brought the bar 
associations into bitter conflict with the government.
As often noted, the overwhelming victory of the 
Democrats in 1950 was largely due to their successful 
appeal to the peasantry and to new commercial and 
industrial middle class, joined by religious leaders who 
had been very much in opposition to the secularization 
policies of the RPP.^ Having such a power base, the rise 
of the DP, signified the replacement of the earlier 
Kemalist bureaucratic/intellectual cadre of the RPP by a 
new political elite. And perhaps, the attainment of power 
by the representatives of the people as well as the 
nouveaux bourgeoisie was the initial manifestation of the
In fact^ the attainment of power by the DP in 1950 has been 
^regarded as the victory of Islam by some conservative groups. And 
during the 1950-1960 period^ the DP has been harsly critisized due to 
its anti-secular policies. In this regard, see Tank Zafer Tunaya, 
İslamcılık Akımı (The Islamic Trend) (Istanbul: Simavi Yayınları, 
1991), pp.205-11; Ahmet N. Yücekök, Türkiye*de Örgütlenmiş Dinin 
Sosyo-Ekonomik Tabanı (The Socio-Economic Bases of Organized Religion 
in Turkey) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 
1971), pp.91-7. For a detailed analysis of the electoral base of the 
ÜP, see Erogul, Demokrat Parti (Tarihi ve İdeolojisi), pp.55-62; 
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1961), pp.316-18; Ergun Özbudun, Social Change and 
Political Participation in Turkey (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), pp.45-5.
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transformation of the bureaucrats from guardians of the 
state to the instruments of the government.
However, it can well be argued that the rise of a new 
political party within the system where the established 
structure of power used to be located in a highlv 
bureaucratized party contained the seeds of a potential 
confrontation. This specifically became the case when the 
proclaimed values of the Democrats turned out to be in 
total contrast with the traditions and values of the 
Republicans. In fact, this conflict to a large extend 
determined the political dynamics of Turkey in the 1950- 
1960 period.
Turkish politics, during the single-party rule of the 
RPP, witnessed a complete fusion between the bureaucratic 
and political power. Politics was largely merged within 
the civil bureaucracy, which in the long run turned out 
to be a part of the political center of the Republican 
regime. Consequently, for the civil bureaucrats, the 
attainment of power by the DP, constituted a threat for 
their monopoly in the political sphere. On the other 
hand, since the civil bureaucracy had largely been 
identified with the RPP, the Democrats totally freed 
themselves from the bureaucracy as the basis of their 
institutional strength, and could in the process place 
the idea of the supremacy of national will as the main 
criterion for their legitimacy.^ In fact, what happened 
in the aftermath of the 1950 general elections was a
Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975 
(London: C. Hurst, 1976), p.44.
127
power clash between the bureaucrats who had been 
socialized into the elitist rhetoric of imposing their 
will on the public for the sake of modernizing the 
country as they saw fit, and the DP who had been the 
defender of the motto of the supremacy of the national 
will.5 To be more precise, this was the reflection of the 
decades-long clash between the state and the people which 
now manifested itself by a constantly growing
polarization between the state elites and the 
"representatives of the people."
However, the consolidation of such a confrontation 
had shown itself as a shift in the locus of the state. 
In this respect, the state-centered polity had been 
replaced with a party-centered polity under the DP rule, 
meaning the transfer of the institutional mechanism of 
power from state elites to political elites.^ On the 
other hand, a party centered polity connotes a political 
party largely autonomous from social groups and a civil 
society without political influence,"^ ironically which
 ^ Metin Heper, "State, Democracy, and Bureaucracy In Turkey," in The 
State and Public Bureaucracies A Comparative Perspective, Metin 
Heper, ed. (Conneticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1987), pp.l36; Also 
see Metin Heper, Bürokratik Yönetim Geleneği Osmanli İmparatorluğu ve 
Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Gelişimi ve Niteliği (The Development and 
Nature of the Tradition of Bureaucratic Administration in the Ottoman 
Empire and Turkey) (Ankara: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi İdari 
İlimler Fakültesi, 1974), pp.128-40. 
6 Metin Heper, The Stace Tradition in Turkey (Walkington, England: 
The Eothen Press, 1985), p.lOO.
Ibid.
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was also the case during the essentially bureaucratic 
rule of the RPP.
In fact, the support behind the DP was largely due to 
the successful mobilization of the population rather than 
its appeal to a truly liberal and democratic regime which 
would bring its constraints itself.^ Schematically, 
Turkey in the 1950s witnessed a transition to 
representative democracy where the government is formed 
by the freely elected representatives of the people. In 
actual fact, although for the first time the people had 
elected their representatives through genuinely free 
general elections, the DP conceived this as an
unconditional transfer of authority to itself to carry 
out the "righteous decision-making" throughout its rule. 
In the long-term, this meant a limitless exercise of 
power, regardless of opposition in and outside the
parliament, for a four-year term only in the end of which 
the people would be granted the right to participate in 
the political system.
Such a disjunction between the party and civil
society on one hand, and the anti-RPP attitude of the DP 
on the other, were to find solid grounds in the
repressive policies pursued by the DP, which clearly 
contradicted the declared liberal rhetoric of the party. 
The failures in the economic sphere as well as the
criticisms by the opposition, soon let the party to adopt 
repressive policies for the rest of its rule which
® C.H.Dodd, Democracy and Development in Turkey (Walkington, England: 
The Eothen Press, 1979), p.lO.
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intensified especially after 1957. The ban on the 
political activity of the academic staff, the right 
assigned to the government to oust civil servants without 
any right of appeal, the adoption of restrictive press 
laws, the imprisonment of journalists are exemplary in 
this regard.^
As mentioned above, within the framework of the 
authoritarian attitude on the part of the DP, one of the 
most severely affected sphere had been the judiciary. In 
this regard, while being perhaps the strongest 
manifestation of the DP's absolutist conceptualization of 
power, the policies concerning the judiciary, had in the 
long run the potential of bringing the bar associations 
and the political elites into conflict.
First and the foremost, the establishment of a 
commission by a decision of the DP parliamentarians on 
April 15, 1960, to investigate the opposition which 
according to the DP parliamentarians, in cooperation with 
the press, had tried to set up illegal and secret 
organizations and armed political gangs composed of 
ruffians and ex-convicts, was very significant.^® In order 
to facilitate its investigations, the commission at once 
banned all political activity of the opposition and any
 ^ For the details of the repressive policies on the part of DP, see 
Cem Erogul, "The Establishment of Multiparty Rule 1945-71," in Turkey 
in Transition, Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak, eds. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp.113-8; Geoffrey Lewis,
Modern Turkey (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp.151-5.
See Tekin Erer, On Yılın Mücadelesi (The Struggle of Ten Years) 
(Istanbul: Ticaret Postası Matbaası, 1963), pp.394-5.
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published reference to the debates in the Assembly. The 
Worst of all, however, the commission had been given 
powers of search, arrest, and detention.n Apart from 
being an exposition of the extreme hostility of the DP 
towards the opposition, the establishment of this
commission with dictatorial powers had constituted a 
direct attack on the functioning of the judiciary.
In fact, the dominating stance of the DP towards the 
judiciary had been a policy issue which made its presence 
strongly felt since the mid-1950s, in the parties' 
disposition with respect to judicial personnel, 
especially the judges.
It is true that this tendency on the part of the DP 
was grounded in the conception of the "national will."12 
It was, however, also related to the DP's hostility 
towards bureaucracy, a point made b e f o r e . I n  this
For the original text of the code see "Türkiye Büyük Millet 
Meclisi Tahkikat Encümeninin Vazife ve Selahiyetleri Hakkında Kanun 
No. 7468," (Code on the Duties and Rights of the Turkish Garand 
National Assembly Counsel No. 7468) Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), 
no:10491, April 28, 1960.
In this respect, the famous statement by Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes, "If I want to, I can even make a wood(read "simpleton") be 
elected to the assembly" best exemplifies the DP's conceptualization 
of power as absolute.
As far as the financial situation of bureaucrats was concerned, 
there appeared to be a considerable decrease in their purchasing 
power during the DP rule. In this respect, there was a fifty percent 
decrease in the total share of bureaucrats in national income. See 
Korkut Boratav, "Gruplar Açısından Gelir Dağılımındaki 
Değişiklikler," (The Shifts in Income Distribution With Respect to 
Groups) Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, 24 (1969), p.206.
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regard, having being identified with the earlier 
bureaucratic intellectual cadre of the RPP, one of the 
most suppressed groups within the bureaucracy had been 
the supreme judges. In fact, while showing strong signs 
of distrust towards this group, supressiveness of the DP 
rulers towards the supreme judges also implied the 
rejection of their status as the guardians of justice 
and, thus of the state.
Within this framework, a law enacted in 1953 reduced 
the number of years of service required for the 
retirement of government officials to twenty-five years. 
Signifying an important step for the government in that 
it would enable it to retire selected judges, such a 
measure had carried in itself the potential of opening 
many judgeships to political appointees. On May 3, 1956, 
twelve judges were forced to retire by a decision of the 
minister of justice, to be followed by the retirement of 
seven judges on June 12, of the same year.^ '^
The Rising Role of the Attorneys as Social and Political 
Actors
The ten-year long DP rule which reached its climax in 
the first half of the 1950s and experienced a downfall 
afterwards, had relatively been a static period with 
respect to the developments directly related to bar 
associations as well as the latter's interface with the 
state. However, the significance of the period lies in
14 Erogul, Demokrat Parti (Tarihi ve İdeolojisi), p.l35.
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its drawing a frame of reference for the study of the 
developments especially during the 1960s.
One of the most significant characteristic of the DP 
period with respect to attorneyship had been the 
considerable rise of the professions' role within the 
political sphere. Such an increase, while to an extent 
can be related to the nature of the profession, in the 
Turkish case the structural changes that the country 
witnessed during the 1950-60 period, had a determining 
effect.
As far as the nature of the profession is concerned, 
there appears to be substantial empirical evidence 
concerning the ambition and career patterns of many 
attorneys seeking out political appointments as well as 
their quantitatively dominant position in many western 
parliaments. In this respect, the relationship between 
the profession of attorneyship and politics had long been 
a recognized and discussed issue within the framework of 
western political science literature.
There is a similarity in the major aims of attorneys 
and politicians which has been the realization of public
Frederic Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge: M.I.T. 
Press, 1965), p.395. For the percentages of attorneys in the 
parliaments of various countries between 1957 and 1969, Mogens N. 
Pedesen, "Lawyers in Politics: The Danish Folketing and United States 
Legislatures," in Comparative Legislative Behavior, Samuel C. 
Patterson and John C. Wahlke, eds. (New York: John Wilet & Sons, 
1972), p.28; For some other comparative figures, see David Podmore, 
"Lawyers and Politics," British Journal of Law and Society, 4 (1977), 
pp.155-87.
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service. The capability to persuade which is a common 
feature of both attorneys and politicians while 
performing their professions, is often referred to 
explain the convergence between the two professions as 
well as the success of attorneys in politics. On the 
other hand, the advantageous position of attorneys when 
compared to other professions like flexible work hours 
which permits their engagement in political activity and 
the fact that absence from practice for a time does not 
appear to involve the loss of either skill or earning 
power, is what basically motivates attorneys for 
politics.
Besides these arguments related with the professional 
characteristics, as far as the Turkish case is concerned, 
the social, economic and political transformation during 
the 1950-1960 period which has widened the gaps and 
inequalities between different economic sectors, social 
classes and geographic regions, can be illuminative in 
explaining the rising role of attorneys in politics. The
For a detailed analysis of the convergence of the two professions, 
see J.A. Schlesinger, "Lawyers and American Politics, A Clarified 
View", Midwest Journal of Political Science, 1 (1957), pp.26-39; M.
Cohen, "Lawyers and Political Careers," Law and Society Review, 3 
(1969), pp. 563-74; H. Eulau and J.D.Sprague, Lawyers in Politics, A 
Study in Professional Convergence (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill,
1964) .
For a detailed analysis of the social, political and economic 
transformation in Turkey during the period, see Emre Kongar, 
Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı (The Societal Structure of Turkey) 
(Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1976), pp.419-94; Gencay Şayian, Türkiye'de 
Kapitalizm, Bürokrasi ve Siyasal İdeoloji (Capitalism, Bureaucracy
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pattern of uneven development which was largely related 
to the change in relations of production, in turn 
produced a heightened perception of interest conflict 
between various groups and regions competing for larger 
shares of the benefits of economic growth. It was this 
changed perception that aggravated the conflicts in the 
society, between land owners and peasants, among 
employers as well as between workers and employers. Such 
a trend, while manifesting itself in the judicial sphere 
with an increase in the number of cases, has positively 
effected the position of attorneys in the society due to 
the strategic importance within the mechanism of conflict 
resolution.
Within this framework, especially in the villages and 
towns attorneys were considered to be the representatives 
of justice - in a sense acting as a bridge between the 
city and the town - who will show the way for the ones 
who had a legal problem. Positioning the attorneys among 
the respected people of the towns, such a trend had its 
positive effects on the chances of attorneys to be 
elected in the elections.
and Political Ideology in Turkey) (Ankara: Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amme 
İdaresi Enstitüsü^ 1974)^ pp.81-7.
Ahmet Yücekök^ Siyaset Sosyolojisi Açısından Türkiye*de 
Parlamentonun Evrimi (The Evolution of the Parliament in Turkey from 
the Perspective of Political Sociology) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi 
Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1983), pp.166-7.
Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, p.l81; Kemal H. Karpat, "The 
Turkish Elections of 1957,” Western Political Quarterly, 14 (1961), 
pp.442-3.
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The Bar Associations in a State of Internal 
Politization: The Rising Professional Consciousness as a
Melting Pot
Such a rise in the social and political status of 
many attorneys had its reflections both on the internal 
dynamics of the bar associations as well as their
relationship with the state.
As far as the internal dynamics were concerned, the 
1950-1960 period can best be described as an era when the 
first seeds of politics have been shown in bar
associations. In fact, what happened then was the
development of a tendency on the part of many attorneys
to view the associations as a way station to politics. In 
many provinces bar associations served as places where 
attorneys, having similar political leanings, discussed 
party politics and their political careers.However, in 
the long run, such a tendency on the part of some 
attorneys had some negative reflections on the 
relationship between the state and bar associations. In 
this respect, although at the institutional level, none 
of the associations had organic ties with any of the 
political parties, specifically the ones some whose 
members were known to have ideological affiliations with 
the Republican People's Party, has attracted the reaction 
of the DP rulers which from time to time damaged the
20 Interview with Ercüment Damalı, the DP Deputy during 1954-1957 
period, and the member of Sivas Bar Association, on December 4, 1993.
136
association's strength in defending their professional 
interests.
Another point which must also be mentioned in this 
coritext/ is the consolidation of professional 
consciousness within the bar associations. In this 
respect, although the above mentioned politization of a 
number of the members of the associations sometimes 
caused conflicts between the groups having different 
political views, the protection of the interests of the 
profession has always remained to be a unifying factor 
due to the member's attachment of ultimate priority to 
professionalism. Individual political interests and the 
significance attached to the political careers by some 
members did not cause a decrease in the significance 
attached to professional norms. And most importantly, 
there appeared to be a greater sensitivity on the part of 
the bar associations in assessing their problems.
In this respect, during the mid 1960s the Ankara Bar Association 
had decided to organize a ball in order to obtain revenue for the 
association's charity fund and asked for the support of the DP. 
Although eventually the party came up with support for the 
Association, the first reaction of the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes 
had been very harsh. Regarding the attorneys "on the other side of 
the camp," he initially rejected to give support to the Association. 
See "Avukatlar," (Attorneys) Akis, 296 (1960), pp.14-5. In fact such 
an attitude was not a contradiction concerning the policies of the DP 
towards other chambers, as during the 1950's the DP governments 
rewarded those chambers of which supported the party and harassed 
those chambers which opposed it. See Metin Heper, "The State and 
Interest Groups with Special Reference to Turkey," in Strong State 
and Economic Interest Groups: The Post-1980 Turkish Experience, Metin 
Heper, ed. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), p.l5.
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specifically questioning their position vis-a-vis the 
state, when compared to the Kemalist era.
In this respect, the tutelage of the state over the 
bar associations, which has limited the autonomy of the 
bar associations has lingered on. However, deviating 
largely from the Kemalist period when the tutelage of the 
state over these associations had not been questioned or 
even discussed, during the 1950-1960 period, it turned 
out to be a hot issue and considered to be a serious 
problem by the bar associations, which, must be coped 
with by the proper regulations. in this respect, the
revision of the law on attorneyship had started to be 
discussed and the first steps had been taken at a meeting 
held in 1957 in Izmir, with the participation of the 
representatives from the bar associations all over the
country. 23
Besides the attitudes of the bar associations towards 
the issues that are directly related to professional 
interests, their disposition towards developments in the 
judicial sphere is also an issue that deserves attention. 
As would be excepted, the most significant group that had 
been in strict opposition towards the DP rulers' policies 
towards the judicial personnel had been the bar
2^ Interview with Metin Nomer, the Member of Ankara Bar Association 
then, on December 13, 1993.
The appearent relaxation of the government’s control on Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry and the abolishing of the tutalege over them 
of the Ministry of Economy and Commerce had also been effective in 
the attitude of bar associations in this respect.
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associations.2^  The reaction of the Ankara Bar Association 
~ one of the most organized bar association when compared 
to others with the exception of Istanbul Bar Association
specifically concerning the compulsory retirement of 
some of the judges by a decision of the government in 
1957, constitutes a good example with respect to the 
above mentioned points concerning professional 
consciousness.
With the aim of protesting the 1957 decision in 
question regarded to be unacceptable as far as the 
independence of the judges was concerned, the Ankara Bar 
Association decided to convene an extraordinary general 
assembly meeting as well as to publish some articles 
about the issue in the association journal. However, 
there appeared to be a strong reaction by the DP 
government against these ambitious attempts on the part 
of the Ankara Bar Association. In this regard, while the 
meeting was immediately cancelled, the pages that the 
articles were to be published appeared to be white.2^
Although ended up with a total disappointment, as the 
DP rulers continued to pursue similar policies within the 
legal and the judicial sphere during the late 1950s, such 
an attempt on the part of the Ankara Bar Association, 
while being an indicator of the consolidation of 
professional consciousness, very well illustrated the
Rahmi Magat, "Yargıç, Savcı, Avukat İlişkileri," (The Relationship 
Between Judges, Prosecutors and Attorneys) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 4 
(1970), p.531.
25 See Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 6 (1957), p.40.
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success of Kemalist efforts in moulding out a republican 
type legal professional who would be the "guardian of 
justice." The Association's initiatives in question were 
a harbinger and also can well be regarded as a 
significant point for the later stance of legal 
professionals and attorneys towards the 1960 military 
intervention, as noted below.
1960 Military Intervention, New Constitution and Legal
Professionals
As mentioned above, the policies of the DP, which had 
shown strong signs of the decline of the government's 
commitment to democratic ideals, soon brought the country 
to a deadlock. Especially towards the end of the decade, 
the tendency on the part of the government to reestablish 
a pre-1950 one-party authoritarianism caused severe 
conflicts between the opposition and the DP while moving 
the country towards the edge of violence.
Such an environment of political disorder served as 
an open invitation to Turkish Armed Forces to step in and
The repercussions of the law concerning the establishment of the 
investigation committee led student demonstrations at Istanbul and 
Ankara Law Faculties. Also there appeared to be riots almost every 
night on the main boulevards of Ankara, see Ali Fuat Başgil, 27 mayıs 
İhtilali ve Sebepleri, (The May 27 Revolution and Its Causes) trans, 
by M. Ali Sebük and î. Hakkı Akın, (İstanbul: Çeltüt Matbaacılık, 
1966), pp.123-8; Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961 
(Washington, DC.: Brookings Institution, 1963), pp.17-20.
140
seize power on May 27, 1960.27 However, rather than having 
the aim of staying in power and ruling the country 
indefinitely the ultimate goal of the military appeared 
to be the reinstitutionalization of a democratic Kemalist 
state and a return to civilian government as soon as 
p o s s i b l e . 28 To be more precise the objective was simply 
one of putting the train back on the tracks, as the 
guardians of Turkish nation and Kemalist ideals. Such a 
trend was evident in the message broadcast to Turkish 
nation on May 27, 1960 by the Armed Forces:
....Owing to the crisis into which our
democracy has fallen, and owing to the 
recent sad incidents and in order to 
prevent fratricide, the Turkish Armed 
Forces have taken over the administration 
of the country.
During the DP rule, the military had been one of the most damaged 
group. As it had been the case for the civil bureaucracy, they too 
had material losses. In this respect there appeared to be a decrease 
in their salary indexes. See Çelik Auroba, "Bürokrat Kesim İçinde 
Mülki Amirlerin Yazgısı: Göreli Gelir ve Statü Gerilemesi," (The 
Faith of Administrative Officials within the Bureaucratic Strata: A 
Relative Decrease in Income and Status) in Türkiye'de Mülki idare 
Amirliği (Administrative Officials in Turkey), Kurthan Fişek, ed. 
(Ankara: Türk İdareciler Derneği, 1976), p.88.
For such an assesment, see Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, "The 
State, Politics and the Military in Turkey," Comparative Politics, 1 
(1983), pp.20-3; Metin Heper, "The State, the Military, and Democracy 
in Turkey," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 9 
(1987), pp.55-6; Ergun Özbudun, The Role of Military in Recent 
Turkish Politics, Harvard University Center For international 
Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, 1966.
141
Our armed forces have taken this 
initiative for the purpose of extricating 
the parties from the inconceivable 
situation into which they have fallen and 
for the purpose of having just and free 
elections, to be held as soon as possible 
under the supervision and arbitration of an 
above party and impartial administration, 
and for handling over the administration to 
whichever party wins the elections.... 29 
In this regard, an intensive series of projects has 
been initiated by the National Unity Committee (NUC), a 
body formed by the intervenors to govern the country till 
the reestablishment of democracy; within seven months 
(January 6, 1961) a Constituent Assembly was in operation 
with the purpose of reviewing the constitution, preparing 
a new election law and strengthening national unity,and 
within a total of seventeen months (October 15, 1961),
elections for a new civilian parliament were to take 
place.
Among other things, it must be mentioned that one of 
the most striking aspect of the 1960 military regime has 
been the efforts on the part of the intervenors to remain
For the full text of the declaration, see Weiker, The Turkish 
Revolution, 1960-1961, p.20-1.
Nurşen Mazier, Türkiye'de Askeri Darbeler ve Sivil Rejime Etkisi 
(The Military Interventions in Turkey and Their Effect on Civil 
Regimes) (Istanbul: Gür, 1989), pp.93-8.
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within law in nearly every stage of their rule.^i However, 
due to their obvious lack of relevant knowledge, they 
usually felt the need of obtaining opinions from the 
legal professionals^^ which was specifically evident 
during the process of constitution-making.
Within the process of the evolution of the 
constitution, there appeared to be four different 
versions,^^ during the preparation of which the legal 
professionals had an overwhelming majority. Each of the 
four versions - the fourth being the final draft - has 
been the product of different commissions:
Mümtaz Soysal, Anayasa'ya Giriş (Introduction to Constitution) 
(Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1969), p. 
291.
Walter F. Weiker, Amerikalı, Fransız, Rus Gözüyle I960 Türk 
İhtilali (The 1960 Military Intervention from American, French, 
Russian Viewpoints), trans, by Mete Ergin (Istanbul: Cem, 1967), p. 
89.
Yüksek Öğretim Üyelerinden Kurulu Anayasa Komisyonunca Hazırlanan 
Anayasa Öntasarısı (The Constitutional Draft Prepared by the 
Commission Consisted of University Professors) (Ankara: 1960) quoted 
in Kazım Öztürk, T.C. Anayasası: Temel Metinler (Ankara: Türkiye İş 
Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1966), pp.21-83/ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Anayasa Tasarısı ve Anayasa Komisyonu Raporu (The Constitutional 
Draft of the Turkish Republic and the Report of Constitutional 
Committee) (Ankara: 1961) quoted in ibid. pp.595-609/ Siyasal 
Bilgiler Fakültesi İdari İlimler Enstitüsü'nün Gerekçeli Anayasa 
Tasarısı (The Constitutional Draft of the Institute of Administrative 
Sciences of Political Science Faculty) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi 
Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1960)/
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As a first step, the NUC has appointed a commission 
made up of Istanbul University law professors. Later, a 
commission has been formed by some academicians from 
Ankara University School of Political Science where some 
legal scholars had taken place. Thirdly, a 
constitutional committee was formed within the 
Constituent Assembly, largely composed of legal 
personalities that had been the members of the above 
mentioned committees. And finally the Constituent 
Assembly ratified the Constitutional Committees proposal 
with minor changes;in the Constituent Assembly, legal 
professionals had the majority when compared to other 
professionals.
Ord. Prof. Dr. Siddik Sami Onar, Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Nail Kubali, 
Ord. Prof. Dr. Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoglu, Prof. Dr. Tank Zafer 
Tunaya, Prof. Ragip Sarıca, Prof. Dr. Naci Şensoy, Doç. Dr. İsmet 
Giritli, later Prof. Dr. İlhan Arsel, Prof. Dr. Bahri Savcı, Doç. Dr. 
Muammer Aksoy, from University of Ankara School of Political Science, 
had been invited to the commission. This commission is known as the 
*Onar Commission*, taking its name from the surname of Siddik Sami 
Onar who was a very well known scholar and the chairman of the 
commission.
Prof. Dr. Turhan Feyzioglu, Prof. Dr. Süheyl Derbil, Prof. Dr. 
İlhan Arsel, Prof. Dr. Bahri Savcı, Assoc. Prof. Muammer Akscy (Head 
of the Ankara Bar Association in the early 1980*s).
For the full text of the 1961 Constitution, see Şeref Gözübüyük 
and Suna Kili, Türk Anayasa Metinleri 1839-1980 (The Texts of Turkish 
Constitutions 1839-1980) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal 
Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1982), pp.145-217.
The total number of legal professionals in the Constituent 
Assembly had been 126 within a total of 297 members. See T. B.M.M 
Albümü 1920-1973 (Turkish Grand National Assembly Album 1920-1973) 
(Ankara: Önder Matbaası, 1973), pp.561-71.
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As far as the ideological position of the majority of 
the legal scholars of the time and their viewpoints with 
respect to the DP rule and the military intervention are 
concerned, the report issued by the commission on 28 May, 
1960, is illuminative:
The political authority which had to be 
the representative of state, law, justice,
public interest and the ideal of public
service and protector of the rights of the 
public, has unfortunately lost its peculiarity 
and in its stead, taken the shape of a 
material force representing and serving the 
interests of a special class....It is for this 
reason that, the political authority has 
broken its ties and contradicted with the
army, administration of justice and bar
associations, civil servants, universities, 
press as well as all other social
institutions, and adopted a hostile attitude 
towards the essential and main institutions of 
the state and the Kemalist principles which 
have utmost importance in preserving Turkey's 
position as a civilized country.... At this 
stage, the ultimate goal is the
reinstitutionalization of democracy and re­
establishment of the rule of law in the full 
sense of the term.^®
For the full text of the report, see "Anayasa Ön Projesi Hazırlama 
Komisyonunun Tesbit Ettiği Esaslar," (The Principles Determined by
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Justifying the military intervention in terms of the 
political ideals of Turkish nation the members of the 
commission had totally reflected the characteristics of 
the Republican type legal professional which the Kemalist 
revolution aimed to mould out as mentioned above. 
However, such an attitude did not constituted an 
exception to the general trend on the part of the legal 
professionals of the time which can be evidently seen 
when the basic principles of the 1961 Constitution are 
kept in mind. In fact, the constitution can well be 
interpreted as a statement of what legal professionals 
regarded was the most appropriate legal and structural 
underpining for the development of the country in 
congruence with Kemalism.
Being a systematic statement of the clear intention 
to maintain Kemalist thought as a political manifesto, 
the constitution reflected the idea of multi-party 
democracy in content, which, though not observed in 
practice, have been present in Republican political 
thought. The constitution, while giving the government 
and the political parties maximum manoeuvrability, had 
the necessary mechanisms, for preventing the accumulation 
of power in the hands of a single party, which had been 
the case during the DP period. With its emphasis on the 
separation of powers between the parliament and the 
executive for checking the majority's potential tyranny, 
a new high Constitutional Court in order to check the
the Committee Responsible for the Preparation of the Initial 
Constitutional Project) Istanbul Barosu Dergisi, 5 (1960), pp.206-9.
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constitutionality of laws, and individual and 
associational rights and freedoms, the new constitution 
had the characteristics of being a guarantee of the 
democratic evolution of the Turkish state and society on 
the basis of Kemalist principles.
Bar Associations, State and the New Code on 
Attorneyship: Continuity or Change?
The Establishment of the Turkish Union of Bar 
Associations: A New Face for the Old Problems
The relatively stable political environment in the 
aftermath of the 1961 general elections - the RPP had won 
the majority of the seats in the parliament -, and the 
spirit of the 1961 Constitution which had defined the 
Turkish Republic as "a national, democratic, secular, and 
social state under the rule of law, based on human 
rights" soon had its reflections for the profession and 
its associations. As it has been the case in many fields, 
a rearrangement for the legal framework of attorneyship
For a detailed analysis of 1961 Constitution, see Bülent Tanör, 
İki Anayasa 1961-1982 (Two Constitutions 1961-1982) (Istanbul: Beta
basım Yayım Dağıtım A.Ş., 1986), pp.9-38; İsmet Giritli, "The
Structure and Characteristics of the Turkish Constitution," Annales 
de la Faculte de Droit d'İstanbul, 10 (1960), pp.257-65; Orhan
Aldıkaçtı, Anayasa Hukukumuzun Gelişmesi ve 1961 Anayasası (The 
Development of Our Constitutional Law and the 1961 Constitution) 
(Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi, 1982); Server Tanilli, Devlet ve
Demokrasi: Anayasa Hukukuna Giriş (State and Democracy: Introduction 
to Constitutional Law) (Istanbul: Say Kitap Pazarlama, 1982), pp.
143-56;
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and bar associations proved to be a necessity. In this 
respect, the process of preparation of a new law on 
attorneyship, which had been initiated in 1958 by a 
decision taken in a meeting held in Izmir, with the 
participation of the representatives of bar associations, 
has gained considerable impetus.
The main concern of the bar associations was the 
enactment of a more liberal law that would replace the 
former one which had been seen by the inter-ministerial 
commission after the military intervention as having 
anti-democratic implications. Certainly, the new
constitutional framework, which had given substantial 
importance to individual and associational rights and 
freedoms, had been determinative concerning the liberal 
aspirations on the part of the bar associations.
As far as attorneyship is concerned, the "right of 
defence" which had been included among the category of 
the "basic rights and liberties of the "individual" in 
the Article 32 of the 1961 Constitution, can be regarded 
as a significant point in this respect. This 
constitutional emphasis, while manifesting the 
significance attached to the "individual" within the 
mechanism of justice at least in ideal terms, can also
Ayşe Öncü, "Cumhuriyet Devrinde Barolar," (Bar Associations in 
the Republican Era) Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol.6 
(1984), p.1572.
"Yeni Avukatlık Kanunu kabul edildi ve Resmi Gazete'de 
yayınlandı," (The New Code on Attorneyship has been Ratified and 
Published in the Official Gazette) Istanbul Barosu Dergisi, 43 
(1969), p.221.
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well be considered as an implicit indicator of an 
elevation in the professional role of attorneys as the 
sine qua non of the judiciary.
other hand. the public professional
were for the first time given
recognition and status within the
framework of the 1961 Constitution. According to the 
Article 122 of the Constitution, public professional 
organizations were to be established by law; their bodies 
were to be elected by themselves from among their own 
members, and administrative authorities did not have the 
right to remove from office or temporarily suspend their 
elected bodies without a court decision. The regulations, 
administration and activities of professional 
associations could not be against democratic principles. 
It can be stated that the inclusion of the public 
professional organizations in the constitution had its 
implications for the future developments concerning bar 
associations and had constituted a factor that 
legitimized and guarantied their long term existence.
Within this framework, having in mind the basic idea 
of cacthing up with the spirit of the time, the first 
steps with respect to the preparation of the new law had 
been taken in 1963 in a meeting held under the leadership 
of the Ankara Bar Association, where the major principles 
of the new law has been defined and the three largest Bar 
Associations namely Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, had been 
assigned the duty of preparing a draft code.'^  ^However due
42 Ibid., pp.222-3.
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to the disputes between the bar associations and the 
Ministry of Justice concerning the main lines of the 
draft, nothing came out of this initiative and it has 
been nullified. Later in 1966 another draft has been 
prepared, this time by a commission consisting of some 
deputies and the representatives of the Ministry of 
Justice and bar associations. Finally, on April 7, 1969
that a new law on attorneyship has been enacted, which 
based itself - with little modifications - on the draft 
prepared by the latter commission.
Being a very detailed code, consisting of 217 
articles, 17 of them being provisional, the new code 
constituted a significant frame of reference for the 
development of the profession and its associations. The 
first aim of the new code was to define both the criteria 
for gaining certification as an attorney as well as the 
general lines with respect to the functioning of bar 
associations, which had been quite similar to the former 
code. Secondly and most importantly, the new code founded 
the Turkish Union of Bar Associations (TUBA), which 
deserves special attention due to its determinative 
function with respect to the state-bar associations 
Relationship.
Having the status of a public professional 
organization as defined by Article 122 of the 
Constitution, TUBA has been established as a peak
For the original text of the code, see "Avukatlık Kanunu No. 
1136," (Code on Attorneyship No.1136) Resmi Gazete, no: 13168, April 
7, 1969.
150
organization for all the bar associations in Turkey. 
Designed to have a supervisory role, one of the most 
striking aspects concerning the establishment of the 
TUBA, has been its assignment with the duty of checking 
and controlling the profession. Accordingly the TUBA has 
been backed up ultimately with certain powers which, 
under the former code had been fallen under the direct 
authority of the Ministry of Justice. In this respect the 
TUBA has been defined as the authority of approval and 
appeal for the bar associations with regard to the
following matters: entry to the profession, licensing,
admittance of apprenticeship, temporary or permanent 
disbarment, disciplinary issues, establishment of bar 
associations, preparation of income schedules for 
attorneys as well as certain regulations required by law.
At first sight, the establishment of the TUBA with 
the mentioned powers at its hand, seemed to be giving a 
liberal tone to the code, serving as a sign of the
promulgation of a self-regulative and autonomous status 
to the bar associations. However, the still continuing 
tutelage of the Ministry of Justice, which signified the 
control of the Ministry over the bar associations, caused 
a total disappointment in this respect. In fact, within 
the framework of the new code, all the decisions of the 
TUBA, on the above mentioned issues - with the exception 
of the authority of licensing - were subjected to the
approval of the Ministry, in order to be put into
practice. And most importantly, the Ministry of Justice 
Was given the right to dissolve the respective organs of
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the individual bar associations as well as TUBA which did 
not abide by the decisions of the Ministry.
In this regard, although the TUBA was defined to be 
autonomous with respect to its internal organizational 
procedures - the most significant indicator of which was 
the non-interference principle on the part of the 
Ministry to its electoral process - such a control 
mechanism had a strong potential of reducing the
association into a sub-branch of the Ministry. In fact, 
in essence the model that was constructed with the new 
code appeared to have no difference from the former one. 
As it has been the case in the former code, the state had 
the full authority over the decisions of the bar 
associations. Only this time, rather than dealing with 
each and every bar association separately during its 
process of checking and controlling the profession, the 
state had to face the TUBA, through which it could 
dominate the profession and the bars. What happened was 
largely a reenactment of the former code under a liberal 
cover.
Being regarded as having an authoritarian stance, the 
domination of the Ministry over the bar associations as 
well as TUBA, caused considerable discomfort and 
criticism on the part of the bar associations. The main 
argument in this regard was based on the apparent 
contradiction between the Article 122 of the Constitution 
and the control mechanism developed by the new code. As
Faruk Erem, "Baroların Bağımsızlığı," (The Independence of Bar 
Associations) Istanbul Barosu Dergisi, 9-10 (1969), pp.417-21.
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mentioned in a speech given by the then chairperson of 
the Ankara Bar Association, Rahmi Magat, in the opening 
of the first general assembly of TUBA, "the respective 
articles of the new code has very much signified an old 
fashioned world view. In this regard, while hampering the 
independence of the bar associations, it has very much 
contradicted the liberal spirit of the 1961 
Constitution.On the other hand, according to Magat, 
such an arrangement was inevitable consequence of the 
negligence of the ideas proposed by bar associations 
during the code-making process. As a matter of fact, the 
code largely reflected the basic points that had been 
made by the proposal of the Ministry of Justice. There 
appeared to be quite an indifferent attitude on the part 
of the commission towards demands of the representatives 
of the bar associations.^”^
45 "Türkiye Barolar Birliği 1. Genel Kurul Toplantısında Ankara 
Barosu Başkanı Rahmi Magat'ın Yaptığı Konuşma," (The Statement by 
Rahmi Magat - the head of Ankara Bar Association - During the 1^^ 
General Assembly of TUBA) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 5 (1969), p.805-6.
"20 Haziran 1969 Tarihinde Ankara Barosu Genel Kurul Tolantısında 
Ankara Barosu başkanı Rahmi Magat'ın yaptığı Konuşma," (The Statement 
by Rahmi Magat - the head of the Ankara Bar Association - During the 
General Assembly of Ankara Bar Association on July 20, 1969) Ankara 
Barosu Dergisi, 4 (1969), p.602.
In this respect, the statement made by Ismail Tekinel, commission 
member, during the parliamentary debates is quite illuminating: "It 
is for sure that rather than specialists of the issue - referring to 
the members of the bar associations - the views of the deputies are 
important as they are the ones who have the right to decide." See 
T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi, vol.32 (1969), p.lOO.
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Another related argument concerning the status of 
TUBA vis-a-vis the state, had to do with the principle of 
separation of powers emphasized by the new Constitution. 
In this respect, the control exercised by the Ministry of 
Justice on bar associations had been regarded as the 
dominance of the executive over the judiciary. Such an 
argument was directly related with the self-perception of 
the attorneys as an organic part of the judicial 
mechanism which had been a part of the professional 
identity that was formed during the Kemalist era. The 
majority of the attorneys regarding themselves as the 
defenders of the rule of law had considered the code as 
totally contradicting with the prerequisites of its 
ultimate practice namely separation of powers.^®
Concerning the independence of the bar associations, 
one of the most significant issues that caused intensive 
criticism, has been the prevention of the bar 
associations and TUBA from any kind of political 
engagement. Such a ban on the activities of the 
associations was another manifestation of the implicit 
intention on the part of the state for their 
pasifization. As mentioned by Faruk Erem, a well known 
legal figure of the time and the then chairperson of the 
TUBA this attitude was due to the fearful tendency on the 
part of the government to preclude any possibility of the 
rise of the TUBA as an effective interest group which
Kemal Sariibrahimoğlu, "Neden özerklik," (Why Independence) Ankara 
Barosu Dergisi, 5 (1971), pp.623-4.
154
would have the potential of challenging its policies.In 
fact, the very establishment of the TUBA, one of its 
major aim being the establishment of coordination and 
enhancement of cooperation between the bar associations 
had carried in itself the seeds of such a potential. 
Having the ideal of unifying the bar associations under a 
single voice in their relationship with the state, the 
TUBA in the long run had signified the formation of 
strong and effective bar associations which caused 
discomfort and suspicion on the part of the state.
On the other hand, according to Erem, the desire of 
the state to form politically neutral bar associations 
was an impossible dream. This was largely due to the 
closeness of the attorneys to social and political issues 
in practising their profession as well as their increased 
political role especially during the 1950s.
Within this framework, as mentioned by Faruk Dereli, 
the then head of the Istanbul Bar Association, the course 
of action that restricted bar associations from any kind 
of political activity was not in harmony with the self- 
identification of the bar associations, since besides the 
professional issues, they regarded themselves highly 
responsible concerning political issues. In this regard, 
they felt themselves obliged to help the state in solving
Faruk Erem, "Baroların Bağımsızlığı," Istanbul Barosu Dergisi, 
p.420.
Faruk Erem, "Kamu Niteliğinde Serbest Meslekler'in Geleceği ve 
Avukatlık," (The Future of Free Professions Having a Public Character 
and Attorneyship) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 5 (1974), p.876.
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the problems of the country as well as preserving the 
Kemalist ideals and the principle of the rule and 
supremacy of law.^^
Besides, as far as the interconnection between the 
professional and political spheres are concerned, in the 
case of the bar associations there always appeared to be 
a high potential of an intermingle. Thus, the mentioned 
restriction in a sense signified a limitation with 
regards to the activities concerning professional issues 
which could hamper the competence of the bar associations 
in protecting the professional interests.
The Social Security Rights of the Attorneys; A 
Paradoxical Issue
One of the most enduring conflicts, between the 
state and bar associations during the enactment process 
of the new code had been the issue of the extension of 
social security rights to the attorneys. The problem that 
caused extensive reaction on the part of the bar 
associations in this respect had to do with the Article 
117 of the new code. Having formally put an end to the 
years-long practice of charity fund system which had been 
left to the authority of the respective bar association 
and constituted the basic source of security for the
"Avukatlık Kanunu'nun Kabulü Hakkında İstanbul Barosu Başkanı 
Faruk Dereli'nin Türkiye Barolar Birliğinde yaptığı Konuşma," (The 
Statement by Faruk Dereli - the head of the Istanbul Bar association 
- on the Enactment of the Code of Attorneyship in TUBA) Istanbul 
Barosu Dergisi, 7-8 (1969), p.384.
Faruk Erem, "Sermaye - Serbest Meslek - Avukatlık," (Capital-Free 
Profession - Attorneyship) Yargı, 20 (1977), p.3.
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attorneys, the Article initiated a different mechanism in 
this respect: the attorneys from then on would be 
compulsorily subjected to the Social Security Code which 
defined the basic lines of the security procedures with 
respect to old age and death. Moreover, the attorneys who 
would not pay their monthly social security premiums 
were to be expelled from the profession. Such a strict 
arrangement of course clashed with the interests of the 
majority of the attorneys.
Accordingly, the main conflict especially during the 
enactment process of the code, revolved around the 
financial inability of most of the attorneys to pay their 
social security premiums. In fact, most of the attorneys 
were even unable to pay the premiums of the charity 
funds, which were much less than the amount required 
under the new code.^^ However, such an argument had 
totally been disregarded by the head of the parliamentary 
commission and the representatives of the Ministry of 
Justice during the discussions. According to the chairman 
of the commission, the amendment of the article was out
See " Ankara barosu Başkanı Rahmi Magat'ın 9 mart 1969 Günü 
Ankara Gazeteciler Cemiyetinde Düzenlenen Basın Toplantısında Yaptığı 
Konuşma," (The Statement by Rahmi Magat - the head of the Ankara Bar 
Association - During the Press Conference held in Ankara Journalists 
Association on March 9, 1969) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 2 (1969), pp. 
428-9; "Ankara Barosu 31. Genel Kurul Toplantısında Ankara Barosu 
Başkanı Oktay Çubukçugil'in Yaptığı Konuşma," (The Statement by Oktay 
Çubukçugil - the head of the Ankara Bar Association - During the 31®^ 
General Assembly of the Ankara Bar Association) Ankara Barosu 
Dergisi, 1 (1969), p.l97; For a similar assesment, also see T.B.M.M. 
Tutanak Dergisi, vol.32 (1969), p.391.
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of question, as it would constitute a denial of the basic 
and indispensable characteristic of the social state, the 
ultimate aim of which was defined to be the realization 
of social justice within the framework of the 1961 
Constitution. Regarding this new arrangement as a first 
step taken by the state in this respect, the chairperson 
had accused the bar associations of refusing to initiate 
of the project of nation wide expansion of the social 
security system.While opening the way for a financial 
crisis and discomfort among the majority of the attorneys 
as mentioned above, such an attitude on the part of the 
commission was a strong manifestation of both the 
indifference of the state towards the associations for 
the sake of implementing its defined policies as well as 
the insufficiency with regard to the bargaining power of 
the bar associations and necessitates the questioning of 
their strategies of interaction and influence vis-a-vis 
the authorities during the enactment process of the code.
It must be mentioned that the attainment of close 
ties with the parliamentarians had been regarded by the 
bar associations as one of the most effective ways for 
the realization of their interests and demands.In this 
respect, from time to time they had even been the strong 
defenders of a corporatist system in the Durkhemian sense 
of the word as to propose a parliamentary system in which
Ibid., p.389.
"Ankara Barosu 35. Genel Kurul Duyurusu," (The 35^^ General 
Assembly Declaration of the Ankara Bar Association) Ankara Barosu 
Dergisi, 1 (1973), p.l47.
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the representatives of the professional associations had 
to take place and represent the interests of these 
associations As far as the former one is concerned, the 
case of the social security issue had been an 
illuminative test case for evaluating the success of bar 
associations in influencing the authorities. In this 
respect, the stance of the attorney-parliamentarians 
during the enactment process of the code deserves 
attention. Paradoxically, there appeared to be a total 
divergence between their views and those of the bar 
associations. Most of the attorney-parliamentarians were 
in a position of strongly defending the respective 
articles of the code. As being among the minority who 
could afford to pay the social security premiums, such a 
trend among the attorney-parliamentarians had constituted 
both a manifestation of the priority given to private 
interests rather than that of their associations as well 
as the absence of unification and harmony between them 
and their associations with respect to the interests.
However, besides this detachment towards the 
interests of the bar associations, there also appeared to 
be an indifferent attitude on the part of the attorney 
parliamentarians towards the interests and welfare of 
some other groups in the society, namely that of the 
workers. The rather privileged position of the attorneys 
in the social security system with regards to the
Kemal Sariibrahimoğlu, "Güvenlik Mahkemeleri Gerekli mi?," (Are 
Tribunals of Independence Neccesary?) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 5 
(1972), p.775-6.
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retirement procedures - the attorneys were given the 
right to get their retirement pensions on the bases of 
the premiums that they would pay in the last three months 
before the retirement date - as compared to the workers 
under the new arrangement may have been the reason for 
this attitude on their part; they were interested in 
enhancing their own interests only. To be more precise, 
what happened during the enactment process was a total 
indifference on the part of the attorney-parliamentarians 
both towards their parliamentarian identification which 
involves the protection of the interests of the whole 
public as well as bar association identifications.^ 7
As far as the former one is concerned, such an 
attitude, has been harshly criticised by the worker 
unions. As mentioned in a declaration of TURK-t§ (Turkish 
Federation of Trade Unions) that were very much in 
opposition towards the enactment of the code, "...the 
attorney-parliamentarians who had been unable to get 
unified even in matters that had ultimate importance for 
the general interest and welfare of the country, due to 
their different ideological commitments, totally
Attorney parliamentarians in general had been regarded as 
constituting a group who are much more sensitive to protecting 
certain interests in the society rather than of their own when 
compared to other professional groups in the parliament, due to their 
professional experience which involves the defense of cases. See 
Maurice Duverger, Siyasal Partiler (Political Parties), trans, by 
Ergun Özbudun (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler 
Fakültesi, 1970), p.l74; Mattel Doğan, "Political Ascent in a Class 
Society, French Deputies 1870-1958," Political Decision Makers, Dwain 
Marwick, ed. (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p.70.
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disregarded their party identifications, when their own 
interests were i n v o l v e d . H a v i n g  regarded such an 
attitude as being not in conformity with the principles 
of rule of law, TURK-ÎÇ had accused the attorney- 
parliamentarians for acting against the interests of the 
w o r k e r s . I n  fact, according to a well known journalist 
of the time, what one observed during the enactment 
process of the code was no more than a division within 
the parliament between the attorney-parliamentarians who 
acted independently of the party line and the others: 
"... during the discussions the political parties were 
out of the platform, leaving their place to a strange co­
operation .... "50
Although most of the bar associations were totally 
against the enactment of the code, and the approach of 
the attorney parliamentarians largely opposed their 
interests, such a stance on the part of the attorney- 
parliamentarians had been considered by the workers as 
the handwork of the bar associations. And from time to 
time brought the workers and the bar associations face to 
face during the early 1970s which largely contradicted 
with the ideological stance of many of the associations.
5^ "Avukatlık Kanunu," (Code on Attorneyship) Türk-iş Dergisi, 5 
(1969), pp.8-9. For similar assesments, see also "Maden İş
Sendikaları Federasyonu Bildirisi," (The Declaration of Maden îş 
Federation of Labor Unions) in ibid., p.ll.
59 Ibid.
Nadir Nadi, "Bizden Veto," (Veto from Us) Cumhuriyet (Istanbul 
daily), April 6, 1969; see also. Nadir Nadi "Tepkiye Devam," (Keep 
Up With Protest) Cumhuriyet, April 13, 1969.
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This posture had specifically been a source of discomfort 
especially for the bar associations in big cities which 
had closely identified themselves with the interests of 
the working class. Such an assessment, came out clearly 
in the words of the then chairperson of the Ankara Bar 
Association, who had invited the workers and the 
attorneys to unite under the same camp: "... I myself
could see no reason for the negative attitude of workers 
towards the attorneys who are in a position of being the 
natural ally of the working class....In fact, both of 
them are strongly in need of a cooperative 
relationship... for coping with the degenerated order 
brought about by the coalition of politicians and 
employers. . . .
A Broadened Field of Interface; Bar Associations vs. the
State in 1970s
Bar Associations in Perspective: A General Assessment
Being an important component of the expansion of the 
boundaries of pluralism in Turkish society, the Turkish 
political scene had witnessed a proliferation of interest 
group activity especially during the late 1960s and 
1970s. During the period in question, there appeared to 
be an increase in the number of interest groups as well 
as their membership, and the type of organized activities
Kemal Sariibrahimoğlu, "Başlıca Problemlerimiz," (Our Major 
Problems) Ankara barosu Dergisi, 4 (1972), p.567.
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they sponsored multiplied. ^ 2 ^he bar associations did not 
constitute an exception to this general trend. In fact, 
the 1970s signified a period of dynamism on the part of 
the bar associations. There appeared to be a significant 
transformation of their previous preoccupation with 
narrow professional issues into an interest in broader 
and political ones. As mentioned by the chairperson of 
the Ankara Bar Association in early 1970s "the bar 
associations no longer define themselves as professional 
associations solely engaged with licensing issues and 
routine works, but as effective interest groups who would 
have a significant role mainly in shaping the state 
policies concerning legal as well as judicial issues. 
Such a trend, had carried in itself a high potential of 
an involvement on the part of the bar associations into 
the political sphere both due to their perception of 
legal and judicial issues from a broader perspective as 
well as the apparent politization within the judiciary.
Besides defining themselves as the guardians of 
justice and thus carrying the ultimate responsibility of 
the realization for certain reforms within the legal and 
the judicial sphere such as the establishment of higher 
educational institutions for recruiting judicial
2^ For a detailed analysis in this respect, see Robert Bianchi, 
Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984).
2^ Rahmi Magat, "Baroların Çalışmaları," (The Works of Bar
Associations) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 1 (1971), p.3.
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personnel^^, the bar associations also regarded 
themselves as the indispensable elements and guardians of 
democracy in Turkey.Although, having its roots in the 
Kemalist process of socialization, such a viewpoint on 
the part of the bar associations has largely been a 
product of the 1961 Constitution which defined the public 
professional associations as the guarantee of the 
democratic order.
Being in total harmony with the framework drawn for 
them by the 1961 Constitution, the bar associations' 
conception of democracy was pluralist. Within this 
framework, they attached ultimate significance to the 
existence of different interest groups in the society and 
regarded their participation in the decision-making
For the details of the reform proposals in question, see Atilla 
Sav, "Başlarken," (While Starting) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 1 (1971),
p.3-4; Rahmi Magat, "Adaletin Gerçekleşmesi," (The Realization of 
Justice) TUikara Barosu Dergisi, 5 (1970), p.747; Yekta Güngör Özden, 
"Hukuk Devrimi," (Law Reform) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 2 (1971), p.213- 
5; "Türkiye Barolar Birliği Başkanı Faruk Erem'in 1976-77 Adalet Yılı 
Başlangıcı Nedeniyle Yaptığı Konuşma," (The Statement by Faruk Erem 
During the Opening Ceremonies of the Judicial Year 1976-77) Türkiye 
Barolar Birliği Bülteni, 39 (1976), pp.5-7; "Türkiye Barolar
Birliği'nin Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Temel Kanunlarında Yapılması Gerekli 
Değişikliklerle İlgili Görüşleri," (The Views and Proposals of TUBA 
Concerning the Reformation of Basic Codes of the Turkish Republic) 
Türkiye Barolar Birliği Bülteni, 7 (1976), pp.1-6.
Teoman Evren, "Çağrı," (Invitation) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 1 
(1977), pp.3-4.
Kemal Sariibrahimoğlu, "Sorunlarımız," (Our Problems) Ankara 
Barosu Dergisi, 4 (1971), p.507.
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process as the sine qua non of a democratic regime.Such 
a conceptualization of democracy, constituted a 
justification ground for their self-identification with 
the political system, and formed a frame of reference 
for the main issues that were in the agenda of the bar 
associations.
The 1970s also signified a period during which the 
Kemalist identity of the bar associations had came quite 
clearly. One of the most significant characteristics of 
the bar associations had been their strong commitment 
towards the republican regime which had been regarded by 
them to be the "holy heritage" of Kemal Atatürk. The 
principles of Kemalism were considered to be the major 
guide-lines that must be respected in the path towards 
civilization.®® Being in line with such an attitude bar 
associations' strong support towards laicism deserves 
attention. Especially the Ankara Bar Association had been 
very sensitive in this respect and started disciplinary 
investigations for some women members who had insisted 
on wearing turbans in the late 1960s.
67 "Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yönetim Kurulu Duyurusu," (Declaration by 
the Board of Administrators of TUBA) Türkiye Barolar Birliği Bülteni, 
1-2 (1979), pp.3-4.
®® In this respect, see Kazım Akdoğan, "Avukatlık Mesleği," (The 
Profession of Attorneyship) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 2 (1977), pp.266- 
8 .
See Yekta Güngör özden, "Değerli Türk Hukukçuları," (Honorable 
Turkish Legal Professionals) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, pp.871-3; 
"Türkiye Barolar Birliği Kararı no:318/4," (Decision of TUBA no: 
318/4) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 3 (1973), pp.607-13.
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As far as the internal dynamics of the bar
associations during the period are concerned, there 
appeared to be a high degree of politization among some 
members of the associations; the politicization in
question had been a part of the process initiated during 
the DP rule with the transition to multiparty politics
and on the other a reflection of the politicization that 
Turkey witnessed during the 1970s. This was specifically 
evident in the bar associations that had been located in 
the big cities. For example, in the mid 1970s, the 
Istanbul Bar Association witnessed certain groupings 
among its leftist members competing to capture the 
administration of the Association.
However on the whole, the politicization did not have 
its effects on all aspects of the functioning of the 
associations which as mentioned above had a Kemalist
world view. And furthermore, the priority given to the 
judicial, legal and. professional issues acted as a 
unifying factor among the members. The professional 
consciousness and sensitivity towards the issues in the 
legal and judicial spheres had reached its ultimate 
recourse. Being gathered under the umbrella of the TUBA 
in their relation vis-a-vis the state, they became a 
unified force.
The general characteristic of the bar associations 
during the 1970s, can be summed up as the internalization 
of the role of protecting Turkish democracy and Kemalist
Interview with Osman Ergiin, the member Istanbul Bar Association, 
on March 10, 1994.
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principles; the main target has been defined as the 
protection of the rule and the supremacy of law’ll. 
Accordingly, the significance of the independence of the 
judiciary, the protection of human rights and liberties, 
the freedom of thought and the supremacy of the 1961 
Constitution, constituted the major points that had been 
frequently stressed. Showing a very defensive attitude, 
any attack to these ideals led to a conflict between the 
state and bar associations as will be delineated.
The Deterioration of the Judicial Mechanism: Bar 
Associations in Defence
The Reappearance of the Signs of Distrust Towards the 
Legal Professionals: A Return to 1920s
In the 1960-1970 period, Turkish politics witnessed 
significant changes. The social and structural changes 
caused by economic development including a high degree of 
rural immigration and urbanization, and the liberal 
atmosphere created by the 1961 Constitution had their 
reflections at the political life. The result was the 
proliferation of different political ideas, particularly 
on the left. For the first time under the republic, a 
Marxist party had been organized (the Workers' Party of 
Turkey) and entered the parliament in the general
For the views of the bar associations in this respect, see "13 
Nisan 1976 günü Türkiye Barolar Birliği Başkanı Faruk Erem Tarafından 
Siyasi Parti Başkanlarına Yollanan Mektup Metni," (The Letter by 
Faruk Erem - the head of TUBA - Which Was Sent to the Political Party 
Leaders on April 13, 1976) Türkiye Barolar Birliği Bülteni, 36 
(1976), p.l.
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elections of 1965.’^2 Organized labor made significant 
gains among industrial workers, partly as a result of the 
law authorizing the right to strike (1963). Towards the 
end of the decade, university students, began to join the 
leftist movement. University students became politically 
active and the first signs of a political polarization 
appeared.”^2 The position Ankara and Istanbul Law 
Faculties has been quite striking in this regard. The two 
schools had been the most striking cases where the 
leftist student organizations had been established and 
became politically active. Specifically the students in 
Ankara Law Faculty had constituted the main body who had 
devoted themselves to a revolutionary struggle and 
usually acted as a motivating force for other students.
2^ In fact, during the 1961-1980 period, Turkish politics had 
withnessed the proliferation of political parties representing all 
shades of opinion on the political ideological spectrum ranging from 
the Marxist left to militant nationalism. For a detailed analysis, 
see Muzaffer Sencer, Türkiye'de Siyasal Partilerin Sosyal Temelleri 
(The Social Bases of Political Parties in Turkey) (Istanbul: May 
Yayınları, 1974), pp.256-421; Sabri Sayan, "The Turkish Party System 
in Transition," Government and Opposition, 13 (1978).
2^ Some of the students joined the federation of Idea-clubs 
encouraged by the Labor Party of Turkey, some others, less in number 
joined other organizations established by the right-wing Republican 
Peasant National Party. For a general assesment of the student 
radicalization during the decade, see özer Ozankaya, Üniversite 
Öğrencilerinin Siyasal Yönelimleri (The Political Tendencies of 
University Students) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler 
Fakültesi, 1966); Jacob M. Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey 
(Leiden: Brill, 1974), pp.29-44.
Alev Er, Bir Uzun Yürüyüştü 68 (The Long March of 68) (Istanbul: 
Afa Yayıncılık, 1988), pp.85.
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Soon there appeared to be a deteoriation in the 
political situation marked by a rising violence, 
fragmentation of political parties and a weak government. 
In the face of continuously rising violence, especially 
on the part of the leftist militant groups, on March 12, 
1971 the military coup by communique took place, forcing 
the government to resign.
The Grand National Assembly and the government were 
largely held responsible by the military for dragging the 
country into anarchy and social unrest. In this regard, 
the main issue on the political agenda soon after the 
coup had been the enactment of a series of constitutional 
amendments which were to strengthen the hand of the 
government in governing the country and dealing with 
dissident violence-prone groups. In this respect, the 
liberal character of 1961 Constitution - which had 
granted extensive individual rights - underwent profound 
changes.The prohibition of civil servants to be members 
of trade unions, the prolongation of the period of 
detention from seven to fifteen days, and the 
authorization of the executive with the power to enact 
decrees having the force of law had been the most 
striking amendments in this respect.
For the full text of the amendments, see Gözübüyük and Kili, Türk 
Anayasa Metinleri 1839-1982, pp. 145-217.
For a detailed analysis of the amendmends, see Mümtaz Soysal, 
Anayasanın Anlamı (The Meaning of Constitution), 4^^ ed. (Istanbul: 
Gerçek Yayınevi, 1977), pp.92-100, 287-90; Münci Kapani, Kamu
Hürriyetleri (Public Freedoms), 6^^ ed. (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi 
Hukuk Fakültesi, 1981), pp.127-36.
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The bar associations which had always regarded the 
1961 Constitution, as a masterpiece with a potential to 
raise the country to the stage of contemporary 
civilization, were totally opposed the amendments. As 
mentioned in a declaration made by the Ankara Bar 
Association, the restrictions brought on the rights and 
freedoms were far from constituting solutions to the 
problems of the country.Moreover, according to the 
Ankara Bar Association, the political environment that 
was hoped to be created by the amendments was designed in 
such a way as to prevent the emergence of public 
consciousness but serve to the interests of certain power 
blocks in the country. The bar associations were also 
dissatisfied with respect to the procedural aspects of 
the issue. In this respect, being very much in 
contradiction with the preparation process of the 1961 
Constitution, there appeared to be an indifferent
attitude on the part of the government towards the views 
of the bar associations and the TUBA -which had carried 
in themselves the ultimate responsibility of solving the 
problems of the country- had been an issue of criticism.
"Ankara Barosu'nun Anayasa Değişiklikleri Konusundaki Görüşleri," 
(The Views of Ankara Bar Association on the Constitutional 
Amendments) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 1 (1973), pp.186-7. Also see
"Türkiye Barolar Birliği'nin 1961 Anayasasının Kabul Ediliş Yıldönümü 
Nedeniyle 9 Temmuz 1978 Günü Yayınladığı Duyuru," (The Declaration of 
TUBA on July 9, 1978, for the Anniversary of the Enactmnet of the
1961 Constitution) Türkiye Barolar Birliği Bülteni, 49 (1978), p.9.
Ibid.
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It seems that besides aiming to create a strong 
executive and to limit basic rights and liberties at the 
individual level, the process of amendment also carried 
in itself the signs of a distrust towards the ordinary 
judiciary. This was specifically evident in the additions 
made to the Article 136 of the 1961 Constitution within 
the framework of which the State Security Courts had been 
established.
According to the new version of the Article, these 
courts had been authorized to deal with offences against 
the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory 
and nation, the free democratic order, or against 
principles of the republic and offences directly 
involving the internal and the external security of the 
country. These courts were to be composed of both civil 
and military judges and public prosecutors, whose term of 
office were to be three years. As far as the appointment 
of the staff is concerned, that authority had been given 
to the Council of Ministers in— case of the civil 
personnel and to the military for the military 
personnel.
The establishment of the State Security Courts and 
the procedures these courts were to follow caused
"T.C. Anayasasının 30., 57., 136., 138., 148. Maddelerinin Bazı 
Fıkralarının Değiştirilmesi Hakkında Kanun No. 1889," (Code on the 
Amendment of Articles 30, 57, 136, 138, 148 of the Constitution, No. 
1889) Düstur Beşinci Tertip, vol. 12.
"DGM'nin Kuruluş ve Yargılama Usulleri Hakkında Kanun No. 2845," 
(Code on the Establishment and Civil Procedures of the State Security 
Courts No.2845) Düstur Beşinci Tertip, vol. 22.
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intensive criticisms both on the part of the bar 
associations as well as many legal professionals of the 
time. Largely resembling the Tribunals of Independence of 
the early Republican era which had signified the
existence of a complete distrust towards the ordinary 
judiciary and its personnel, the establishment of the 
State Security Courts had been regarded as a backward 
step for the Turkish judicial system. According to a well 
known legal scholar of the time,
...It had been a great misfortune for the 
legal professionals who had witnessed the era 
of Tribunals of Independence, to find 
themselves at the same point again, after half 
a century... And moreover, the Tribunals of 
Independence had been established on a 
temporary bases just to prevent some events 
endangering the very existence of the newly 
formed Republic. Where as the State Security 
Courts had been designed as constitutional ^
institutions having a permanent character 
which makes the over all picture even worse.
As it has been the case for most of the amendments 
which were made after the coup, the bar associations were 
in total opposition towards the establishment of the new 
courts too. "The unconstitutionality of the project" 
constituted the main argument of the TUBA.
Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, 12 Mart Faşizmin Felsefesi (The 
Philosophy of March 12, Facism) (Istanbul: Evrim Yayınları, 1990), p. 
71.
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The main argument made by the TUBA was that such a 
practice would pave the way for enlargening of the 
maneauvering sphere of the executive in interfering with 
the judicial affairs which surely contradicted the 
constitutional principle of the independence of the 
judiciary. Having the potential of leading to 
politicization within the judicial personnel of these 
courts in the long run, the dominance of the executive 
especially within the process of appointments courts, had 
been regarded as to cause a deterioration in the 
functioning of these courts as judicial organs in the 
full sense of the term. In other words, according to the 
TUBA, rather then acting as independent organs of the 
judiciary, these courts would be the emanations of the 
executive. The following declaration of the TUBA makes 
this point clear: "The reason for our Associations'
negative stance with respect to the State Security Courts 
is neither due to an ideological fanatism nor 
partisanship. The reason is our strong desire to prevent 
political authorities from dominating j u s t i c e . O n  the 
whole the decision establishing the State Security 
Courts, was regarded to be the final step which would put 
an end to the efforts to consolidate the Turkish 
democracy.
82 "Türkiye Barolar Birliği'nin Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri 
Hakkındaki Basın Bülteni," (The Press Declaration of TUBA on State 
Security Courts) Türkiye Barolar Birliği Bülteni, 39 (1976), p.9.
83 "Türkiye Barolar Birliği'nin 25 Nisan 1971 tarihli Duyurusu,"
(Declaration by TUBA on April 25, 1971) Türkiye Barolar Birliği
Bülteni, 5-6 (1971), pp.1-2.
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Another important point that was strongly stressed by 
the TUBA was the contradiction of such a project with the 
constitutional principle of the guarantee of "natural 
judge." This principle prohibits the establishment of 
extraordinary tribunals having the jurisdiction of 
removing a person from the jurisdiction of the natural 
judge. The Article 32 of the 1961 Constitution expresses 
this principle. However, while constituting one of the 
arguments put forward by TUBA that showed its opposition 
with respect to the establishment of State Security 
Courts, also manifested a disregarded attitude and 
opposition towards the mentality of the constitutional 
amendments that had been realized in 1971. In fact the, 
principle of "natural judge" had been replaced by the 
principle of "legally designated court" stating that "no 
one could be put on trial in a court other than the 
legally designated one within the framework of laws" 
which had constituted the legal framework of the 
establishment of the State Security Courts.®^
For an overall evaluation of the issue, see "Ankara Barosu Yönetim 
Kurulu'nun Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri hakkındaki Görüşleri," (The 
Views of Ankara Bar Association Board of Administrators on the State 
Security Courts) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 6 (1976), pp.1148-54; 
"Türkiye Barolar Birliği'nin Olağanüstü Genel Kurul Bildirisi," 
Extraordinary General Assembly Declaration of TUBA) Türkiye Barolar 
Birliği Bülteni, 39 (1976); Teoman Evren, "İhtisas Mahkemeleri," 
(Specialized Courts) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 3 (1978), pp.425-30.
For a detailed analysis of the above mentioned principles, see 
Bülent Tanör, Türkiye'nin İnsan Hakları Sorunu 1 (The Problem of 
Human Rights in Turkey 1), 2^ *^  ed. (Istanbul: BDS Yayınları, 1991), 
pp.287-292.
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With these points in mind, during the process of the 
establishment of State Security Courts, TUBA started a 
campaign in order to prevent the actualization of the 
project. According to the TUBA, the best solution lied in 
the realization of a judicial and legal reform, instead 
of the establishment of these extraordinary courts which 
would damage the prestige of the Turkish judiciary. 
this respect, while trying to convince the public 
opinion, the TUBA made recourse to the president of the 
Republic in order to stop the enactment of the law.s"^  But 
the result was a total disappointment. One of the most 
important point that must be mentioned in this respect 
was the position of the attorney parliamentarians during 
the enactment process of the law. As it has been the case 
during the parliamentary debates concerning the social 
security rights of the attorneys noted above, there 
appeared to be an indifferent attitude on the part of the 
attorney parliamentarians towards the stance of the bar 
associations. While being an indication of the 
ineffectiveness of bar associations to effect the law 
making process through their parliamentarian members, 
such a detachment was regarded as a betrayal towards the 
profession and its ideal of protecting the rule of law 
and democracy.
Kemal Sariibrahimoğlu, "Güvenlik Mahkemeleri Gerekli mi?," (Are 
State Security Courts Necessary?) Ankara Barosu Dergisi  ^ p.775-6.
Faruk Erem, "DGM*nin Durumu," (The Position of State Security 
Courts) Cumhuriyet, December 18, 1976.
Velidedeoğlu, 12 Mart Faşizmin Felsefesi, pp.149-150.
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Besides the establishment of extraordinary courts 
however, there also appeared to be other issues which had 
signified a complete distrust of the executive towards 
the judiciary and their system of justice during the 
1970s. While manifesting itself as a dominating attitude 
on the part of the executive towards the judiciary as it 
had been in the case of State Security Courts, such a 
distrust had also shown itself as a complete detachment 
both on the part of the government towards the decisions 
of the judiciary. The most significant example of such an 
attitude had been the resistance of the government in 
applying the decisions of the Council of State -the 
court of the last instance for reviewing decisions made 
by the administrative courts. This stance had not been 
in line with the Article 132 of the Constitution which 
stipulated that the legislative, executive and the 
administrative authorities were obliged to act in 
conformity with the court decisions. However, 
governments, largely viewed these decisions as obstacles 
which reduced their effectiveness in governing the 
country; the latter resorted to legal covers and made use 
of the loopholes in the rules and regulations. 
According to the then head of the Justice Party and. Prime 
Minister Süleyman Demirel "It was impossible for the 
government to rule the country within an atmosphere which 
was characterized by the existence of a Constitutional
See Cahit Tutvirti, "Türk Personel Sisteminin Sorunlarına Genel Bir 
Yaklaşım," (A General View on the Problems of Turkish Personnel 
System) Amme İdaresi Dergisi, 13 (1980), p.l03.
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Court stronger than the National Assembly and a Council 
of State stronger than the government...."5° Bar 
associations considered such a mentality as one opposed 
to the rule of law. Regarded to be "...a symptom of the 
bankruptcy of the Turkish state...and a serious attack on 
the rights of the individual. . . ' by the then head of 
TUBA, this very issue caused a total discomfort on the
part of the bar associations. For the first time in the
bar associations history, a fully organized protest was 
made under the leadership of the TUBA. March 4, 1977 was 
declared as "Condemnation Day" and the attorneys were 
requested not to show up in court. Although, this act
caused no significant change of course on the part of the 
government, it at least served as a warning and showed 
the authorities the concern of the bar associations
concerning the judicial issues and their influence upon 
members.
Tercüman (Istanbul daily), January 11, 1976.
"Danıştay'ın 108. Kuruluş Yıldönümü nedeniyle Türkiye Barolar 
Birliği Başkanı Faruk Erem'in Yaptığı Konuşma," (Speech by Faruk Erem 
- the head of TUBA - During the 108^^ Anniversary of the Council of 
State) Türkiye Barolar Birliği Bülteni, 7 (1976), p.l2.
92 «4 Mart 1977 Kınama Günü ile ilgili Duyuru (1977/41-2)," (The 
Circular (1977/41-2) Concerning The March 4, 1977 Condemnation Day) 
Türkiye Barolar Birliği Bülteni, 8 (1977), p.l.
Such an attempt had largely been welcomed by the majority of the 
Attorneys all over the country. Only some attorneys from Erzurum Bar 
Association had not confirmed the a decision and been harsly 
criticized. See, Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, "Bir Тек Söz Bekledim," 
(I Longed for a Word) Cumhuriyet, March 5, 1977.
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Another act which was organized by the Istanbul Bar 
Association for protesting the overall policies of the 
government in the legal and the judicial sphere, 
including the State Security Courts, the non-execution of 
the court decisions by the government, and the violation 
of the Constitution, took place on April 17 of the same 
year. On this occasion, all bar members marched in 
Istanbul demanding "respect for law." Blaming the 
Nationalist Front government^‘^ for aiming to bring fascism 
into the political arena, the head of the Istanbul Bar 
Association explained the rationale of their protest in 
as follows:
...The march that has been organized by the 
Istanbul Bar Association is a warning 
concerning the anti-democratic practices of the 
government. Our bar is prepared to put on a 
struggle with all its might in order to 
preserve the rule of law and democracy in the 
country. The ones who aim to bring fascism to 
the country will never succeed. We, as the 
members of the Istanbul Bar Association will 
always stand against them and do whatever is 
necessary for protecting our country.
At the time, the Justice Party (Right-of-Center), the National 
Salvation Party (Religious) and the National Action Party (Ultra 
nationalist) had been the coalition partners.
"Istanbul Barosu Başkanı Mehmet İkizler'in Yaptığı Açılış 
Konuşması," (Opening Statement by Mehmet Ali İkizler - the head of 
the Istanbul Bar Association - ) Istanbul Barosu Dergisi, 1-2-3-4
(1976), pp.14-5.
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While receiving an overwhelming support from the 
individual bar associations all over the country, the 
protest created a wide range of public opinion. Many 
people in Istanbul had attended the march. The press, 
with the exception of some rightist newspapers which 
harshly blamed the Bar associations for their anti- 
governmental stance,56 also regarded the march as a 
positive step. However, what was most striking about the 
protest was extensive support that it had received from 
various interest groups including the Istanbul Medical 
Association, the Association of the Teachers Union of 
Turkey(TOBDER), Association of Technical Personnel Union 
of Turkey(TUTED), and several Chambers of Engineers and 
Architects in Istanbul.5”^
The Attacks on the Right of Defence and Professional 
Freedom
Being a significant part of the deterioration that 
the Turkish judicial system witnessed during the 1970s, 
the attacks on the right of defense, constituted the most 
problematic issue with regards to the state-bar 
association relationship.5® In fact, the reason for this 
confrontation lied in the fact that, besides being very
56 Exemplary is the article; Bedii Faik, "Yürüyen Baro," (Bar 
Association on the Road) Tercüman, April 18, 1976.
57 "Yürüyüşün Etki ve Tepkileri," (The Effects of and Reactions to 
the March) Istanbul Barosu Dergisi, 1-2-3-4 (1976), p.lO.
56 For an eloboration of the right of defence and its significance 
for the judicial mechanism, see Zeki Hafızoğulları, "Genel 
Çizgileriyle Savunma Hakkı," (General Features of the Right of 
Defence) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 1 (1994), pp. 20-32.
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much in contradiction with the rule and supremacy of law 
which as noted above constituted the most significant 
ideal for the bar associations, the restrictions 
concerning the right of defense had also their direct 
effect on the professional rights and liberties of the 
attorneys.
First, although the right of defense had been 
included among the basic rights of the individual in the 
1961 Constitution, there appeared to be serious 
limitations concerning the issue. The most urgent problem 
in this respect had been the rule about the "secrecy with 
regards to the evidence" which largely prevented the 
attorneys from performing their profession and the right 
of defense. The Article 82 of the Council of State Act^^ 
and the Article 54 of the High Military Administrative 
Court of Appeals Court Act, totally prohibits the right 
of the attorney. It also deprives the accused of the 
right to examine the documents related with the case. 
Also, according to the Article 88 of the Criminal 
Procedures Act,^°^ if the disclosure of certain documents 
was deemed harmful for the security of the country by the
For the full text of the code, see "Danıştay Kanunu No.· 571," 
(Code of the Council of State No. 571) Düstur Beşinci Tertip , vol. 
4.
100 pqj. the full text of the code, see "Askeri Yüksek İdare mahkemesi
Kanunu No. 1602," ( Code on the High Military Administrative Court
No. 1602) Resmi Gazete, no. 14251, July 20, 1972.
101 por the full text of the code, see "Ceza Muhakemeleri Usulü 
Kanunu No. 1412," (Code of Criminal Procedures No. 1412) Meri 
Kanunlar, vol. 1.
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highest authority in a governmental department, then it 
was impossible for the attorney or accused to use those 
documents even if they were related with the case.i°2 This 
secrecy concerning the evidence which had left its 
footprints on the judicial mechanism during the 1970s 
regarded by the bar associations as a factor which had 
"...deteriorate the equality of the state and the citizen 
behind the court in favour of the former....
A second problematic issue which attracted the 
reaction of bar associations since the early 1970s was 
the rule of secrecy during the police interrogations. 
Although there were no legal restrictions in any of the 
codes as it has been the case with regards to the secrecy 
of evidence as noted above, the accused particularly in 
the criminal cases was prohibited from contacting his 
attorney during the police interrogation and while he was 
under detention.Constituting an integral part of the
102 pqj. details of similiar practices in Germany, see Faruk Erem, 
"Avukat Croissant Olayı ve Verilen Hüküm, " (The Incident of the 
Attorney Croissant and the Final Judgement) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 2 
(1979), pp.6-10.
103 "Ankara Barosu Başkanı Teoman Evren*in 40. Genel Kurul 
Toplantısında Yaptığı Konuşma, * (The Statement by Teoman Evren - the 
head of the Ankara Bar Association - during the 40^^ General 
Assembly) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 1 (1978), p.l48.
104 "Türkiye Barolar Birliği*ince Cumhurbaşkanı, Meclis Başkanı ve 
Genel Kurmay Başkanına Gönderilen Rapor, * (The Report of the TUBA 
Submitted to the Presidency of the Turkish Republic, the Presidency 
of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and the Presidency of the 
General Staff) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 3 (1980), pp.423-7.
Concerning this issue, the TUBA has received many complaints from 
the attorneys. See **Burdur Barosuna Bağlı Bazı Avukatların
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limitations which was brought on the right of defense and 
freedom to claim rights, such a practice was regarded by 
the TUBA as being totally in contradiction with the 
principle that "defense must start as soon as conviction 
starts.
Besides the argument concerning the negative effects 
of such a practice on the individual's right of defense 
many of the attorneys regarded the issue as a policy 
choice on the part of the police to camouflage torture 
which was said to be an integral part of the police 
interrogations during the period. 1°·^ In fact, there 
appeared to be many complaints on the part of the
Müvekkileri ile Görüştürülmemeleri no:1976/ 40-5," (The Prohibition 
of Contact Between the Attorneys of Burdur Bar Association and Their 
Clients no:1976/40-5) Türkiye Barolar Birliği Bülteni, 36 (1976),
p.l3; "Istanbul Barosuna Bağlı Bazı Avukatların Müvekkilleri ile 
Görüştürülmemeleri no:1976/37-7," (The Prohibition of Contact Between 
Some Members of Istanbul Bar Association and Their Clients 1976/37-7) 
Türkiye Barolar birliği Bülteni, 37 (1976); "Ordu Barosuna Bağlı Bazı 
Avukatların Müvekkileri ile Görüştürülmemeleri, no:1976/40-12,"(The 
Prohibition of Contact Between Some Members of Ordu Bar Association 
and Their Clients no:1976/40-12) Türkiye Barolar Birliği Bülteni, 40 
(1976), p.21.
106 "Türkiye Barolar Birliği'nin Sakarya Toplantısında Sunulan
Bildirisi," (Declaration of the TUBA Submitted in the Sakarya
Meeting) Türkiye Barolar Birliği Bülteni, 41 (1977), p.3.
107 such an assesment, see "Türkiye Barolar Birliği 11. Genel
Kurul Bildirisi," (The ll^ *^ General Assembly Declaration of the TUBA) 
Türkiye Barolar Birliği Bülteni, 47 (1978), pp.14-5; "Türkiye Barolar 
Birliği'nin 30 Nisan-2 Mayıs 1977 Tarihinde İzmir'de Yapılan
Olağanüstü Genel Kurul Toplantısında Sunulan Bildirisi," (The
Declaration of the TUBA Submitted in the Extraordinary General
Assembly in Izmir on April 30 - May 2, 1977) Türkiye Barolar Birliği 
Bülteni, 42 (1977), p.l4.
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attorneys who had regarded it to be an urgent problem 
with must be coped with. Especially during the mid 1970s, 
the subjection of the accused to torture as well as ill 
treatment had turned out to be a very hot issue which 
caused a conflictual relationship between some of the bar 
associations and the state. The Ankara Bar Association 
had been very sensitive regarding the issue, as it 
appeared to be the first association which had declared 
its critical views concerning the problem, by denouncing 
the state authorities for "committing the greatest crime 
of the human race and in the process causing a 
deterioration within the justice system.
There appeared to be considerable amount of ill 
treatments and attacks by the police directly towards the 
attorneys, too. This had been true particularly in the 
case of the attorneys who defended political criminals 
political criminals. Here, the police was largely 
hampering the professional freedom of attorneys.
In this respect, see "Ankara Barosu Bildirisi: Yetkililer İşkence 
İddialarına Cevap Vermelidir," (The Declaration of the Ankara Bar 
Association: The Authorities Should Respond The Claims of Torture) 
Yeni Halkçı (Ankara daily), November 30, 1973; Yekta Güngör Özden, 
"İşkence Devlete Kötülük, İhanettir," (Torture is Treachery and Doing 
Evil to the State) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 2 (1974), p.355.
109 There appeared to be many applications to TUBA on the part of 
attorneys in order tc to take measures for preventing such a 
situation, see "1977/42-11 Sayılı Dilekçe," (Petition, no:1977/42-11) 
Türkiye Barolar Birliği Bülteni, 42 (1977), p.l8; "1977/45-8 Sayılı 
Dilekçe," (Petition, no:1977/45-8) Türkiye Barolar Birliği Bülteni, 
45 (1977), p.l4; "1978/48-13 Sayılı Dilekçe," (Petition, no:1978/48- 
13) Türkiye Barolar Birliği Bülteni, 48 (1978), p.23.
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There seemed to be one basic reason for this state of 
affairs. First, in the eyes of state authorities 
attorneys who defended political criminals were no longer 
professionals but attorneys of certain ideologies. In 
fact, the attorneys who were defending the political 
criminals, seemed to be identified with the views of 
their clients. It was claimed that, rather than being 
professionals performing their professions in the court 
room, they mirrored with the views of their clients that 
they had represented.
Besides this rather micro perspective however, 
such an attitude on the part of the state authorities can 
well be regarded as having its roots in the general 
attitudes of the attorneys towards the system. Thus, it 
can be regarded as a manifestation of the distrust 
towards the attorneys due to their largely negative 
stance with regards to the policies of the governments 
and the conflictual relationship between the governments 
and the bars.
Bar Associations as "Outsider Groups"
As noted above, there appeared to be a discomfort on 
the part of the bar associations towards the decisions 
and practices of the governments in the legal and the 
judicial sphere particularly since the coup by
For a general evaluation of the role of attorneys with respect to 
political cases, see Faruk Erem, Siyasi Davalarda Müdafilik (Defence 
in the Political Cases) (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1971).
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communique of 1971. The governments were always accused 
of being incapable of bringing peace and quite in the 
country^ but instead causing a deterioration in 
government.112 What happened during the period was the 
total politicization of the echelons of the state, as 
there appeared to be a continuing effort on the part of 
the governments to politicize the bureaucracy in order to 
make them completely subservient to themselves. Also 
the relative exhaustion of Kemalism which began as early 
as the 1950s, seemed near completion. Although, 
Kemalism still was the dominant ideology, it became a 
cover for other ideologies, ranging from extreme rightist 
to leftist ones.
Parallel to the developments, the bar associations - 
basically maintains their Kemalist orientation and
111 Teoman Evren, "Anarşi," (Anarcy) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 1 (1978), 
pp.3-4.
ll^For an evaluation of the discomfort on the part of the bar 
associations with respect to the politicization within the echelons 
of the state, see "Türkiye Barolar Birliği 9. Genel Kurul 
Toplantısında Ankara Barosu Başkanı Nejat Oğuz'un Yaptığı Konuşma," 
(The Statement by Nejat Oğuz - the head of the Ankara Bar Association 
- During the 9^^ General Assembly of TUBA) Ankara Barosu Dergisi, 1 
(1976), pp.3-5.
ll^lt was specifically during the period of Nationalist front 
governments (1975-1977) that bureaucracy had been extremely 
politicized. See Metin Heper, "Recent Instability in Turkey: End of a 
Monocentrist Polity," International Journal of Turkish Studies, 1 
(1980).
114Frederic Frey, "Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey," in 
Political Elites in Turkey, George Lenczowski, ed. (Washington D.C.: 
American Research Enterprise for Public Policy Research, 1975), p.lO.
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undertaking into themselves the ultimate responsibility 
of warning the authorities for preserving the Kemalist 
heritage - had usually been in opposition with 
governments' policies specifically in matters related to 
the legal and judicial spheres, in particular rule and 
supremacy of law.
In fact, when the state-bar association relationship 
during the 1970s is compared to the previous decades, it 
can be said that there emerged a more conflictual 
relationship between the bar associations and the state. 
Although there appeared to be a continuity with respect 
to purely professional matters like the supervision of 
the state over the bar associations through the tutelage 
of the Ministry of Justice^^^ or the state policies 
towards the judges as it has been the case during the DP 
period, during the 1970s, bar associations, involved 
themselves in broader issues, too. Such diversification 
of concerns on the part of the bar associations had the 
potential of being regarded by the governments as an 
interference to the functioning area of the state by 
bringing into the agenda the questioning of its 
effectiveness in coping with the problems specifically 
the realization of justice over which the state had the 
monopoly as well as democracy which had still been 
evaluated as an end in itself- that of finding the "one
In this respect, throughout the 1970s the enactment of a new code 
on attorneyship had always been on the agenda of bar associations.
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best way" rather than of satisfying group interests, In 
this respect, opposition and defensive attitudes on the 
part of the bar associations, while from time to time, 
had caused the formation of an hostile attitude on the 
part of the state elites-which had been largely replaced 
by their political counter parts- towards some
attorneys, also caused a detachment towards the
associational interests by the state authorities.
Although the 1970s had signified a period of dynamism 
and increasing political consciousness on the part of the 
bar associations, they acted as an "outsider group" as 
their interest group activities took the shape of public 
campaigning and protest, rather than an "insider" one 
having direct access to ministers and civil servants. 
This was due to the disinterestedness and hostility on 
the part of the authorities.
Heper, "The State and Interest Groups with Special Reference to 
Turkey," in Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: The Post-1980 
Turkish Experience, Heper, ed., p.l9.
Terminology has been adopted from, Wyn Grant, "Insider Group, 
Outsider Group, and Interest Group Strategies in Britain," 
unpublished paper (1977), cited in Graham K. Wilson, Interest Groups 
(Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1990), p.92.
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chapter Five
STATE vs. BAR ASSOCIATIONS IN THE POST-1980 PERIOD; A
POLITICS OF PARADOX?
The Bar Associations in the Early 1980s
During the early 1980, Turkey had been under the 
pressure of a multi-faced crisis. Besides the economic 
instability - which was characterized by a sharp increase 
in inflation rate, the balance of payments deficits, 
industrial slow-downs, foreign debt problem -,i 
democracy was also in trouble. Increased street violence 
and civil strife due to the ideological fragmentation and 
polarization within all the echelons of the state and 
society, including organized labor, professions, civil 
bureaucracy and even the security services, as well as 
lack of a capable government, constituted the most 
critical issues which had to be solved in order to attain 
political stability.2 In fact, the parliament had been 
under a situation of a total deadlock even failing to
 ^ For a detailed analysis of the economic crisis during the mentioned 
period, see Peter Wolf, Stabilization Policy and Structural 
Adjustment in Turkey, 1980-1985 (Berlin: German Development 
Institute, 1987); Yakup Kepenek, Gelişimi, Üretimi ve Sorunlarıyla 
Türkiye Ekonomisi (Turkish Economy with Its Development, Production, 
and Problems) (Ankara: Savaş Yayınları, 1983), Chapter 6; Bilsay 
Kuruç et. al.. Bırakınız Yapsınlar Bırakınız Geçsinler; Türkiye 
Ekonomisi 1980-1985 (Laissez Faire Laissez Passez; Turkish Economy 
1980-1985) (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1986).
 ^ For a detailed elaboration of the factors that gave way to the 
political crisis see C. H. Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy, 
(Walkington: The Eothen Press, 1990), Chapter 2.
elect a president of the Republic for six m onths .  ^ And, 
it is surprising that Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel of 
the Justice Party, who had formed a minority government 
that avoided confronting the parliament, "even seemed to 
prolong the deadlock over the presidency in order to 
prevent the conduct of other legislative business.'"^
Under these conditions where the state was incapable 
of maintaining order and administering the law, Turkish 
political life witnessed the third coup d'etat of its 
history. It was in September 12, 1980 that a temporary
abandonment of democracy took place, with the seizure of 
the power by the Turkish Armed Forces which again had the 
ultimate aim of reconstructing the political system thus 
restructuring democracy as it had been the case during 
the previous military interventions of 1960 and 1971.
In the military's view, politicians had miserably 
failed in their task of governing the country in a 
rational and civilized way. The political parties and 
their leaders were regarded to have the ultimate 
responsibility for the major sources of emerging 
terrorism, chaos and the erosion in public authority.^
 ^ For an elaboration of the parliamentary problems in late 1970s, see 
Turan Güneş, Araba Devrilmeden Önce (Before the Car Crashed) 
(Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1983), pp.23-30.
 ^ Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington, England: 
The Eothen Press, 1985), p.l24.
 ^ liter Turan, "Political Parties and the Party System in Post-1983 
Turkey," in State, Democracy and the Military in Turkey in the 1980s, 
Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988),
p. 68.
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Having totally lost their trust towards the governments 
in solving the problems of the country as well as 
accusing the political parties and constitutional 
institutions for keeping silent, the military had 
explained the rationale of the intervention as both to 
maintain the national unity and territorial integrity of 
the Republic which was claimed to be undermined by 
treacherous ideologies as well as by direct attacks 
initiated by internal enemies, and to reconstruct the 
Atatiirkist state. ^ Accordingly, defining the military as 
the most passionate guardian of Atatiirkist thought. 
General Kenan Evren, the Chief of the General Staff, the 
head of the National Security Council which stayed in 
power until the general elections of November 6, 1983,
and the president of the republic between November 1982- 
November 1989, underlined the fact that:
. . . Turkish Armed Forces would never allow 
the Turkish Republic to be taken over by the 
traitors.... For them the most important thing 
was not the general welfare of the nation but 
the interests of their political parties. The 
sole raison d'etre of the Turkish Armed 
Forces is to defend this country as an 
indivisible whole against its internal as 
well as external enemies, and to see to it
® Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy, p.50.
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that this country will always be secure and 
its citizens happy and well-cared for.^
It must be mentioned that, the 1980 military 
intervention had enjoyed broad popular support from the 
general public. This was largely due to the military's 
short term goal of giving an end to the rising violence 
and terror in the country. Being alienated from
politicians and politics of the seventies, many groups, 
looked to the military as a final hope for peace and 
order.®
Bar Associations did not constitute an exception in 
this regard. In a letter signed by Atilla Sav, the head 
of Turkish Union of Bar Associations (TUBA) then, and 
sent to General Evren just after the intervention on 
December 12, 1980, the bar associations had made their
views known regarding the intervention. Declaring their 
strong commitment towards democratic regime and its 
institutions, bar associations thought that the 
intervention had to be evaluated within the framework of 
the conditions that Turkey faced in the late 1970s. In 
fact, although at the theoretical level they seemed to be 
against the coup d'etat in the name of a well functioning 
democracy and the rule of law, they still declared -their
 ^ Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, "The State, Politics, and the 
Military in Turkey," Coirparative Politics, 16 (1983), p.29.
® For detailed information concerning the views of different groups 
in Turkey towards the military intervention, see Nurşen Mazxcx, 
Türkiye'de Askeri Darbeler ve Sivil Rejime Etkisi (The Military 
Interventions in Turkey and Their Effect on Civil Regime (Istanbul: 
Gür Yayxnlarx, 1989), pp.186-222.
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trust to the military specifically due to the short-term 
goal of the intervention of eliminating the terror from 
which many attorneys had also suffered.^
Such a viewpoint had also been expressed by one of 
the attorneys during the fourteenth General Assembly 
meeting of the TUBA as follows:
. . . Before the intervention what was on the 
political and social scene had been a chaos 
growing day-by-day and threatening the 
country with a total destruction. In such a 
situation of the Turkish state facing 
extinction, I would surely be on the side of 
saving the state first, rather than choosing 
the supremacy of law. In this respect, we 
must be on the side of the military for the 
sake of putting an end to violence which had 
affected many of our members during the 1970s 
and then think of reconstructing the rule of 
law which constitutes a most holy concept for 
all of us.^°
In addition to the belief in the military's short 
term goal, such a viewpoint on the part of the bar 
associations with respect to the 1980 intervention 
inherently had its roots in the long-term goal of
 ^ "Devlet Başkanı Sayın Orgeneral Kenan Evren'e Sunulan Mektup 
Metni," (The Letter Submitted to the President of the Republic 
General Kenan Evren) in Türkiye Barolar Birliği XIV Genel Kurul 
Tutanağı (The 14^^ General Assembly Minutes of TUBA) , 16-18 Mayıs
1981, Ankara, pp.22-3.
10 Türkiye Barolar Birliği XIV Genel Kurul Tutanağı, p.37.
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reconstructing democracy and reinvigorating Atatiirkism 
and the Atatiirkist state. Assuming the military rule as a 
transitionary period, the bar associations were very much 
interested in a return to the democratic regime as soon 
as possible.
During the interregnum(1980-1983) , the entire country 
was put under martial law; all political parties were 
permanently banned; almost all associational activity was 
stopped; three of the four labor confederations were 
closed and their leaders were put on trial and convicted; 
and, labor lay-offs, collective bargaining, strikes as 
well as lockouts were suspended. The bar associations 
were rather tolerant to these developments due to their 
belief in the temporary suspension of democracy in the 
name of saving the country from ruins.
However, as far as some other practices of the 
military rule were concerned, there appeared to be some 
problems and from time to time the bar associations 
displayed strict opposition to the military. The bar 
associations gradually became very much bothered with 
respect to the policies pursued by the military in the 
field of law and judiciary.
The limitation of freedom to claim rights of the 
accused, the restrictions regarding attorneys face-to- 
face contact with the accused, and the claims concerning 
torture had been the major issues that were particularly
"Devlet Başkanı Sayın Orgeneral Kenan Evren'e Yollanan Mektup 
Metni," in ibid., p.22-3.
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criticised by the bar associations. ^2 In fact, in addition 
to the criticisms of the bar associations, some of these 
practices had also drawn the attention of international 
organizations; the issue of torture of the accused had 
been given priority. Though, the military regime
admitted that only a small number of cases of torture had 
occurred, 12 both the bar associations as well as Amnesty 
International constantly attempted to show that torture 
was adopted as a consistent policy by the Turkish 
police. 1^
Another issue that attracted the attention of bar
associations was the legislations enacted during the
period in question. The bar associations were rather 
uncomfortable with respect to the substance and form of 
the laws as well as the preparation process. Regarding 
themselves as specialists within the field of law, thus 
experts, whose views must be taken into consideration 
during the preparation of laws and regulations at least 
with respect to form, most of the attorneys came into
12 For a detailed disscussion of these points see, Türkiye Barolar 
Birliği XVI Genel Kurul Tutanağı (The 16^^ General Assembly Minutes 
of TUBA), 13-15 Mayıs, 1983, Antalya, p.81-6; Also see "Ankara Barosu 
Başkanı Muammer Aksoy'un Konuşması," (The Speech by Muammer Aksoy - 
the head of the Ankara Bar Association - ) in Türkiye Barolar
Birliği XIV. Genel Kurul Toplantı Tutanağı, 16-18 Mayıs, 1981, 
Ankara, pp.2-9.
2^ Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy, p.55.
In fact, the existence of torture had always been a point of 
criticism during the 1980s. In this respect, see Bülent Tanör, 
Türkiye'nin İnsan Hakları Sorunu 1 (The Problem of Human Rights in 
Turkey 1) (Istanbul: BDS Yayınları, 1991), p.33-39.
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opposition with the military due to the military's giving 
shortshrift to them and other jurists. soon the same 
concerns on the part of the bar associations appeared on 
the agenda in relation with the new 1982 Constitution.
The 1982 Constitution and the Bar Associations
General Framework of the Constitution; The Views of the 
Bar Associations
It had been with the 1982 Constitution that the 
military prepared the legal framework in which the state 
would be strong, capable, and autonomous vis-a-vis the 
civil society. In fact, the basic goal of the framers of 
the new constitution had been to bring the state back 
in.i^ In many of his public speeches, besides blaming the 
politicians for their incapability in governing the 
country,General Evren held the 1961 Constitution 
responsible for the chaotic situation Turkey faced before 
the intervention. According to Evren "...the 1960
Constitution had been a luxury for the country. There had 
been many missing points, of which some wicked people
"Devlet Başkanı Sayın Orgeneral Kenan Evren'e Gönderilen Mektup 
Metni," in Türkiye Barolar Birliği XIV Genel Kurul Tutanağı, p.22-3.
For an elaboration, see Tachau and Heper, "The State, Politics, 
and the Military in Turkey," Comparative Politics, pp.28-32.
The most significant manifestation of viewing the pre-1980 
politicians as potential threats for the recurrence of violance and 
political paralysis on the part of the military had been the adoption 
of the constitutional provision which banned the leading political 
figures as well as some politicians from active involvement in 
politics. The total number in this respect had been 723, out of which 
242 has been banned for ten years and 481 for five years. The bans 
were lifted later in a special referendum held on September 6, 1987.
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took the advantage. In fact, such acts led both to the 
Communique of March 12, 1971 as well as the military 
intervention of September 12, 1980."is
With such discontent concerning the 1961 Constitution 
on the part of the military, the Consultative Assembly 
which on October 23, 1981 had started the work on the 
drawing up of the 1982 Constitution, appointed a 
committee composed of fifteen members under the
chairmanship of Professor Orhan Aldikagti. The Committee 
completed devising the draft Constitution on July 17, 
1982. After its approval by the Consultative Assembly, 
the draft was approved by the National Security Council 
that functioned as the upper legislative body with final 
authority) with certain amendments and became the law of 
the land following the referendum in November 1982.
When compared to the previous constitution, one of 
the most significant points that had been the focus of 
criticisms was the way in which the 1982 Constitution was 
prepared. The Constitution was prepared without feedback 
from the civil society. In fact, the 1981 Consultative 
Assembly in contradiction with the 1960 Constitutive 
Assembly of 1960 had not been constructed on an
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenan Evren'in Söylev 
ve Demeçleri(12 Eylül 1980 - 12 Eylül 1981) (The Speeches and
Statements of the President of the Turkish Republic) (Ankara: 
Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1981), p.67. Also see Kenan Evren, Zorlu Yıllar 
^ (Hard Years I) (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1994), p.363; Kenan 
Evren, Kenan Evren'in Anıları (The Memoirs of Kenan Evren), vol.3 
(Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1991), p.207.
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associational b a s i s , I n  the Consultative Assembly, the 
views of the bar associations as some other associations 
had not been represented. In order to fill such a gap, 
the Constitutional Committee had welcomed comments and 
suggestions from universities as well as several 
professional organizations, including the Confederation 
of Employer's Associations(TISK) and the Confederation of 
Workers' Union(TÜRK İŞ). Perhaps paying slightly more 
attention to the views of the TISK and TURKIŞ, the 
Committee largely ignored the other views.
Such an indifferent attitude by the assembly had been 
the focus of criticism for the bar associations, as they 
considered themselves among the primary group whose views 
must be seriously taken into consideration specifically 
during the making of a new constitution. In this regard, 
the bar associations held special meetings; the attorneys 
discussed the draft constitution and prepared an 
alternative constitution. Moreover, the associations let 
the Consultative Assembly know the points they did not 
agree within the draft by submitting a report to the 
Assembly on July 17, 1982.21 The bar associations' result
For the details of the preparatory process of the 1982 
Constitution see Bülent Tanör, İki Anayasa 1961-1982.. (Two 
Constitutions 1961-1982) (Istanbul: Beta Basım yayım Dağıtım A.Ş.,
1986), pp.99-107; Burhan Kuzu, 1982 Anayasasının Temel Nitelikleri ve 
Getirdiği Yenilikler (The Main Characteristics of the 1982 
Constitution and Its Novelties) (Istanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1990),
pp,24-30.
20 Dodd, Crisis of Turkish Democracy, p,78.
21 See Türkiye Barolar Birliği XVI Genel Kurul Başkanlık Raporu ve 
Yönetim Kurulu Çalışma Raporu (The 16^^ General Assembly Presidential
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was a total disappointment, none of the points in the 
report had been taken into account in the preparation of 
the final text of the constitution.
As far as the substance of the 1982 Constitution was 
concerned, one of the most striking aspect had been the 
extension of the rights of the president as well as those 
of the executive. According to the bar associations the 
most dangerous aspect of such an arrangement was the 
deterioration of the balance of power between the 
executive and the judiciary in favor of the former. In 
other words they had suspicions concerning the protection 
of the independence of the judiciary vis-a-vis the 
executive within the framework of the new constitution.
The most significant argument in this respect, had 
been the extension of appointment powers of the president 
of the Republic in the field of judiciary. Whereas under 
the 1961 Constitution the president was authorized to 
appoint only two members of the Constitutional Court out 
of fifteen, under the new constitution he was given the 
right of appointing all the members(Article 146). In the 
same way, the president had been given the right to 
appoint one fourth of the judges of the Council of the 
State(Article 155), who were previously appointed by the 
Constitutional Court, the Council of State and the 
Council of Ministers. Perhaps the most significant point 
which had been stressed by the bar associations in the 
said report had been the selection method of the members
Report and Board of Directors Working Paper of TUBA) 13-15 Mayıs, 
1983, Antalya, pp.44-63.
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of the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors. 
This council is responsible for the admission of judges 
and public prosecutors of the courts of justice and 
administrative courts into profession, their 
appointments, transfer, promotion and removal from 
office. Under the 1961 Constitution, the members of the 
council were elected by the plenary session of the Court 
of Cassation. According to the 1982 Constitution, the 
president of the Republic was given the power to appoint 
the members of the Council from among the candidates 
nominated by the Court of Cassation and the Council of 
State. The same constitution involved the government in 
the judicial sphere, too. The Minister of Justice himself 
was made the president of the Council, and the under­
secretary of the Ministry was made an ex-officio member 
of the Council(Article 159). According to the bar 
associations, the above arrangements had contained the 
seeds of a potential politization of the judiciary.
Another important area with regards to 1982 
Constitution which was underlined by the bar 
associations, had been the limitations put on the 
"Fundamental Rights and Duties." Although the 1982 
Constitution recognized all the basic rights- and 
liberties which are found in liberal democratic 
constitutions, the manner in which the rights were 
regulated was more restrictive than it had been the case 
in the 1961 Constitution.22 In fact, what constituted the
22 Ergun Ozbudun, "The Rule of Law under the Constitution of 1982," 
in Perspectives on Turkish Democracy, Ergun dzbudun, ed. (Ankara:
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main argument of the bar associations had been this 
restrictive style. According to attorneys, the 
circumstances under which the rights and liberties would 
be the subject of restrictions were specified in such a 
detailed form and numerously that in the final analysis 
this damaged the core, and, thus the content of the 
rights and liberties. 3^
The bar associations specifically referred to the 
limitations on the free exercise of individual rights and 
liberties with the purpose of maintaining national 
security and public order. One of the most often 
mentioned criticisms in this respect had been the article 
on "Personal Inviolability, Material and Spiritual 
Entity of the Individual" (Article 17). According to the 
bar associations the restrictions within the framework of 
certain circumstances to personal inviolability were so 
heavy that the article had a strong potential of being a 
legitimization of death penalty on the one hand, and 
seemed to open the way for the security forces to violate 
the material and spiritual entity of the citizens on the 
other. 24
Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), p.l98.
22 This point had been elaborated by the head of the Istanbul Bar 
Association, Turgut Kazan, who had been a member of the Basic Rights 
Commission, formed by TUBA for the purpose of evaluating the basic 
rights within the framework of the draft constitution and preparing 
the said report. See Türkiye Barolar Birliği VI. Olağanüstü Genel 
Kurul Tutanağı (The Minutes of the 6^^ General Assembly of TUBA) , 2-4 
Ekim 1982, Ankara, p.33.
24 Ibid., p.38.
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Finally, the bar associations focused on some of the 
provisions related to the protection of rights. Exemplary 
has been the "Freedom to Claim Rights" (Article 36), 
according to which "Everyone had been given the right of 
litigation either as plaintiff or defendant before the 
court through lawful means and procedure." Although being 
very much in favor of such an article, its silence on the 
"duty of the state authorities to appoint an attorney for 
the accused who lack the necessary financial means," as 
it has been the case in some Western constitutions, had 
been considered to be an important weakness for the 
Turkish judicial system.
On the whole the new Constitution proved to be far 
away from what the bar associations expected it to be. 
According to them, the 1982 Constitution signified a 
reaction towards the 1961 Constitution and the political 
system that the latter had aimed to set up in Turkey. In 
this respect, as mentioned at a press conference that 
organized by TUBA, "...with all its limitations on the 
rights and liberties as well as with some of its articles 
which had strong signs of a distrust towards the 
judiciary, even aiming to pacifize it, the 1982 
Constitution has been a retrogression for Turkish 
democracy....
See "Türkiye Barolar Birliğinin 14. Kuruluş Yıl Dönümü Nedeniyle 
Yapılan Basın Toplantısı Metni," (The Text of the Press Conference 
held for the 14^^ Anniversary of TUBA) in Türkiye Barolar Birliği 
XVI ■ Genel Kurul Başkanlık Raporu ve Yönetim Kurulu Çalışma Raporu, 
13-15 Mayıs, 1983, Antalya, pp.34-43.
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The 1982 Constitution and the Public Professional 
Associations
Perhaps the single most important difference between 
the Turkish Constitutions of 1961 and 1982 had been that 
"the latter opted for a much less participant and 
pluralistic version of democracy compared to the former." 
The different approaches of the two constitutions to 
interest group politics constituted one of the best 
starting point to detect this contrast. In this respect, 
even the 1961 Constitution which has been known as the 
most liberal one, failed to adopt a purely liberal and 
pluralistic view of organized interests; its successor 
had been designed to put them under much stricter 
governmental controls.
The system designed by the new constitution 
concerning the organization and representation of 
interests in the society had been one of the most debated 
issues that attracted wide range of attention both among 
professional associations as well as other organized 
interest groups. The system was based itself totally on 
a mechanism which would enable the state to strictly 
control the organized interests. In fact, the 1982 
Constitution carried in itself the desire for creating a
Ergun Özbudun, "The Post-1980 Legal Framework for Interest Group 
Associations," in Strong State and Economic Interest Groups The Post 
1980 Turkish Experience, Metin Heper, ed. (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyder, 1991), p.41. For the comparison of the basic characteristics 
of the two constitutions, see Mümtaz Soysal, "Temel Nitelikleriyle 
1961 ve 1982 Anayasaları," (The 1961 and 1982 Constitutions with 
Their Basic Characteristics) Anayasa Yargısı, (1984), p.9-20.
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strong and capable state which would be the "guardian" of 
the society. As mentioned above what on the whole was 
envisaged in the new constitution was a depoliticized 
society.2·^ In such a system, while politics were reserved 
for the parliament, society was expected to preoccupy 
itself largely with matters of private concern. Such an 
attempt of depolitization of the society found its best 
expression in the articles regulating the organized 
interests. Besides, the private associations and the 
employers' and the workers' unions, the public 
professional associations form a part of the organized 
interests in questions.28
Article 135 of the Constitution provides the basic 
legal framework for the relationship of these bodies with 
the state. While assigning a dominant role for the state 
by endowing it powers to interfere in the functioning of 
the associations, the Article implicitly regulates the 
state-association interface and, among other things, aims 
at the pacifization of these groups.
The first point that should be made in this respect, 
has been the limitation brought to the activities of 
these associations. The public professional bodies were 
to engage neither in activities outside the aims for 
which they were established nor in political activities.
2^  İlkay Sunar and Sabri Sayan, "Democracy in Turkey: Problems and
Prospects," in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Southern Europe, 
Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, 
eds. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986), p.l84.
2® In this respect, see Articles 33, 51, 52, 53, 54 of the
Constitution.
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They were also required not to take any joint action with 
political parties, labor unions, and other associations. 
Such a ban on the political activities of the public 
professional bodies can be regarded as the most clear 
manifestation of the distrust on the part of the framers 
of the Constitution towards the pluralistic model of 
politics. In fact, the "necessity" of such a separation 
between political and associational spheres of activity 
was also clearly expressed in the speeches of General 
Evren. Evren believed that each and every institution 
should act in its own sphere of activity and politics 
should be reserved only for political parties. Neither 
the associations nor the political parties should 
interfere each others space.
What was most shocking for the bar associations was 
the mechanism designed the state supervision of public 
professional associations. The Constitution subjected the 
public professional associations to the administrative 
and financial supervision by the state. At the request 
of the state authority designated by law, the responsible 
organs of the public professional bodies which had not 
acted in accordance with the mentioned limitations, could 
be dissolved by a court order. And moreover, with the 
purpose of safeguarding the existence and independence of 
the Turkish state, indivisible integrity of the country 
and nation, peace of the society, and preventing the 
activities threatening the fundamental characteristics of 
the state as defined in the Constitution, the highest
29 Evren, Kenan Evren'in Anıları, vol.3, p.313.
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representative of the state in the localities could 
remove the responsible organs of these bodies from power.
Being evaluated as a strong indicator of the desire 
of the pacifization of public professional bodies, these 
arrangements had been regarded by the bar associations to 
be a part of the project of creating a strong executive 
to govern the country. In this respect, the Article was 
viewed by the bar associations to be an act of moving 
away from pluralism and planting the seeds of
totalitarianism into the regime in its stead.
Other than these provisions which are directly 
related to the relationship of these associations with 
the state, there was another important development 
concerning the inner functioning of these associations. 
This development was that the civil servants regularly 
employed in the public bureaucracy would no longer be 
required to become members of their respective public 
professional bodies. According to the bar associations, 
this was in contradiction with the raison d'etre of the 
public professional associations as defined in the 
Constitution. The public professional associations are
defined as public bodies established with the objectives 
of meeting common needs of the members of a ..given
profession, facilitating the lathers' professional
activities, ensuring the development of the profession in 
keeping with the common interests, and safeguarding
professional discipline and ethics in order to provide
Türkiye Barolar Birliği XVI. Genel Kurul Toplantısı Başkanlık 
Raporu ve Yönetim Kurulu Çalışma Raporu, p.67.
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for integrity and trust in relations among its members 
and the public. The initiation of the practice of 
voluntary membership for some professionals would surely 
make the realization of some of these objectives partly 
impossible. As was pointed out by the bar associations, 
as there would be now some non-member attorneys some of 
the disciplinary measures and ethical rules which the bar 
associations developed for ensuring the integrity and 
trust, would not be applicable to everybody in the 
profession. This would surely have the potential of 
damaging the image of the profession in addition to the 
emergence of a double standard within the profession. 
Furthermore, in the long run, due to the high probability 
of leading to a decrease in membership as well as a 
deterioration in integrity, such a system would have 
negative effects on these associations' relationship with 
the state in protecting their interests.
The Bar Associations and the Motherland Party 
Governments, 1983-1989
Some Perceptions on Liberalization and the Rule of Law
The General Elections held on November 6, 1983, that 
heralded a transition of the Turkish political life from 
military to civilian rule, had been the first” step 
towards the restoration of democracy in the country. With 
the prohibition of some newly formed parties which were 
in fact the continuation of some of the pre-1980 
political parties, only the Nationalist Democratic party.
Ibid., p.73.
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the Populist Party and the Motherland Party had been 
allowed to contest in the said elections. Among these
alternatives the centre-right Motherland Party, 
established by Turgut Ozal —  Under-secretary of the 
Prime Ministry in the Demirel government before the
intervention and Deputy Prime Minister during the early 
phases of the 1980-1983 interregnum —  came to power, 
having garnered 45,2 percent of the votes. 2^ This clear
victory for the Motherland Party also signified the 
beginning of a new era during which in Prime Minister 
Ozal's words, "... a new, harmonious, and an
industrialized Turkey would be created."23
Defined to be a liberal, anti-state, and anti-
bureaucratic party and formed by a group of people from 
the business world and civil bureaucracy and having in 
itself four inclinations of liberals, religiously- 
oriented, nationalists and social democrats,24 one of the 
most significant characteristic of the Party's Programme 
was its emphasis on the free market model for economic 
development. The radical restructuration of the economy
22 For an analysis of the parties that participated in the 1983 
elections, see Üstün Ergüder, "Post-1980 Parties and Politics in 
Turkey," in Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey Ergun 0zbudun> ed., 
pp.126-33. Also see Turan, "Political Parties and the Party System in 
Post-1983 Turkey," in State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 
1980s, pp.73-6,
22 Turgut Özal, "Preface," in The Programme of the Motherland Party, 
1983, pp.3-4.
24 See Üstün Ergüder, "The Motherland Party," in Political Parties 
and Democracy in Turkey, Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau, eds. 
(London: I.B, Tauris, 1991), pp.152-69.
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in question, was in total correspondence with the 
division of labor between the state and political elites 
that had been envisaged by the 1982 Constitution. In 
fact, while being an attempt of revitalization of the 
state, the Constitution had also automatically led to a 
redefinition and reformulation of the role of the 
President and National Security Council on the one hand, 
and the government on the other. ^5 in this respect, as 
mentioned by one of the leading scholars of Turkish 
politics "The Third Turkish Republic turned out to be a 
compromise between the state and the political elite. The 
state and politics were now two different spheres and 
each had its own e x e c u t i v e L e a v i n g  the political, 
specifically the economic issues under the responsibility 
of the political elites, from then on the state elites 
were made responsible only for the internal as well as 
external security of the country and preservation of the 
modernistic features of the polity.Such a pacifized 
statue of the state elites in politics, had very much 
suited to the Motherland part programme which had been 
moulded out with the idea of the realization of a liberal
Keraal Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in 
Turkey Before and After 1980," in State, Democracy and the Military: 
Turkey in the 1980s, Heper and Evin, eds., p.l54.
Metin Heper, "The Executive in the Third Turkish Republic, 1982- 
1989," Governance 3 (1990), p.306.
Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey 
Before and After 1980," in State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey 
in the 1980s, Heper and Evin, eds., p.l54.
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r e v o l u t i o n .38 Emphasizing the need for a decrease in the 
role of the state, what the Motherland Party aimed was a 
total restructuration both at the economic and political 
s p h e r e s .39 in this respect, policies like privatization 
which had been initiated with the motto of extending 
ownership to a wider bases and making people to 
participate to decision making process;extension of the 
power of local administrative units;'^3 and the free market 
economic model, all had the potential of strengthening 
civil society. Thus, "The programme of MP did carry 
within it the seeds for the pendulum to swing from the 
state through political party to society.'"^3
However, the possible consequences noted here were 
hardly attained. In the final analysis, instead of a 
liberal political and economic order, a ruler-dominated
38 Metin Heper, "The State and Debureaucratization: The Case of
Turkey," International Social Science Journal, 126 (1990), p.610.
39 For a detailed analysis of the views of Mr. Özal in this respect, 
see Anavatan Partisi Genel Başkanı Turgut Özal*m 6 Kasım 1983 
Seçimi Öncesi Basın Mensuplarıyla 25 Ekim 1983 Tarihinde TRT'de 
Yaptığı Açık Oturum (The Television Programme of the Head of the 
Motherland Party, Turgut Özal with the Journalists Held Before the 
November 6, 1983 Elections on October 25, 1983) (Ankara: Semih Ofset, 
1983) .
In this respect see, "Başbakan Turgut özal'in Basın Toplantıları 
(7 Ocak 1984 - 30 Kasım 1987) Altıncı Basın Toplantısı Metni," (The 
Press Conferences of Prime Minister Turgut Özal (January 7, 1984-
November 30, 1987): The Text of the Sixth Press Conference) (Ankara: 
Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1987), p.5.
3^ The Programme of Motherland Party, 1983, p.34.
3^ Metin Heper, "The State, Political Party and Society in the Post- 
1983 Turkey," Government and Opposition 25 (1990), p.325.
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government emerged between the state and civil society. 
In fact, what Turkish politics witnessed during the 1983- 
1989 period was the rule of governments which had been 
very much isolated from the civil societal elements and 
in turn often dictating their policy preferences towards 
the civil societal groups as had been the case for bar 
associations.
However, in addition to the this general orientation 
of the Motherland Party rule with respect to civil 
societal groups which surely had its impact on the bar 
associations, too, there also appeared to be another 
basic feature that had its effects on the position of the 
bar associations vis-a-vis the state, which was the 
governments' views and attitudes concerning the supremacy 
of law.
As noted above, Ozal's rule concentrated first and 
foremost at achieving a liberal economic order within the 
framework of which Turkey would be competitive in the 
international markets. In fact, throughout the 1980s, 
Prime Minister Ozal's overriding aim had been to turn 
Turkey into a powerful trading and industrial country. In 
this respect, measures had been introduced to liberalize 
foreign trade and capital and foreign exchange 
transactions and to encourage industrial investments. 
However, contrary to their enthusiasm concerning the 
economy the governments did not appear to be showing the 
same sensitivity towards preservation of the rule of law
3^ Ibid. p. 330-1
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in the country, despite the fact that explicit reference 
had been made to it in the program of the Party.
Besides the constantly changing legal rules, many 
laws had been enacted which lacked constitutional 
validity during the period in question. 5^ in fact, Ozal's 
attitudes and views concerning law and its application 
proves to be a very illuminative point for understanding 
the general atmosphere of the period with respect to the 
supremacy of law in the country, as Ozal has been a very 
influential figure at all the echelons of the party and 
administration.“^^  Ozal's declaration concerning the debate
In the Article 3 of the Motherland Party Program following points 
had been made concerning significance of the rule of law in the 
country; Justice is the foundation of the state.
Ensuring and distributing the justice are among the most important 
tasks of the state.
Justice guarantees that the civil rights and freedoms. It also 
guarantees that the freedoms are not used against the public 
interest.
Equality before the laws is essential.
In order to establish a national unity and togetherness, and to 
ensure confidence in the State, it is essential that the justice 
should be implemented evenly among the citizens.
Justice should be swiftly fulfilled; the penalties must be effective 
and detterent.
It is essential that the legal bodies function independently and 
objectively.
Between the 1983-1989 period thirty seven of the laws that had 
been enacted were nullified by the Constitutional Court.
According to Heper, Ozal*s distrust of people especially of the 
ones who were not close to him, made Ozal to conduct his 
administration by individual decisions where governmental decisions 
were required, and by governmental decrees where laws were necessary.
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on the date of local elections in 1988 with his following 
words "No harm can be inflicted by violating the 
Constitution only once" had perhaps been the best 
indicator of Özal's disregard towards the rule of law.'^  ^
In fact, for Özal law and logic represented the same 
thing. According to him if one had the necessary logic 
for solving the problems than there appeared to be no 
need for a four year education of law. “^8 Özal had been 
criticised due to his view of seeing the state as a 
commercial entity and the codes as documents preventing 
this entity from doing its job properly and efficiently. 
Thus, there always appeared to be an inherent conflict 
between economic liberalization and the rule of law. Even 
after being elected as the President of the Republic on 
October 30, 1989, Özal had several times been criticized 
by the bar associations on the grounds of his
disregardful attitude both towards the legal rules, thus 
the supremacy of law, as well as towards the bar
associations that had always defined themselves to be the 
defenders of the rule of law.8°
See Heper, "The State and Debureaucratization; The Case of Turkey," 
International Social Science Journal, p.612.
For an elaboration of Mr. 0zal*s stance with respect to rule of 
law, see Hasan Cemal, Özal Hikayesi (The Story of Özal) (Ankara; 
Bilgi Yayınevi, 1989), pp. 115-8.
Yavuz Gökmen, Özal Sendromu (The Özal Syndrom) (Ankara; Verso 
Yayıncılık, 1992), p.52.
Ibid., p.ll6.
See, for example, "Türkiye Barolar Birliği Başkanı Av. Önder 
Sav*ın Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut Özal*ın Sözleri ile İlgili Demeci - 
9.12.1990," (The Declaration of Önder Sav - the head of TUBA -
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Not surprisingly, the bar associations had always 
constituted an opposite camp for the Motherland Party 
governments, due to the former's strong belief in the 
inviolability of the rule of law and justice, and had 
warned the governments whenever necessary. The report 
prepared by the TUBA on the details of the measures which 
had to be applied by the government for the preservation 
of the superiority of the rule of law constituted a good 
example for showing the sensitivity of the bar 
associations in this respect.
The 1980s has been regarded as the most conflictuel 
period as far as the relationship of the bar associations 
with the state is concerned. The interface of the bar 
associations with the Motherland Party governments during 
the 1980s can well be analyzed within the framework of 
two different areas of interaction. The first one, which 
had largely been the case during the years 1983-1986 had 
been the codification process, in other words the legal 
restructuration of the profession. This period is 
important due to the fact that it gives certain clues 
concerning the policies of the post-1983 governments 
towards the attorneys. On the other hand, especially in
Concerning the Statement of the President of the State Turgut özal - 
December 9, 1990) Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yönetim Kurulu Çalışma
Raporu (The Working Paper of the Board of Directors of TUBA) 11-12 
Mayıs 1991 Mersin, pp.114-5.
"Hukukun Üstünlüğünün Sağlanması Konusunda Hazırlanan Rapor," (The 
Report on the Realization of the Rule of Law) in Türkiye Barolar 
Birliği XX Genel Kurul Başkanlık Raporu (The 20^ *^  General Assembly 
Presidencial Report of TUBA), 27-28 Mayıs, Giresun, pp.29-75.
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the late 1980s, the second one had been the issues 
related to the inner mechanism of the bar associations 
and the Ministry of Justice's position in this respect. 
As being the case for the developments within the 
codification process, the experiences of the bar
associations during their relationship with the
Motherland Party governments, showed a strong parallelism 
with the above delineated general understanding and view 
point of the governments with respect to law and its 
status in the society. Thus, an analysis of this 
relationship has utmost importance in understanding the 
details of the policy preferences of the Motherland Party 
governments in the legal and judicial spheres.
The Formation of a State-Dominated Profession
Arrangements concerning the public professional 
associations in the 1982 Constitution soon required 
certain amendments in specific codes that regulated the 
organization, administration, and activities of these 
associations. Showing great variances when compared to 
the 1961 constitution both in substance and form, the 
framework drawn by the new constitution had to be 
reflected in the codes in order to harmonize, the 
legislation in the country.
As far as the bar associations are concerned, this 
new legislative process had carried in itself the seeds 
of a potential of discomfort and dissatisfaction. Having 
a totally negative stance towards the system designed 
for public professional bodies by the new constitution.
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the bar associations largely stood in opposition for the 
amendments which would soon have their impacts at the 
specific field of attorneyship. Moreover, for these 
associations who had even reacted the code enacted in 
1969, which included some minor points that hindered 
their independence when compared to the new amendments, 
such a development clearly signified a back step in their 
professional history and symbolized the end of a decade- 
long struggle for improving the Articles of the 1969 
code.
Within the framework of the new legislative process, 
the first step had been the enactment of the Authority 
Code Concerning The Public Professional Associations - 
No. 2767- on December 28, 1982, according to which the
Council of Ministers had been given the power to enact 
regulations with the force of law concerning the 
activities, election and disciplinary procedures as well 
as administrative and financial control of public 
professional bodies.Accordingly, the Council Ministers 
had enacted two different regulations with the force of 
law on the reorganization of attorneyship and bar 
associations during 1983,^3 which in one year time - May
"Kamu Kurumu Niteliğindeki Meslek Kuruluşları Hakkında Yetki 
Kanunu No. 2767," (The Autorization Code on Public Professional 
Organizations No. 2767) Resmi Gazete, no:17914, December 30, 1982, .
See Kani Ekşioğlu, "Avukatlık Yasasında Son Değişiklikler," (The 
Latest Amendments on the Code of Attorneyship) in Cumhuriyet Dönemi 
Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol. 6 (1984), pp.1577-8.
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8, 1984 - had been unified under the Code on Amendments 
of Certain Articles of Code on Attorneyship - No. 3003.^4
Being the main document reorganizing certain points 
on attorneyship and bar associations after the military 
intervention, the new code largely reflected and 
solidified the Article 135 of the Constitution. In this 
respect, the code can be described as an extended version 
of this article which had clarified and defined certain 
points specifically for attorneyship and state-bar 
association relationship.
Within the framework of the code in question, bar 
associations had defined to be under the strict control 
of the Ministry of Justice;
Accordingly, the ministry had been given the right 
to demand the public prosecutor in the respective 
province to bring a suit against the bar associations for 
dissolving the responsible organs in case of their 
engagement with activities other than stated under the 
code as well as for implementing decisions which has not 
been approved by the Ministry.
Another very important point which had the potential 
of hampering the independence of the bar associations had 
been the power given to the Ministry as an auditing 
authority. In this respect, according to the code, each
4^ "1136 Sayılı Avukatlık Kanununun Bazı Maddelerinin! 
Değiştirilmesi, Bazı Maddelerine Fıkralar Eklenmesi Ve Kanuna Geçici 
Bir Madde Eklenmesi hakkında Kanun No. 1238," (Code on the Amendment 
of Certain Articles of Code on Attorneyship No. 1136, Addition of 
Paragraphs to Certain articles and Addition of a Temporary Article to 
the Code) Resmi Gazete, no:18402, May 15, 1984.
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and every bar association as well as the TUBA were to be 
checked and controlled by the inspectors of the Ministry 
periodically, for the detection of the degree of their
compliance to the administrative and financial 
procedures as defined in the code.
Besides, being different from these rather
conventional areas of control some of which were also
present in the codes on attorneyship during the early 
Republican era and to a lesser extent in the previous
code, a totally new issue over which the ministry had 
given the authority to control has also been included in 
the new code. Accordingly, both the bar associations as 
well as the TUBA were required to obtain the permission 
of the Ministry of Justice in order to attend or be 
represented in any international meeting or congress. In 
fact, as far as the previous meetings that the bar 
associations attended at the international level are 
concerned, they were largely related to professional 
issues which served for the development of the
profession. In this sense, within the framework of the 
requirement of such a permission the ministry had also 
partly been authorized to interfere with the activities 
j^0Ts,ted solely with professional issues.
A final point which must be made concerning the 
extension of state control on attorneyship and bar 
associations, is related to the issue of the prohibition 
of attorneys from performing the profession. According to 
the related Article of the Code, the ministry was given 
full authority to decide in this respect if the
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disciplinary commission fails to decide in two months 
time. Besides the transfer of the authority to the 
Ministry of Justice, the inclusion of "the acts against 
the personality of the Turkish state" as a new criterion 
for the prohibition of the Attorneys from performing 
their profession was an issue of discussion by the bar 
associations. According to the bar associations, such an 
arrangement was an attack towards the honour of the 
profession. In fact, such an argument was based on the 
self perception of the majority of the attorneys as the 
guardians of the Turkish State and the defenders of the 
Kemalist principles.
Another widely diseased issue concerning the Article 
was its clash with the universal principles of justice as 
well as human rights. According to the Article the legal 
procedures for the prohibition of the attorney from 
performing his profession were to start as soon as he was 
accused of the acts that was defined to be incompatible 
with the nature of attorneyship. At this point, the final 
decision of the court, proving or disproving the 
accusation would lose its significance. Thus, an attorney 
who was declared as non guilty at the end of the trial 
could well have been prohibited from performing his 
profession months before the final decision. In the final
55 Türkiye Barolar Birliği XVIII. Genel Kurul Başkanlık Raporu ve 
Yönetim Kurulu Çalışma Raporu (The 18^^ General Assembly Presidential 
Report and Board of Directors Working Paper of TUBA), 11-12 Mayıs 
1985, Bursa, p.42.
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analysis, such a practice would surely cause moral and 
material damages for the attorneys.
While having strong similarities with the practice 
initiated by the Code that had been enacted in 1938 which 
after the Military intervention of 1960 had been declared 
of having anti-democratic provisions, such a measure 
constituted a step of reinitiating the supervision of the 
state on bar associations in a most strict and direct
way 57
As should by now be apparent this new legal 
restructuration had constituted one of the most widely 
discussed issues within the professional circles. During 
the seventeenth General Assembly meeting of the TUBA, 
the Code has been regarded as a document prepared solely 
for facilitating the state's control on bar associations 
rather than protecting the interests of the profession 
and its associations. What the code signified for most of 
the attorneys was no more than a step taken by the state 
to enable itself to arrange its relationship with bar 
associations in an authoritarian framework. In this 
regard, the Code had been seen as an attack of the state 
on the honor of attorneyship as well as the independence 
of its associations. And the Code had the latent aim. of a
Ibid., p.43.
57 Atilla Sav "Barolar ve Türkiye Barolar Birliği," (Bar Associations 
and the Turkish Union of Bar Associations) in Cumhuriyet Dönemi 
Türkiye Ansiklopedisi vol.6, p.l581. Also see, Atilla Sav, "Geriye 
bir adım," (A Step Backwards) Cumhuriyet, October 31, 1984; Turgut
Kazan, "Avukatın İşten Yasaklanması," (The Prohibition of the 
Attorney from Performing the Profession) Cumhuriyet, June 30, 1984.
219
complete incorporation of the bar associations to the 
state apparatus.58 However "...neither the bar 
associations were the organs of the state nor the 
attorneys were civil servants...."59 Thus for many, this 
new legal framework was a total mistake.
Having these points in mind, just after the enactment 
of the Code, the TUBA started a campaign against the 
code. In the final stage, a suit had been brought to the 
Constitutional Court by the Populist Party for the 
annulment of the code.^o The Constitutional Court 
nullified the only article concerning the prohibition of 
the attorneys from performing their professions. However 
it must be mentioned that, before the annulment, many 
attorneys had been banned from performing their 
professions. In this respect, specifically the case of an 
attorney from Malatya Bar Association, who had at the 
same time been the Head of the local branch of the
58 Türkiye Barolar Birliği XVII Olağan Genel Kurul Tutanağı (The 
Minutes of the 17^^ General Assembly of TUBA) , 18-19 Şubat 1984, 
Ankara, p.l6.
59 Ibid.
59 According to the Article 150 of the 1982 Constitution, only the 
President of the Republic, Parliamentary Groups of the party in power 
and of the main opposition party, and a minimum of one-fifth of the 
total number of the members of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey 
have the right to apply for the annulment of laws to the 
Constitutional Court.
81 See Anayasa Mahkemesi Karar Dergisi, 21 (1985), p.99. Also see 
Türkiye Barolar Birliği XVIII. Genel Kurul Başkanlık Raporu (The 18^^ 
General Assembly Presidential Report of TUBA), 11-12 Mayıs, Bursa, 
pp.103-113.
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opposition party in Malatya attracted widespread 
attention.
On January 1, 198 6 another "Code on the Amendment of
the Code on Attorneyship, No. 3256" had been enacted. 
However, consisting of only four articles, this code was 
also far from solving the mentioned problems of the bar 
associations. In fact, the tutelage of the Ministry on 
the bar associations still continued to be the issue.
The legal restructuration of the profession and its 
associations during the Motherland Party governments, 
specifically between 1983-1986, had perhaps been the most 
unfavorable period in the professional history of 
attorneyship. Apart from the content of the codes such an 
assessment is specifically true as far as the
relationship between the bar associations and the
Ministry of Justice during the preparatory process of the
new legal framework is concerned.
The strategy of the state towards the bar
associations, can be described as those of a total
pacifization and ignorance. When compared to the
preparatory stages of the previous codes, even the one
enacted in 1939, the pacifization of the bar associations 
reached its climax during the time.^^ In this respect, as 
far as the former code, enacted in 1984, was concerned,
Tanör, Türkiye'nin İnsan Hakları Sorunu 1, p.332.
"1136 Sayılı Avukatlık Kanununda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun 
No, 3256" (Code on the Amendments of the Code on Attorneyship No. 
3256) Resmi Gazete, no:19004., January 30, 1986.
See Türkiye Barolar Birliği XVII. Olağan Genel Kurul Toplantı 
Tutanağı, 18-19 Şubat 1984, Ankara, p.ll8.
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although at first stages of the preparatory process, the 
TUBA was asked by the Ministry of Justice to prepare a 
report which would include the views of the bar 
associations. Later the Institute of Public 
Administration for Turkey and the Middle East was given 
mandate in this respect. None of the points that had been 
mentioned by TUBA had been included in the code. 
Although, being harshly criticised by the TUBA, such a 
stance on the part of the Ministry continued to be the 
case during the preparatory stages of the latter Code. 
Neither consultation nor bargaining took place between 
the Ministry and the bar associations. Describing the 
code-making process during the 1980s as a shame for all 
the bar associations in Turkey, the representatives of 
the bar associations which had gathered for the ninth 
extraordinary meeting of the TUBA, criticised the 
authorities of the Ministry of Justice. The following 
words of one of the attorneys from Izmir Bar Association 
had been exemplary in this respect: "It is quite
surprising and shameful that, just a few bureaucrats who 
for sure have close connections with the political 
authorities and lack the knowledge on the issue, dare to 
prepare a code concerning our profession without- even 
consulting us.
Türkiye Barolar Birliği IX. Olağanüstü Genel Kurul Tutanağı (The 
Minutes of the 9^^ Extraordinary General Assembly of TUBA), 4
Haziran, 1988, Ankara, p.31.
222
The Bar Associations and the Motherland Party Governments 
in the Late 1980s: Towards a "Commercialization of 
Justice"?
One of the most significant debates among the bar 
associations during the late 1980s, had been the tendency 
on the part of the government towards a 
"Commercialization of Justice," as the bar associations 
called it. What made the bar associations to come up with 
such a view point had been the establishment of the "Fund 
for Strengthening Justice Organization" in July 1988, 
with the aim of providing a financial base for the 
services of justice in the country.
The initiation of the sale of certain services within 
the judicial mechanism which earlier were free of charge 
and regarded to be public a service such as the provision 
of the records of previous convictions as well as certain 
application forms and files, came to be the points of 
controversy. In fact, while being regarded as an attack 
towards the equality of the citizens before the law, such 
a practice was criticised on the grounds of damaging the 
honor of the Turkish judicial system. The following 
quotation is exemplary with respect to the views of the 
bar associations in this respect:
The sale of certain judicial services which 
were previously financed by the taxes and 
fees, constitutes a practice that totally 
contradicts with the concepts of public
"Adalet Teşkilatını Güçlendirme Fonu Kurulmasına Dair 3454 Sayılı 
Yasa," (Code on the Establishment of the Fund for Strengthening 
Justice Organization No.3454) Resmi Gazete, no: 19832, June 4, 1988.
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service, honor of the judicial system, and 
the constitution. The commercialization of 
justice would surely cause a deteoriation in 
the image of the state in the future and lead 
to a significant chaos within the judicial 
sphere that would adversely affects the 
equality of the citizens.
Another controversial point was related to the 
supervision of the fund. The functioning of the Fund 
outside the consolidated budget and jurisdiction of the 
High Court of Accounts, had been the focus of attention. 
In fact, as it has been the case for other funds which 
had been established during the Motherland Party 
governments, the fund in question had designed to be 
under the control of the High Board of Supervision which 
had been affiliated to the Prime Ministry. According to 
the bar associations while being in contradiction with 
the principle of unity of the budget, such an arrangement 
had the potential of causing certain problems in 
controlling the expenditures to be made within the 
framework of the Fund.^® The negative effects of the fund 
on the independence of the judges and judiciary had also 
been underlined. The addition made to the Article .64 of 
the Budget Code within the framework of which "The
Türkiye Barolar Birliği IX. Olağanüstü Genel Kurul Tutanağı, 4 
Haziran, 1988, Ankara, p.5.
68 3gg "Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti Genel Başkanlığına Yazılan 
Mektup Örneği," (The Letter Sent to the Social Democratic Populist 
Party) in Türkiye Barolar Birliği XX. Genel Kurul Başkanlık Raporu, 
27-28 Mayıs, 1989, Giresun, pp.149-150.
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members of the Constitutional Court, High Court of 
Appeals, Council of State, judges and public prosecutors 
were ordered to be given housing credits from the Fund 
in appropriate amounts that would be determined by the 
High Planning Council" had been a focus of criticism, 
too. According to the bar associations, while being a 
serious attack of the state towards the independence of 
Justice this article had been the most significant 
indicator of the institutionalization of bribery in the 
Turkish judicial mechanism by the state.
On the whole, according to many attorneys, the 
establishment of the mentioned fund had constituted no 
more than a pathological reflection of the liberal 
economic policies on the field of judiciary.
Another problematic issue during the period had been the 
negative stance of the Ministry of Justice towards the 
bar associations. Although there appeared to be a very 
high degree of professional consciousness both with 
respect to purely professional issues as well as to 
problems related with the above mentioned developments
Ibid., p.8.
^9 In this respect, some suits had been brought to the Council of 
State concerning the sale of certain forms during 1990-1991 by the 
bar associations. For a detailed technical discussion of the issue, 
the views of some legal professionals and decisions of Council of 
State see "Görev Anlayışımızın Kilometre Taşları," (The Basics of Our 
Understanding of Duty) Istanbul Barosu 1990-1992 Dönemi Yönetim 
Kurulu Çalışma Raporu iThe 1992-1993 Working Paper of the Board of 
Directors of Istanbul Bar Association), pp.19-31; Türkiye Barolar 
Birliği XXI Genel Kurul Başkanlık Raporu (The 21®^ General Assembly 
Presidential Report of TUBA), 11-12 Mayıs, Mersin, 1991, pp.33, 115.
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within the judicial and legal spheres on the part of the 
bar associations, it largely could not been effective and 
even get curbed. Although the bar associations did not 
constitute an exception in this respect as "there was 
hardly any pluralistic or institutionalized (neo- 
corporatist) give-and-take between the weighty social 
groups and the government, during the period, the 
attitude of the party towards the legal and judicial 
issues as described above made the situation worse for 
the bar associations when compared to other groups in the 
society.
The most significant characteristic of the 1980s with 
respect to the state-bar association relationship had 
been the bar associations' loss of monopoly over the 
professional issues. This has been largely related to the 
application of the above mentioned codes in such a way as 
to enhance the interests of the Ministry rather than the 
profession of attorneyship and its associations ."^2
One of the most significant indicator here has been 
the paradoxical stance of the Ministry concerning the 
entry of judges - who had been retired from judgeship or 
wanted to continue their career as attorneys then on - to 
the profession of attorneyship. As one of the., most 
effective tools for the creation of a well-functioning 
profession as well as preservation of its honor and
Heper, "The State and Debureaucratization: The Case of Turkey,"
International Social Science Journal, p.610.
Interview with Burhan Karagelik, the vice-president of the TUBA, 
on July 19, 1994.
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dignity, the licensing process had constituted an issue 
of high priority for the bar associations since their 
establishment. In fact, before submitting their decision 
to the Ministry of Justice as being the final authority 
within the framework of all the codes on attorneyship, 
the bar associations had always acted very sensitively 
in evaluating the qualifications of the potential members 
of their associations who had made an admission for entry 
to the profession. Being in contradiction with the 
previous experiences however, where the bar association's 
decisions was largely approved by the ministry, during 
the 1980s, there appeared to be many disputes between the 
two, specifically with regard to the cases mentioned 
above. Although the professional records of many of the 
applicants were not in accordance with the desired 
standards that the bar associations had put forward for 
the candidates, the ministry had approved their
admission. According to a deputy chairman of the TUBA, 
such a stance while being a manifestation of the 
ministry's negative perception of the attorneyship and 
non respectful attitude towards the right of defence, had 
also indicated their distorted view point concerning 
legal professionals, within the framework of ..which 
judgeship had been regarded as a much more honorable 
profession than attorneyship. As in many of its 
decisions, the ministry had been on the side of the 
judges who had not been regarded eligible for practicing
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the profession of attorneyship by the bar associations 
due to their professional records. In one of its 
decisions the ministry had blamed the respective bar 
association for perceiving their profession as much more 
honorable than judgeship because of the letters' 
disapproval of the admission of a judge who had many 
penalties in his professional record, and evaluated such 
an assertion as contradicting the codes.
Another very important issue of conflict had been the 
ordinance issued by the Ministry of Justice on April 1, 
1988, which one year later had constituted the basis for 
an order of the Ministry, by which the attorneys were 
prohibited from receiving the orders of the offices of 
execution concerning distraint. From then on the offices 
of execution was sent their orders directly to the debtor 
which, according to the bar associations would create 
certain problems with regards to the execution of the act 
of distraint due to the elimination of the attorneys from 
the process. According to the Head of Istanbul Bar 
Association, Turgut Kazan, such a decision on the part of 
the Ministry while signifying a very well proof of the 
distrust of the Ministry towards the attorneys, had the 
potential of creating distortions in the system o.f the 
actualization of debt payment, as it carried in itself
Ibid.
"Ankara 1 No'lu İdare Mahkemesi'ne 11. 12. 1985 gün 1984/973 esas 
1985/773 sayxli kararın bozulmasına ilişkin sunulan dilekçe metni," 
(The text of the Petition submitted to the Ankara Administrative 
Court No. 1 on the cancellation of the court decision No. 1985/773 
dated December 11, 1985), p.2.
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the involvement of Mafia within the process. In fact, 
calling it "the ordinance of Mafia," the Ministry had 
largely been accused of establishing a very secure basis 
for the employment of Mafia by the lenders for the 
repayment of the debts.Although, the ordinance had been 
withdrawn by the Ministry in a very short period of time 
largely due to the unfavorable public opinion engineered 
by the Istanbul Bar Association, the issue represents a 
good example of the nature of conflicts between the two 
institutions as well as the stance of the Ministry 
towards the bar associations.
Another point on which the struggle between the 
Ministry and the bar associations again manifested itself 
during the period in question, had been the issue of 
women attorneys' attire, some of whom had insisted 
wearing "türban" while performing their profession in the 
court room. Being very much in contradiction with the 
ideological position of the bar associations and most of 
the attorneys, such a standing on the part of some women 
attorneys had been regarded as a disciplinary issue which 
had to be coped with, as it was the case during the
For the views of Turgut Kazan as well as information concerning 
the issue, see "Istanbul Barosundan Tepki," (Reaction from The 
Istanbul Bar Association) Günaydın (Istanbul daily) November 4, 1989; 
"Çek Senet Mafyası Teşvik Ediliyor," (Check Vaucher Mafia Incited) 
Güneş (Istanbul daily) November 4, 1989. Also see "Görev Anlayışımız 
ile İlgili Bazı Örnekler," (Some Examples With Respect to Our 
Conception of Duty) İstanbul Barosu 1988-1990 Dönemi Yönetim Kurulu 
Çalışma Raporu, (The 1988-1990 Working Paper of the Board of 
Directors of Istanbul Bar Association), pp.41-4.
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1970s. However, the stance of the Ministry of Justice
towards the issue showed great variance when compared to 
the 1970s. Nearly all the decisions of the bar
associations, requiring the initiation of disciplinary
procedures for the members that dress up in the Islamic 
way, had been disapproved by the Ministry.In fact, such 
a configuration between the Ministry and the bar 
associations can well be regarded as the manifestation of 
a recent political controversy between the Kemalists and 
fundamentalists, the former insisting on the Western
dress code, and the latter defending the right of the
choice of Islamic outlook as a democratic right. The 
reflection of such a debate on the administrative levels 
of the state was largely related on two interrelated 
factors: the stance of the Motherland Party governments
vis-a-vis the fundamentalist world view on the one hand, 
and the policies of the party with respect to the 
bureaucracy on the other.
As far as the former one was concerned, many of the 
widely known members of the Motherland party had been the 
ex-members of the National Salvation Party of the 1970's 
which was banned after the military intervention of 1980. 
In fact, 6zal himself occupied a place in Turkish 
politics somewhere between the religious right of the 
National Salvation Party and the more secular Justice
Interview with Burhan Kara?elik, the Secretary of the TUBA, on 
July 19, 1994.
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Party.77 In this respect, the policies of the party had 
largely been a driving force for the fundamentalists. 
Thus, the utilization of Islam as a unifying factor for 
the society had found secure grounds within the policies
of the party.78
As far as the Motherland Party's policies towards 
civil bureaucracy was considered, what happened during 
the party rule can well be regarded as a total challenge 
of position of career bureaucrats, specifically the ones 
at the top ranks of the administration and their 
replacement by those who had been sympathetic to the 
party's world view. In this respect, Islamists had also 
been given the opportunity to have a dominant place in 
the bureaucracy. Regardless of its effects on the issue 
of "türban" and some others professional issues, the 
politization of the civil bureaucracy especially the 
personnel of the Ministry of Justice, had always been a 
point of criticism for the bar associations.
In this respect, the decision that had been taken by 
the Ministry to remove the president and the Board of 
Istanbul Bar Association from office in early 1990 
constituted perhaps the most significant development 
during the period in question. The decision of the 
Ministry to commence a trial was taken on the grounds
77 Ergiiden, "The Motherland Party," in Political Parties and 
Democracy in Turkey, Heper and Jacob M. Landau, eds., p.l55.
78 For an evaluation of the pro-Islamic policies of the Motherland 
Party, see Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics, and Religion in 
Turkey," in The State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 
1980s, Heper and Evin, eds., pp. 131-4.
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that Istanbul Bar Association has refused to disbar one 
of its members. In order to understand the roots of the 
conflict, the details of the case needs further 
elaboration.
On November 21, 1986, the Board of Directors of 
Istanbul Bar Association had decided the continuation of 
the membership of one of its members who had been 
sentenced to eight years of heavy imprisonment for 
violating the Article 141 of the Turkish Penal Code.®^ 
This decision had been criticised by the Ministry of 
Justice and one year later the Board of Directors was
forced to change their decision and disbar the member. 
However, on the occasion of a case which had been brought 
by the member to the administrative court for his 
reacceptance to the profession, the Istanbul Bar 
Association had decided to change its decision and
declared the previous decision for the disbarment of the 
member as null and void. And as a result, the Ministry 
decided to initiate a case against the Istanbul Bar
Association demanding the removal of the president and
the board of directors of the Association from office. 
This act which the ministry had instituted against the 
Istanbul Bar Association had no legal basis. The Ministry 
only had the power to dissolve the bar associations
79 "Davaname, Sayı 1990/268," (Petition to the Court, No. 1990/268).
Within the frameworlt of Article 141 of the Turkish Penal Code, 
associations with the purpose of establishing communist, anarchist, 
dictatorial, or racist regimes or of destroying or weakening national 
sentiments were ordered to be banned.
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either because of their engagement in politics and 
activities that had not been defined in the code or 
because of the bar associations' defiance of a decision 
by the Ministry for which the latter had authority. In 
this case, however, none of these mentioned conditions 
were present. The Ministry had the final authority only 
for disciplinary issues and for the decisions concerning 
the admission of a member to the profession. In this 
respect, although the ministerial authorities regarded 
the annulment of a decision concerning the disbarment of 
a member as an act of accepting him to the profession, 
such a view point was regarded to be totally 
contradictory with the principles of administrative law 
by the scholars specialized in that field. According to a 
report which had been prepared by the Administrative law 
professors on the request of the Istanbul Bar
Association, the act and thus the view point of the 
Ministry was irrelevant, as the ministry's authority of 
dissolving a bar association had been limited only with 
the issues that had been defined by law.®^
In the light of the above mentioned points, Istanbul 
Bar Association regarded the case as the most serious
See Lütfi Duran, "Av. Alp Selek'in Durumu hakkında Mütalaa," 
(Opinion Concerning the Position of the Attorney Alp Selek) 5 Ocak, 
1990, Istanbul; Ülkü Azrak, "Istanbul Barosu Yönetim Kurulu'nun 
11.4.1989 tarihli kararının Adalet Bakanlığı'nca onaylanmadığının 
bildirilmesi karşısında ortaya çıkan hukuki sorun," (The Legal 
Dispute Arised with the Istanbul Bar Associations Administrative 
Board's Disapproval of the April 11, 1989 dated Decision of the
Ministery of Justice) 17 Ocak, 1990, Istanbul.
step that had been taken by the Ministry for curbing the 
independence of the association. In this respect,
according to the association what had motivated the 
Ministry in initiating such a case had been the fact of 
viewing the Bar Associations as a potential threat for 
realization of certain decisions and actions of the 
ministry. As mentioned by the Head of Istanbul Bar 
Association Turgut Kazan, the criticisms and protests on 
the part of the Istanbul Bar Association with respect to 
the policies of the Ministry which had been regarded in 
violation of the supremacy of law, had been the main
i^eason in this respect.
It must be mentioned that, besides the unfavorable 
spread of public opinion that the case had led in 
Turkey,®^ there also appeared to be a strong discomfort
8 У "İstanbul Barosu Vekillerinin Cevap Layihası, Dosya No. 990/368,"
(The Draft of the Response of the Attorneys of Istanbul Bar
Association, File No. 990/368), p.6. Also see "Türkiye Barolar
Birliği Başkanı Avukat Önder Sav*ın Gazeteciler Cemiyetindeki Basın
Toplantısında Yaptığı Açıklamalar, 25.7.1990," (The Explanations of
Önder Sav - the head of TUBA - at the Press Conference held in
Journalists Association on July 25, 1990) p.2.
8 "21.2.1990 Günü Gazeteciler Cemiyeti'nde İstanbul Barosu
Başkanlığınca Yapılan Basın Toplantısı Metni," (The Text of the Press 
Conference Organized by the Istanbul Bar Association at the 
Journalists Association on February 21, 1990) p.2.
During the period in question there appeared to be many articles 
published on the issue in various newspapers. Among them exemplary 
®re. Uğur Mumcu, "Baro Olayı," (The Bar Association Event) Cumhuriyet 
(Istanbul daily), February 22, 1990; Yazgülü Aldoğan, "Hukuk Emirden 
(üstündür," (Law is Prior to Order) Günaydın (Istanbul daily), 
February 22, 1990.
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among the international community of legal professionals. 
The stance of the International Bar Association - a 
federation of 124 Bar associations and law societies from 
75 countries representing over 2.5 million lawyers - and 
the CCBE - the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of 
the European Community, representing 300,000 lawyers - is 
exemplary in this respect.
In the letter that the head of the CCBE, sent to the 
Minister of Justice, the views of this organization was 
summarized as follows:
The issue, as we see it, is merely that a 
decision by legitimately established 
representatives of the profession should be 
frustrated by an act of the government and, 
moreover, that the representative body of the 
profession should be dissolved by such an act 
is wholly unacceptable to the members of the 
European legal profession. My European 
colleagues and I cannot but regard this 
conduct as contrary to the fundamental rights 
of the profession and wholly incompatible 
with even the minimum standards to which any 
community should adhere.
Urging the government and the Ministry of Justice to 
respect the independence of the profession and withdraw 
the case as soon as possible, the IBA has shared the same 
point of view with that of CCBE. As mentioned in a letter
For the full text of the letter see 1988-1990 Dönemi Istanbul 
Barosu Yönetim Kurulu Çalışma Raporu, p.20.
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that had been sent to Ozal who was the President of the 
Republic then, the IBA had considered the act of the 
Ministry as violating the Concluding Document of the CSCE 
Conference, which stated that "The independence of the 
legal practitioners will be recognized and protected, in 
particular as regards conditions for recruitment and 
practice.
The case had been dismissed due to the cancellation 
of the Article 141 of the Turkish Penal Code,- which had 
been the reason of the dismissal of the member from the 
Istanbul Bar Association -, by the Code on Prevention of 
Terror, adopted by the Motherland Party government in 
spring 1991. While leaving a very negative mark on the 
relationship of the Ministry and the bar associations, 
such an act of bringing a law suit against the bar 
association by the Ministry had perhaps been the most 
striking indicator of the paradox of Motherland Party 
governments whose motto was that of liberalization.
86 For the full text of the letter, see ibid., p. 25.
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Chapter Six
CONCLUSION
The present study has focused on the bar associations 
in Turkey from the perspective of the relationship 
between the state and interest group associations. While 
examining the historical evolution and thus the 
institutionalization process of bar associations by 
giving reference to the development of the profession of 
attorneyship, the study, necessarily extended itself to 
the examination of the judicio-legal issues which 
constitute the main sphere of interface between the bar 
associations and the state.
It was possible to categorize the historical 
development of bar association-state relationship into 
five different periods, each signifying a different stage 
of institutionalization both for the bar associations as 
interest groups as well as their interface with the 
state. While making it possible to show the links between 
the development of bar associations, their goal setting, 
their goal achievement, their policies, as well as their 
position vis-a-vis the state and the shifts in the 
judicio-legal and political milieu of different periods 
in Ottoman-Turkish history, such a categorization has 
important implications for evaluating the points of 
continuity and the change in the historical evolution of 
the relationship, its nature and the institutionalization 
of the associations.
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In the light of the present study, the Ottoman 
period, specifically the era starting with Tanzimat 
reforms can be labelled as a period of early 
institutionalization. The period mainly witnessed the 
legal formation of bar associations in the polity. 
However, during the period, the Bar Association of 
Istanbul, then the only bar association, established in 
1876, has largely remained immature both qualitatively 
and quantitatively. In this respect, the religio-ethnic 
and educational heterogeneity among the members of the 
association on one hand and the novel formal recognition 
and definition of attorneyship as a legal profession on 
the other have been the main factors that prevented the 
bar association from developing professional idealism and 
solidarity. Although in the early twentieth century, 
there appeared to be a dynamism in terms of defending and 
formulating the professional interests, the Istanbul Bar 
Association in the Ottoman period had usually been not 
very active in this respect. Mostly engaging in routine 
matters like disciplinary procedures and financial 
matters, the Association was far from being an interest 
group association during the nineteenth century and 
stayed no more than a supervisory body, with the -major 
purpose of checking and controlling the profession on 
behalf of the Ministry of Justice.
The Kemalist Era has been the second stage in the 
historical evolution of bar associations. The period is 
significant in terms of institutionalization the 
associations. It was an era during which the
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associational and professional identification of the bars 
developed for the first time. The newly enacted codes 
defined the rights, duties and responsibilities of the 
profession. A new type of professional who would have no 
links with the mentality of the Ottoman past was created. 
The Kemalist cadre tried to mould out a new profile for 
the bar associations based on the values of Western legal 
and political culture. In fact, what has happened during 
the period was a total restructuration both at the 
professional as well as at the associational levels and 
thus the creation of pro-regime associations under the 
tight control of the state. In fact, although the bar 
associations still elicited an immature and passive 
portrait vis-a-vis the state in terms of formulation and 
defense of their interests, it was during this period 
that the seeds of the future bar associations were 
thrown.
The 1950-1980 period that constitutes the third stage 
in the process of associational development, can be 
regarded as the period of consolidation. It has been 
mainly during this period that the image of the bar 
associations as institutionalized interest groups was 
consolidated. During the 1950s what had been experi-enced 
by the bar associations was an activation in their 
internal dynamics rather than a rise in their involvement 
in the political system as interest group associations 
which turned out to be the case during the 1960-1980 
period. Being a reflection of the newly developed multi­
party politics as well as the extension of the socio­
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political role of attorneys, first seeds of politics have 
been sown into the bar associations which for the most 
part transformed them into arenas where party politics 
were discussed. Besides such a development, which had its 
long term effects as a rise in the sensitivity towards 
socio-political issues, the extension of professional 
idealism as well as solidarity among the bar associations 
had been other important characteristics of the period. 
The 1950s had characteristics of a preparatory stage for 
the formation of a dynamic portrait of the bar 
associations throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
It was during the late 1960s and 1970s that the bar 
associations completed their institutionalization 
process. The most significant development here had been 
the establishment Turkish Union of Bar Associations, the 
peak association for all the bar associations in Turkey. 
The establishment of the TUBA re-provoked a debate, 
namely the problem of their autonomy vis-a-vis the state. 
The legal status of TUBA that involved the tutelage of 
the Ministry of Justice over the Association, always 
constituted the basis of their critical attitude towards 
the state during the recent decades.
Besides the intensification of the issue of autonomy, 
what basically distinguished the bar associations of the 
1970s from the early stages had been the visible 
extension of their issue spectrum. In this respect, they 
had a critical stance towards the state and political 
elites, specifically with respect to the letters' 
attitudes on judicial and legal issues as well as
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preservation of democracy and the rule of law that in the 
final analysis led to a sharp rise in the conflict 
between the state and the bar associations.
The 1980s had been a stage of strict opposition of 
the bar associations towards the state. Having completed 
their institutionalization process during the 1960s and 
the 1970s, in the 1980s, the bar associations were now 
fully institutionalized interest groups with well defined 
professional and socio-political consciousness. It was 
also during the 1980s that the bar associations were put 
under strict control and supervision of the state both 
within the framework of the 1982 Constitution and the 
codes enacted in this respect. Being placed under the 
strict administrative and financial control of the 
Ministry of Justice, that made the bar associations 
critical of the state more than ever.
Besides the issue of autonomy, however, it was also 
the violations in the sphere of law that had its effects 
on this conflictuel relationship during the 1980s. As 
perceived and often declared by the bar associations, the 
late 1980s signified a period of crisis in the judicio- 
legal sphere. In fact, what best described and largely 
differentiated the 1980s from other periods in, the 
history of bar associations had been the mutual and 
fervent opposition between the bar associations and the 
state, even reaching to a stage of perceiving each other 
as enemies. While the bar associations directly
criticised and attacked the state for its policies 
concerning the judicio-legal as well as professional
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sphere, the state in turn tried to repress and control 
them whenever possible.
In its broadest sense, the historical evolution of 
the bar associations presented unmistakable signs of an 
potential conflict in their relationship with the state. 
In fact, often the relationship turned out to be a 
struggle of the bar associations intending to maximize
their influence for influencing the state policies in
line with their interests and values and an effort on the 
part of the state to maintain its autonomy and to 
minimize interference in its affairs. These attitudes on 
the part of the state and the bar associations towards 
each other can be explained in terms of some interrelated 
factors. The unique position of the Turkish state vis-a- 
vis civil society, its dominance in the judicio-legal 
sphere, and the institutionalization level of the bar
associations constitude the main points that deserve 
attention in this respect.
One of the most striking points which has been common 
to all the stages in the historical evolution of bar 
associations has been the continuity in the negative
stance of the state towards the associations. The case of 
bar associations does not constitute an exception-.- The 
state in the Turkish context, has been aloof from the 
"squabbles" of particular interests and undertook into 
itself the duty to pursue a Rousseanian general will. 
While protecting its autonomy, as a distinct sector, that 
is managing its functions independently, the state has 
also been sovereign in the sense of defining and trying
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to attain the goals for the society. Accordingly, the 
state in Turkey appeared to be a very active and dominant 
participant in all aspects of the political process, thus 
having a superordinate position vis-a-vis the bar 
associations. Any group having the potential of 
challenging the state was closely controlled by the 
state. This had been the case for the bar associations, 
too. In fact, it has been this unique characteristic of 
the Turkish state that has prevented Turkish interest 
group politics from displaying the characteristics of 
neither pluralism nor different versions of corporatism - 
state and societal.
As far as pluralism is concerned, it needs a state 
that is responsive to civil society. The state acts as an 
arbitrator among the conflicting demands presented by the 
interest groups in determining official policy. The 
state's ability to act on its own initiative is 
downgraded. While the interest groups shape the state 
action, the state elites lack the capacities and 
inclination to distance themselves from the pressures and 
constraints applied by the interest groups. With the 
mentioned characteristics of the Turkish state, as 
constituting a good example of a strong state and. thus 
having its capacities and traditional will in keeping all 
the civil societal elements at bay, pluralist politics 
has never flourished in Turkey.
As for neo-corporatism, it necessitates a harmonious 
relationship between the state and interest groups as 
basing itself on a bargaining process between the two. In
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neo-corporatist type of interest group politics, the 
basic point is to reconcile the general and the sectional 
interests which bases itself on a process of regular 
consultations between the interest groups and the state 
elites for the making of public decisions. As already 
mentioned, such a state of affair is also alien to the 
Turkish experience. Instead of satisfying their 
interests, the interest groups turned out to be actors 
who presumably serve the general interest which is 
determined by the state elites themselves.
In the Turkish case the interest group politics has 
not shown the characteristics of state corporatism, 
either. In contrast to some arguments which are based on 
the existence of a state corporatist form of relationship 
between the interest groups and the state, especially in 
the early Republican era^ there appears to be enough 
evidence of differentiating the period from the cases of 
state corporatism. As also indicated by Metin Heper, the 
most significant point in this respect has been the 
"differentiation of the state from the interests".^ in 
fact, during the Republican period, there was an absence 
of an alliance between the state and the interest groups, 
in contrast to the Italian case under the rule of 
Mussolini - a perfect example of state corporatism -
 ^ Exemplary is Taha Parla, Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de 
Korporatizm (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989).
 ^Metin Heper, "The State and Interest Groups with Special Reference 
to Turkey," in Strong State and Economic Interest. Groups, The Post- 
1980 Turkish Experience Metin Heper, ed. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1991), p.20.
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where there appeared to be a fundamental interdependence 
between the state and the groups in question.^ In fact, 
in the Turkish case, the state as rather than being a 
fusion of interests, has always been above them and thus 
acting as a guardian over the civil society.
Secondly, besides the unique position of the state 
vis-a-vis the civil society as mentioned above, what is 
significant in the framework of the state-bar association 
relationship has been the policies of the state in the 
judicio-legal sphere. They constituted one of the most 
significant area of interface between the state and the 
bar associations.
In fact, it was the extent of dominance of the state 
in this specific field that primarily determined the 
nature of its relationship with the bar associations. As 
being a variable closely related to the degree of 
stateness in a polity, the incorporation of law into the 
state had a two-sided impact on the state-bar association 
relationship. First, this situation left little room for 
the bar associations either to bargain with the state or 
be effective in terms of judicio-legal issues. And there 
existed neither pluralist nor institutionalized give and 
take between the state and the bar associations. Rather 
than having direct access to ministers and civil
 ^ Peter J. Williamson, Varieties of Corporatism A Conceptual 
Discussion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.83. For 
the Spanish case under the rule of Franco as being another example of 
state corporatism, see Joe Foweraker, "Corporatist Strategies and the 
Transition to Democracy in Spain," Latin American Research Review 20 
(1985), pp.61-95.
245
servants, the activities of the bar associations often 
took the shape of campaigning and protest. Secondly, it 
eventually made the bar associations as eager as the 
state to be dominant in the field, a legacy of their 
socialization along statist lines dating back to the 
Kemalist era.
From time to time each side viewed the other as a 
threat to its own ability to act independently. This 
became specifically the case where there appeared to be 
deviations from the ideal model, as perceived by the bar 
associations which was based on the division of labor 
between law and politics. Any "interference" in the legal 
sphere by the bar associations constituted a ground for 
conflict.
Another aggravating factor in the ongoing conflict 
between the bar associations and the state has been the 
very institutionalization of the bar associations. The 
bar associations evolved into cohesive and continuously 
functioning organizations that ideally presumes regular 
human and financial resources, a stable membership, 
immediate operational objectives associated with
philosophies that are broad enough to endow them with a 
potential to bargain with the governments over, the 
application of specific legislation or the achievement of 
particular concessions. However, rather than producing 
the desired changes in their overall level of interest 
group power over state policies, such a change in the 
institutionalization level of bar associations largely 
served to intensify the conflict in their relationship
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with the state. As has been the case for any
institutionalized association the bar associations not 
only worked to achieve the goals laid down for it, but 
they also embodied certain values that brought them face 
to face with the state. These primarily denoted the 
values deriving from the secular European legal and 
political culture that were introduced by the Kemalist 
Revolution. Having a significant place in shaping the 
policies of bar associations, these set of values, too 
brought bar associations into conflict with the state.
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